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approach to several trends termed
“ecopsychology.” This work attempts
to bring light to some of the
misconceptions that have hardened as
“ecopsychology,” as these ideas have
been reinterpreted and sometimes
oversimplified by the general public and
some professionals outside mainstream
psychology. Part of the confusion
arose when “ecopsychology” became
inadequately amalgamated with other
ideas. Nevertheless, within the social
and behavioral sciences, at least, there
is great value in devising and applying
evidence-based strategies that track
the normative ramifications dealing
with cognition, emotion and behavior,
exploring how or why humans relate
to natural processes in a wide range of
ways.
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“In any case, the scientist’s good reputation has been
assured for quite some time now. Nature can no longer
reveal itself in any sort of human form and every
step forward in science has effaced from nature an
anthropomorphic trait.”
(Jacques Lacan, Écrits, Discussion of the Objective Value
of the Experience, 1999: 69)
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Foreword

I discovered Alan Drengson and his “The Trumpeter: A Journal

of Ecosophy” during its 2nd year of publication. Shortly after I
became a Reviewer and then Contributing Editor. Two decades
later I found myself unexpectedly accepting the position of
Editor-in-Chief. Deciding then to re-visit one of my favorite
writers, I sent out a call-for-papers for two Special Issues of the
journal dedicated to Paul Shepard.
One of the ﬁrst papers submitted delighted me so much that
I emailed the author to request a chat by phone. He acquiesced
and that is how Dr. Jorge Conesa-Sevilla and I became friends
and colleagues.
Bill Devall was Dr. Conesa-Sevilla’s mentor at Humboldt
State University and mine during my ﬁrst few attempts at
editing The Trumpeter. Dr. Conesa-Sevilla and I are both taken
by Paul Shepard’s work and have become friends of his wife
Flo Shepard. Alan Drengson has been inﬂuential in our doing,
thinking and writing.
Dr. Conesa-Sevilla has kindly sent me excerpts and papers
over the years and I have been delighted to read them. As a
Managing Editor of the Trumpeter for several years he and I
often discussed submissions from folks both eminent and of
lesser renown. That we seemed to be in agreement most of the
time, is I think, a testament to our shared knowledge and values.
As Dr. Conesa-Sevilla has mentioned in Chapter Four, he
has been sitting Zazen for many years. I have been playing
Taijiquan, Qigong and Zhan Zhuang for 35 years. With our
mutual friend, Terry Keenan (Keenan Roshi), we have published
a small book of poetry: “The Way of Stubbed Toes and Bruised
Knees”. All this from a chance meeting (but aren’t all meetings
by chance?)
Dr. Conesa-Sevilla’s interests in semiotics, deep ecology and
ecosophy have informed his thinking and writing for decades.
He has developed a command of these areas second to none and
is respected globally for his insight. He is a foundering member
of the European Ecopsychology Society. His voice is one that
ix

all people concerned about ecosophy and sustainability ought to
know and understand.
In personal communication, Dr. Conesa-Sevilla’s told me
some of his reasons for this text. There are, obviously, additional
reasons but in my opinion, these are fundamental:
1. Revisit the history and changing deﬁnitions “ecopsychology”
2. Introduce students to thoughtful examinations and deconstructions of terms commonly used in deep ecology,
“ecopsychology,” and ecosophy
3. To develop “a more scholarly approach to the study of
‘nature aﬃliations’”
Has Dr. Conesa-Sevilla achieved his aims? Certainly,
from my perspective he has, exceptionally. As a text for
both researchers and students it is “chock full” of historical
information and detailed analyses. It will be a standard reference
text for some time.
Years ago, I stumbled upon a new friend and
We walked together along unfamiliar paths.
Deepening our budding relationship.
Some years later, my special friend and I
Continued our journey on now familiar paths
Appreciating our ﬂowering association.
Now my cherished friend and I have found new paths
To stroll and new byways to explore, at leisure.
As we explore moments of mutual awareness.
Michael T. Caley, PhD
Edmonton, Alberta June 2017
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Preface
“Signification has […] two references, one to the thing indicated,
and the other to the response, to the instance and to the meaning
of the idea. It denotes and connotes. When the symbol is used
for the one, it is a name. When it is used for the other, it is a
concept.” (G. H. Mead)

The first draft for this work was completed in June of 2013.

Since then, and while exchanging notes with colleagues around
the world, major edits were done to do justice and service to
many perspectives and conversations. Despite the seeming
plurality of these points of view, usually, the conversations fell
into two groups. One spoke from a transpersonal perspective
and the other from more philosophical and even scientific bases.
Missing from these voices, it seemed to me at the time and
even today, was a willingness to deal with the question of self
in nature (eigen-umwelt) from a deconstructive or beginner’s
perspective. That is, various individuals speaking from these
perspectives seemed to be sold on a particular idea or committed
to a point of view that was satisfactory to them and that justified
their careers and endeavors. Repeatedly, I observed the usual
tactic of beginning a discussion at the self-nature (eigen-umwelt)
level of discourse in order to justify and argue for a preferred and
ultimately idiosyncratic eigen-mitwelt (self-society) formulation
(e.g. there were no academic disciplines—science—in the time
of our ancestors, therefore, children do not need schooling).
Generally speaking, conversations about “ecopsychology”
wound up avoiding basic questions that most social scientists,
philosophers, or natural scientists would have addressed as a
matter of interest, discipline and as an obligation to the noble
enterprise of foundational inquiry.
From June of 2013 to May of 2015, and during my spare time
and academic breaks since, I have endeavored to capture and
distill the essence of these conversations. However, it occurred
to me that new ways of thinking and looking at these problems
were needed. Thus, this work as a whole is doing two things:
xi
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addressing, revising, and updating the content of these conversations while formulating new idea structures that can help us
revisit what we all think we understand when we use the tag
“ecopsychology.”
What is “Ecopsychology”?
Generally defined, “ecopsychology” is an interest area
in psychology and other disciplines. Unlike many officially
sanctioned and recognized fields such as Cognitive Psychology
or Psychoanalysis, “ecopsychology” is a collection of viewpoints
and stances aiming to elucidate the relationship between human
health and wellbeing, and natural processes (i.e., ‘nature’). “Ecopsychology” goes one step further by intending to say something
‘normative’ about these relationships. Whether its deontology is
based on actual scientific findings (evolutionary science, human
ecology, ecology) or on humanistic grounds (transpersonal
psychology, narrative psychology, humanistic psychology), the
intent is to define “nature connection” as a basic synergy toward
authentic being.
The above (permeable) classification is an advantage, for
“ecopsychological” inquiry and practice can be an important
focus in any other field.
Despite the present critique, I agree that some reiteration of
thoughtful, evidence-based, and scholarly serious approaches
to “ecopsychological problems” can be very useful when these
ideas are implemented as “therapies.” I believe that this endeavor
is sorely needed as we face almost intractable global problems
of our own making. Furthermore, I think that to the extent that
mainstream psychology has neglected basic formulations of
eigen-mit-umwelten (self-society-nature) in favor of, in an anthropocentric manner, eigen-mitwelten (self-society) relations,
it has done a great disservice to a more inclusive understanding
of what it is to be a human being. Any psychologist who agrees
with the latter criticism is already or is on her way to being an
“ecopsychologist.”
One of the problems, however, with the tag “ecopsychology” is that it implies, confounds, or reiterates both new and old
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meanings. The old, and without the tag, pertains to contrasts
and descriptions as old as civilization, or more precisely, as
long as there has been an obvious cultural schism between
“the countryside” and “the city”—resulting in psychologically different modes of perception, social organizations, and
health. By any other name “ecopsychology” has been and
continues to be a collection of observations--a critique--that
amassing hordes of people inside citadels is not the best way
to experience life—to derive its fullest and most authentic
meanings. This criticism, then and today, elevates country
living, the pastoral, and even “wildness” to an idealistic qualitatively higher status; never mind that human psychology can
never hide its shortcomings and inadequacies. Specific ideas
(philosophies and interventions) on how to address and correct
the deficiencies caused by the schism, the countryside-the city,
have sprung up since long before Lao Tzu walked away from
humanity, Epicurus founded his garden, and Diogenes ran
around naked.
Whether framed in negative terms, terms of “deficiency,”
expressed as nostalgia for simpler times, or as folk psychological
and cultural wisdom, some of the “ecopsychological insights” or
proposals derived from more careful observations are:
1. The countryside (The Pastoral) is intrinsically virtuous.
2. “Happiness” is to be found in these simpler and more
frugal interactions (times, recollections, activities).
3. Alienation and estrangement from “nature” (The Pastoral)
may result in illness and unhappiness (morbidity,
cynicism, fetishism, “dysfunctions”).
4. A return to the countryside (to “wildness,” to “nature”)
reestablishes a genuine “connection”—bestows or
renews virtue.
5. Undue social complexity and urban development carry
costs, foreseen and unforeseen, where fewer individuals
stand to benefit, albeit usually in meaningless and unfulfilling ways, while many others sacrifice much more and
receive much less.
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6. Neglect or carelessness of deeper, actual or potential,
relational meanings and affections (nature affiliations)
inherent in self-nature gestalts can be read as non-biophilic tendencies and even psychological dysfunction.
The above list can be extended to include particular cases
and ethereal arguments, regional idyll poetry exalting the virtues
and wisdom of “a place” or of “a people” and of “its ways.”
When we include all of the above, “ecopsychology’s” meaning
and aims alternate between “consciousness raising,” changing
behaviors, changing attitudes, changing lifestyles, changing
discourse, changing language, changing culture and changing
societies— revisiting “nature connection” norms.
So, in all the senses that matter, “ecopsychology,” new and
old, stands for a symptom, or a collection of symptoms, of some
larger combination of problems that bear down on a troubled
population, on the very core of who we are as natural beings. To
the extent that the most recent reiterations of ecopsychological
sentiments emerged during the 1960s and progressed in tandem
with other green movements, it is too a symptom and a nascent
awareness of the implications of existing in a new context of
urban and suburban life, the pernicious presence and consequences of an industrial, corporate, militarized ethos, and the
constant pressures to consume at an impractical and unjustified
pace—the degeneration of good and simple values.
On the other hand, for any frugal group of humans who
lives closely to natural processes and organizes activities
around natural cycles, “ecopsychology” is a way of life taken
for granted, its implications clear, a construct that needs no
definition or scholarly affirmation.
Meanings
In our desperation, eagerness, ignorance, and necessity to
“live meaningful lives,” and with the specific aim to deduce
what each of us understands by “nature” or “connection,” to
discover it for ourselves, “ecopsychology” is newly represented
by a plethora of ideas and presenters whose claims and proposals
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are neither new, original, nor completely tested in their efficacy
to close the almost incommensurable gulf that exists for most
people, between “modern, neurotic life” and “idyllic country
living.”
At the heart of the inability of professional nature apologizers
or enthusiasts to “sell nature” is a lack of rigor when it comes to
adopting or defining terms. A good number of self-appointed and
self-defined “ecopsychologists” simply adopt some idealized
version of “indigenous wisdom,” some version of “sustainability,” some “mindful practice,” some social or behavioral platform
particular to their interests and personal peeves (e.g., eco-feminism, environmental justice, healthy food, animal rights), and
produce their unique version of “ecopsychology.”
Meanwhile, and more importantly, few of these proposals
and idiosyncratic admixtures ever question the validity or actual
usefulness of coopting very specific indigenous or traditional
practices or deconstruct in a convincing and rigorous manner
what the terms “nature,” “connection,” “spiritual ecology,”
“spirit,” “mind,” or “consciousness” mean.
That is, to the extent that terms and/or constructs such as
“mind,” “soul,” “consciousness,” and/or “spirit” are used interchangeably, on purpose, with the intention to obfuscate,
inadvertently and in ignorance, or out of laziness, the enterprises
collectively referred to as “ecopsychology” diminish in their
discourse value to persuade a host of social and behavioral
scientists, the more discerning public, and policy makers that
“nature matters,” that our personal and collective relationships
to “nature” are central to well-being.
Much of this book is an exercise in the deconstruction of
terminology that is often employed in “green circles” and is
assumed to have universal meanings. These criticisms can be
seen as a general failure of misunderstanding and misusing
metaphors as concrete and untested meanings. For example,
when a cognitive scientist employs the word “mind,” one
assumes that s/he means brain processes and not “spirit.” When
the same group of professionals employ the word “consciousness,” one also assumes that they mean some sort of brain
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module (or collection of circuitry) whose function is to collate a
seemingly unified experience (s) into qualia—that it has survival
value. I do not assume that they mean that “consciousness” is
“the human soul.”
Non-experts, who employ the above tags interchangeably, do
so for reasons that could, generally and specifically, be described
as non-scientific. This book would end right here if we were to
claim that all “ecopsychologists” are disinterested in matters of
science. In this case, the claim “I feel connected to nature and
believe that nature has agency—a thing that has consciousness—
and will heal me if I only behave in a ceremonious sort of way,”
is the beginning and the closing argument for “ecopsychology.”
Similarly, the claim “I feel connected to a god-head (a
grand spirit) and believe that this being has agency—a thing
that has consciousness—and will heal me if I only behave in a
ceremonious sort of way,” could be, equally, the beginning and
the closing argument about the “nature of things.”
However, to the extent that many people “live off the land”
(cultivate, hunt, or fish), seek out recreation in natural or wild
places, study nature dynamics and processes with avid affection
and curiosity, or generally enjoy the immersion of self in
nature, that is, otherwise experience deeply felt and authentic
“connections” but do not give a hoot about “spirit,” then one
must question whether “nature” or “connection” means the same
thing to everybody.
Therefore, and for the most part, the phrase “nature
connections” will be substituted with, “nature affiliations,” to
suggest, throughout this book, long term, deeply psychological,
and more integral ways of thinking about self-nature gestalts.
Generally speaking, “ecopsychology” is an important
enterprise to the extent that some people may feel very strongly
that preparing for or averting the environmental wows that are
sure to visit us (that are now occurring because of human-caused
activities) involves all people, regardless of how we engage in/
with natural spaces. To put it simply, either “ecopsychology”
is a continuation and transliteration of nature spiritual practices
applied to modern problems, or a systemic enterprise that seeks
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to resolve what “nature” and “connection” mean in light of the
complexities of modern life. Proponents of Integral Ecology
may balk at this dichotomous presentation, but on the other
hand, a bumblebee flies on gossamer magical wings and fairy
dust, and that is why it flies, or the aerodynamics of its uniquely
shaped wings beating against air at a certain speed keep it alight.
One of these proposals is falsifiable and thus scientific, the other
is not. One describes, makes specific predictions, and improves
our understanding of the natural world, the other does not.
In the above context, the term “greenwashing” can also
be used to describe the dumbing down of complex, scientific
ecological ideas (e.g., human ecology, environmental philosophy,
anthropological ecology, evolutionary science) into a facile,
perfunctory, and/or idiosyncratic set of slogans that individuals
themselves habitually employ. As in the case of companies
attempting to do the same with profit in mind, “ecopsychology”
can take this propaganda form.
Organization of this book
This book will make specific arguments and raise questions
with regard to the dubious practical usefulness of coopting failed
“magical” solutions to attempt to solve very complex problems.
Green movements in the humanities, social and behavioral
sciences seemed very hopeful at first and made specific promises
with regard to a shift toward “green consciousness” which never
materialized at a scale that made a difference. Their failure to do
so is examined here.
The arguments and questions unfold across eight chapters,
as follows:
Chapter One: For whom do the “nature” bells toll? Various
forms of “identification in/with nature” are explored, including
individual and collective projections onto “nature.” Historical
and cross-cultural modes of “nature connection” are examined
from psychological and anthropological perspectives which
suggest and predict that no single approach or perspective in
ecopsychology has primacy over others.
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Chapter Two: Ten Misconceptions About Ecopsychology Taken-for-granted notions of what “ecopsycholgy” is or what its
practitioners do are revisited while employing a ‘misconceptions’ framework. From this perspective, “ecopsychology”
endeavors are shown to be potentially interdisciplinary and even
open-ended.
Chapter Three: Nature Affiliations: Self-Nature Gestalts The
phrase ‘nature connections’ is substituted with another, ‘nature
affiliations’ to suggest and inquire about deeper Self-Nature
Gestalt ‘connections.’ Different psychological approaches
are revisited and modified so they can be employed, as social
scientific models, to describe and assess various types and
processes here defined as ‘nature affiliations.’
Chapter Four: Deconstructing Origins The recent history of
“ecopsychology” has been multi-claimed and/or coopted by
various groups attempting to legitimize their own origins and
practices. A critical examination of these claims is undertaken
based on archival data.
Chapter Five: Psycho-Phenology: Applications of Ecological
Panarchy to Psycho-Ecological Systems A dynamic and systems
approach, Panarchy, to psycho-ecological thinking is introduced.
Ideas of sustainability and resilience across several association
levels are revisited as natural cycles of all systems that can be
said to be “ecological.”
Chapter Six: Nature as Madness A recurring theme in the ecopsychology literature is that a certain proxy agency, “nature,”
is directly responsible for healing, transpersonal processes, and
other transformational events. In this sense, nature is understood
as having produced or played a role in maintaining a sort of
“madness.” In the context of this work, the word “madness”
signifies the free flow of accommodations necessary in order to
survive an environment constantly in flux.
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Chapter Seven: We Know What We Know and Make Up the
Rest Some factions within ecopsychology have overplayed the
“spirit in nature” slogan or metaphor—and made money from
it. At the same time, these factions are rejecting scientific methodologies and data that would be valuable to anyone who is
concerned with the importance of sound scientific designs put to
the service of human health and planetary stability. They are the
nature mysterians (Dennett, 1995).
Chapter Eight: The Murmuration of Transfixitive “Wants” The
value of ecopsychological discourse is undeniable if its proposals
are consistent with established and testable paradigms (evolutionary science). When ecopsychological discourse is too idiosyncratic,
extant from evaluative norms and processes, then it runs the risk
of misrepresenting “nature” and “nature connections” entirely.
Epilogue: Feathers, Crystals, and Plenty of Whiskey--in the
Apocalypse Surely, we have never before stood teetering
between rapidly evolving technologies whose use and effects
cannot be duly vetted, a culture of universal glut, and the deterioration and corruption of so many natural systems, at once,
without the benefit of past generations—recent memories—to
advise and dissuade us of our folly, if it is simply folly. Appendix
I: Marg and Précis. Appendix II: Illustrates applications of formulations presented in Chapter Five.
Throughout this work, the words ecopsychology, nature,
and connection, as well as others, often appear in quotations.
This is to signify, in all cases, that personal and idiosyncratic ideas of what these terms mean, vary greatly. It is assumed
that, presently, no definitive semiotic rendition can satisfactorily summarize all the meanings implied by these complex and
confounded constructs or interactions. When these terms appear
without quotes, they refer to specific applications, kinds, views,
descriptions, reiterations, or classes with specific signification
that is apparent in context.
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As far as science can inform us, never has humanity been
universally threatened by its own actions this perversely, nor been
so “efficient” at altering so many Earth systems at once without
the hope of rectifying the consequences of its own actions.
As far as history can inform us, never has humanity been so
universally acculturated into gluttonous patterns of consumption
that defy the logic of sustainably obtaining sufficient necessities
that make an individual healthy and secure.
With most of pre-history and history having been populated
by humans who one supposes lived in more sustainable
relationships with their natural surroundings, albeit in existentially precarious and frugal conditions, disturbingly, none of their
collective “wisdom” was able to offset the quick-and-dirty precipitation of “bad culture.” It seems highly questionable, then,
that coopted and “greenwashed” wisdom, incomplete in form
and content and lacking scientific methodologies, will succeed
as a credible cantilever against these multi-determined forces.
For all these reasons, a self-critiquing, evolving, and scientifically based reiteration of “ecopsychology” is needed and will
be needed for generations to come. If nothing else, it is necessary
to understand why humans are this self-deceptive in particular
and general ways to the point of collective self-destruction and
imminent oblivion. Equally, and across psychological work,
it is necessary to understand why humans persist in delusion
or wishful thinking as part of self-deception during times of
collective self-destruction and imminent oblivion.
Finally, throughout this book, the principal argument, in
various forms and under several guises, is the exploration of a
fundamental contradiction: to the extent that “ecopsychological” perspectives and similar approaches contain a high degree
of humanism, they fail to fully have trust in and live up to the
phrase and deep ecological sentiment, “the intrinsic value of
nature.” That is to say, when “ecopsychological” perspectives
and similar approaches replace the open-ended enigma that is
“nature” with yet another absolutist and recognizable form of
anthropocentric and idiosyncratic thinking, they fail at the very
task of promoting the opposite ideal: an inclusive but humbling
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description of humanity, scaled way down to the inhabitation
of an almost insignificant portion of time and place within a
vast and unknowable cosmos which is utterly indifferent to our
needs or desires. To signify “human” as more than that, without
scientific evidence and on the basis of preferred over-simplifications, is to fall into the trap of anthropocentrism.

*

*

xxi

*

Chapter One
For Whom do the “Nature” Bells Toll?
“It has become fashionable to describe myths as though they
were entirely about the psychic life of humans. The cosmos is
exhausted as the projection of the unconscious life … Myths may
illuminate unconscious processes, but the context in which that
inner world came into being is ecological.” (Paul Shepard)

As

introduced earlier, “Ecopsychology” is a generic term
that encompasses the work of several disciplines and perspectives. What they have in common is the following: As theory,
science, or practice, “eco-psychology” assumes that there are
ideal (optimal) natural parameters that give rise to and maintain
physical and psychological health and sustainable communities.
To be “whole,” in a sense that matters, in a sense that directly
impacts our understanding of “human nature,” means to be an
integral part of the natural world.
The closer these existential parameters resemble evolutionary, ancient, and traditional-sustainable modes of “being,” the
more likely it is that humans will be “whole”--physically and
psychologically healthy.
In this context, to be an integral human being has always
meant having hourly or daily access to natural spaces--being
physical-a deep understanding of these natural environments,
and an authentic identification with various aspects of nature
and relations within small-scale human communities in a way
such that they were all one and the same (integral).
By logical extension, nature alienation implies a breakage
or rupture—a disorganization—of the integrity of these evolutionary, ancient, and traditional interrelations. However,
“ecopsychological” questions, approaches and practices
examine both the causes of the human-nature rupture and also
the means of reconciling these factors and forces toward optimal
wellbeing, including failures to make truly integral affiliations.
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Because “ecopsychological” questions, approaches and
practices are diverse and come from multiple areas of interest,
these examinations also include, for some professionals,
questions about spirituality, the integration of both male and
female roles (principles), and sensual or intimate modes of
human nature interactions.
These diverse approaches are worth studying to the extent
that an “identification with nature” is a psychological projection,
and individuals will interpret this identification in ways that are
personally meaningful and thus satisfying.
When it comes to studying “human-nature-connections”
from both ecologically and psychologically credible (i.e.,
useful, evidence-based, pragmatic, scientific) perspectives, it
pays to ask the question: “Who interprets ‘nature’ and for what
reason(s)?” For the poet, a hunter, an ecologist, a pagan, a hiker,
or a miner, “nature” may be very different things.
From both a psychological and an ecological perspective,
asking the question “Who interprets ‘nature’ and for what reason
(s)?”, leads one into a study of motivations (goals & objectives),
behaviors, and thinking—a study of Psyche-Natur.
As a self-reflective tool or process, the same question is likely
to deepen our affiliation potential when immersed in natural environments. As foundational questions go, it is the disciplined
query that sustains reflection, that reduces the probability of
hubris, and that ultimately enumerates and elucidates basic psychological commodities regarding nature affiliation.
Without this basic deconstructive groundwork, we are left
with muddled, confusing, and even contradictory proposals.
Attributions
Our many direct ancestors and those of closely related
species, some of whom are now known to have contributed to our
human genome (e.g. Neanderthal), faced the daily challenges of
survival and opportunities for thriving, and equally, from time to
time, catastrophic situations that brought some of those species
to the brink of extinction. Some died out completely. Their
collective wisdom, their “magic,” their exquisite knowledge of
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flora, fauna, and atmospherics did not prevent the cyclical or
surprising lethality of natural disasters and accelerated modernization.
That is, their collective wisdom, their “magic,” their inclusive
knowledge of flora, fauna, and atmospherics was applicable and
effective as long as the conditions of their existence did not vary
widely outside a limited set of critical functional and adaptive
parameters. Most of their collective wisdom and “magic” has
been lost to us and even when reinterpreted, it is very doubtful
that it could address the complexities of the deterioration and
spoilage of so many systems at once. To believe otherwise is
pure fantasy. They themselves did not or could not prevent—or
were themselves directly responsible for— the extinction of so
many species they depended on. Verily, wisdom and shortsightedness are oftentimes traveling companions on the same road.
With close to seven billion people on this planet and
millions already facing various degrees or forms of apocalyptic
doom-these large numbers acting as a buffer against complete extinction--and facing dramatic changes that are already happening
and surely will worsen by the end of this century, and even while
employing simple math, this could translate into many more
unknown millions suffering starvation and death. To be “happy”
in these troubled times brings up an immediate sense of guilt if
one cares even a little bit. To be affluent in these troubled times
seems more like a desperate acceptance and last gluttonous act
before dystopia fully settles in. It is already dystopia for millions
of human-animals and non-human animals.
One of the many ways green psychological practices are
carried out (thought about) is through various forms of identification in/with “nature,” with specific elements, entities or aspects
of nature, or with actual organisms. Whether these exercises
(interventions) are self-directed, mediated by somebody else,
or undertaken with others, they all have one thing in common:
they are projections of “self” (insecurities, certainties, questions,
hopes, vague assumptions), onto “nature,” however dimly
understood or defined. To the extent that these exercises are part
of personal growth practices, and every now and then, they do
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provide some insight into “self” or “nature,” and nobody gets
hurt badly, then they are innocuous enough and sometimes a
little helpful.
We could ask, “An ecopsychology that is innocuous enough
and sometimes a little helpful cannot be bad, right?” When
globally shared environmental problems are as grave as they
are and our sense of alienation is this acute, “innocuous and
sometimes a little helpful” may not be enough. At worst, the “feel
good” moments do not squarely address the darker depths and
truths that now define human relations in the ambit of ongoing
destabilizing natural systems.
That is, some aspects of “ecopsychology” do not seem
serious enough, adult enough, informed enough, and resemble
more the stuff that children would engage in when playing
‘house’ or ‘doctor’ or ‘fort in the forest’--‘tis infantile, and
if some of these less mature aspects of “ecopsychology” are
indeed, clinically infantile, they are significant in their own right
as a reflection of the psychology that drives these behaviors and
well-wishing.
In addition to channeling “animal spirits” while wearing
cardboard masks, there is no question that a chance meeting with
an actual wild creature in its own habitat could be an unforgettable experience. Some folks might even describe these encounters
as “magical.” Even a fleeting glimpse of a fox’s glyph-eye and
sinuous red body is likely to endure as a significant memory,
salient above many others. Such excitement is understandable,
and its energizing potential, its impressionistic value for making
us more aware of grander ecologies, of our humble place in their
habitats, cannot be underestimated.
Conversely, if one has little experience with wild animals,
understanding their behaviors and their ecological function,
these moments could also be exalted above and beyond their
basic reality experience. Meaning is added that makes this not
simply an encounter between two organisms in the forest, but
much more— depending on the semiotic interpreting agent.
Swimming with dolphins and all sorts of incidents or accidents
of “connection” become manufactured spirituality. By manu-
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factured spirituality, I mean the almost instinctive impulse to
describe any odd moment, however prosaic, as possessing an
otherworldly meaning. That is, any odd experience that the
observer sees/feels fit converges on the singular explanation
“miracle.” Attempting to understand why humans tend to do this
and, in particular, why they do this at all when interacting with
natural environments, is a question of interest for a scientifically-oriented “ecopsychology.”
The flight of the bumblebee is said to be “sacred” because the
person decides that it is, or somebody else decides for her, that it
is so. But is that all there is to a fox’s glyph-eye or a bumblebee’s
flight? The all-explaining moment, the all-inclusive explanation
that it is magical and it made someone feel good-special, seems
like a poor cousin to the myriad things we could understand
about foxes, or about foxes in forests— anatomy, physiology,
ecology--while gaining with this knowledge, more, not less
appreciation, sympathy, and even love for these creatures.
Although a rare, “special,” or unique experience can be translated
(designated or interpreted) as “spiritual” by an observer, on
a whim, it does not make it so if standards of objectivity and
rationality are applied.
In this chapter, we are also addressing a problem of “false
equivalence.” False equivalence occurs when there seems to be a
need to devote equal time to competing ideas, voices, ideologies,
and constructs. Democratic societies with truly independent
media tend to accommodate “opposing views” even when,
clearly, one side of the debate has rationality, experience, and
science on its side. The persistence of wanting to devote “equal
time” to debate the known against the unknown, data against
wishful thinking, began when modern so-called democratic
societies came into existence, when the scientific method did
not exist and citizens depended on their “opinions” to make
arguments, to express their points of view.
Truly, most scientists and the educated public do not think
there is a “debate” between evolution and creationism with
respect to their power to explain natural phenomena. Fallacies
of false equivalence aside, most scientists and the educated
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public do not think there is still a “debate” to be had between the
reality of human-caused climate change and a corporate effort to
continue making profits from dirty energy sources.
The list of “false debates” can be extended to plate tectonics,
the age of our planet, the similar genomes between humans and
bonobos, and the demise of thousands of species due to habitat
loss. No amount of equal time will erase the fact that genome
data, agreed to by most scientists across disciplines, describe
bonobos as primate kin. Scientists themselves constantly vet,
weigh, and judge the merits of new data and decide if these are
compelling, worthwhile, or not. They are the experts.
Interestingly, in mundane practical life, most of the time,
we do not think we know more than the plumber, an architect,
an electrician, an auto mechanic, our butcher, or our medical
doctor, when it comes to their knowledge, expertise, and ability
to solve the problems they are experts at addressing. In other
words, everybody would agree that, except in rare circumstances, our opinions are not on equal footing, do not count the same
or more, as those of experts. Experts deserve that designation
because of their demonstrable understanding, what they can do
and accomplish. Said differently, skills and knowledge matter
most, uninformed opinions and wishful thinking, less or not at
all.
When an “ecopsychologist” passes h/herself as an expert,
and the so-called expertise is ephemerally built upon well-wishes
and bad science, do we need to trust them at all?
Swimming with Dolphins and All Sorts of
“Magical” Incidents
Many years ago, while swimming with my brother and
cousin in the frigid Pacific Ocean waters near Seal Beach,
California, a most amazing event occurred, at least to us. All of
a sudden we were surrounded by a pod of a dozen or so of what
we later learned were common dolphins (Delphinus delphis).
I have encountered and handled wildlife before and since, but
this experience was then and continues today to be very unique.
Many elements came together to make it also special. It was
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sudden, we were swimming beyond our normal range and
comfort zone, it was a confirmable throng experience, and we
also felt extremely vulnerable and grateful that none of these
wild animals took any interest in us. They briefly surrounded
us and swam away with gracious porpoising speed. California
surfers experience what I just described routinely. To some of
them, these encounters are part of the excitement of being in the
water. Both, at least momentarily, share an out-of-the-ordinary
space and moment: two species regard one another and allow
each other to pass or engage one another in play.
Some people pay good money to swim with dolphins. They
report a similar sense of awe when they encounter an alien intelligence, animal “otherness,” so removed from our own, in such
an intimate and precarious situation.
Some people would (but I did not then, nor today) describe
similar experiences as “magical.” I am not sure if they are
using that word metaphorically, hoping even that magic was
happening, that is, imperfectly expressing in one word simultaneous emotions and sentiments too new and extant to express
otherwise. Others might be inspired to become marine biologists
after similar encounters. Another group might come to believe
that these dolphins were there for them, as part of some cosmic
dance and communication that is delightfully mysterious and
will be, forever, enigmatic and beyond scientific understanding. Finally, still others may exploit this sense of wonderment
and awe and make it into a profession where as “nature gurus”
they mediate and facilitate forces assumed also to be beyond
scientific understanding: They speak “for dolphin.”
It is a fair observation that a good number of ecopsychologists seek out this diverse platform as a means to express and
broadcast already deeply felt convictions--beliefs. Oftentimes,
ecopsychologists are coming from a transpersonal (humanistic)
psychology perspective already saturated with unknowns and
the giddiness of “mystery”: “spirit,” “Gaia consciousness,”
“collective unconsciousness,” and other gossamer winged
fantastic ideas. The transliteration from these collective beliefs
(this ‘text’) and their extension into “nature” and human-nature
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interactions come ready-made-affected by similar conclusions,
their transliteration made in very easy and confident steps
without questioning the underlying principles.
And therein lies the Achilles heel of most of what passes
for “ecopsychology”: the uncritical acceptance of one sort of
psychology under a new, green guise. Thus, it becomes a question
for detached, professional historians to inquire and describe
how this process came to be. Perhaps humanistic psychology
was already in decline at a moment when the green movement
provided a useful conduit-tonic for reiterating unscientific but
emotionally evocative and attractive dogma. Perhaps scientific
training or science in general were suspect to begin with.
Perhaps, individually and collectively, they are disillusioned
with “mainstream psychology,” the colder facts of evolutionary
science and human ecology, a harsher text of graphs, numbers,
and figuring they do not understand.
To be fair, one very good argument for transpersonal (humanistic) psychology (or for other forms of religious
counseling) is that most people believe in something already,
anyway, thus it pays, would be the claim, to start therapy,
counseling, or clinical work at the mind-place where they are
already, even if we do not subscribe, really, as professional psychologists, to the notion of “souls.” However, judging by the
cross over humanistic-ecopsychology literature, their Jungian
insinuations and elaborations, it is clear that more than detached
(measured) sympathy for clients is going on here. As attested
to by specific approaches and claims in the literary records,
their “nature spirituality” seems genuinely sought and imparted--proselytizing.
The problem, for it is a problem, I have outlined above spills
over into or originates from other spheres of public discourse
where “mysterians,” folks who prefer easy but enigmatic answers
to a protracted and disciplined study of natural phenomena,
insist on having “equal time” for their ideas—their beliefs. Unfortunately, if influential enough or obedient to others, they are
involved in public policy making with potentially unhelpful or
even harmful consequences.
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Adoring Idols
To reiterate, understanding, dispassionately and with a
degree of scientific skepticism, why some people have the need
for hugging trees; petting rocks; making offerings to mountains
and rivers; sincerely (hoping that it will have an effect) placing
flowers at the effigy-feet of the patron saint of tigers; that is, for
understanding why some people attribute agency to inanimate
objects, should be an object of study for Ecopsychologists.
Of interest also, is what makes some people generate,
internalize, or manage strong emotions and feelings that they
interpret as originating in a “spiritual realm.” Understanding
the reasons, scientifically so, why any person would believe,
feel, and behave as though they have a personal and particular
“connection” with spiritual aspects of an entity they personify as
real, Gaia, should be a focal interest for those who deal, directly,
with constructs of “nature connection.”
The significance of the belief that nature-at-large, or that
particular elements and organisms in it, have singled any one of
us out so that certain subtle “transcendental” truths can be shared
and that no other form of understanding is on parity with it,
cannot be underrated or underestimated. To the extent that these
relational tendencies are persisting and common across time and
cultures, and across domains within cultures, says a lot about
how the human mind evolved. These relational tendencies, if
common during early stages of human development but less so
as we age and mature, also say something about the intricacies
of a developing brain and its cognition.
To walk in the cool shadows of sycamore trees, by a
noisy creek, and feel part of an ecological ensemble of experiences—-dynamics and meanings potentially graspable--is
very human. To believe that the night wind and the unseen
“chattering” leaves are delivering a personal message to us is also
human, but equally in need of addressing if we are to understand
something about our fantasy-prone minds. This is an important
scholarly task because a comparable or even larger number of
fantasy-prone minds come to very different conclusions, some
of which are antagonistic to a sense of “nature connection,” or
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interpret these as mediated by “some unfathomable otherness”
who decides our fate, including the apocalyptic demise of our
planet. The latter are the nefarious mysterians.
As far as philosophy and scientific psychology are concerned,
neither group should be let off the hook.
Persevering in believing in something, an idea or feeling,
that cannot be confirmed by logical argumentation or scientific
analysis seems irrational to most educated people. The repeated
rebuttal of these arbitrary notions would seem to be central to
the practice of a scientifically oriented psychology. Yet, even
within psychology departments, debates flare up over what, in
the guise of “equality” or “diversity,” are more likely to be false
equivalencies—unwarranted lassitude.
For example, the right of a student to skip a Saturday class
because of religious beliefs, the expectation that special provisions
must be made for a student to retake a test or receive lecture
notes that other students who attended actually endeavored to
compile, seems like the fair thing to do. The irony might be that
this very student might be taking a course in psychology while
studying cognitive errors of reasoning. Except in specialized
courses, no one ever questions whether there is something
fundamentally unhelpful with carrying on with such beliefs.
The slippery slope might continue if one day the instructor is
asked to devote equal time to the presentation of this student’s
religious beliefs as some sort of psychology. Unless this was a
class (psychology of beliefs, psychology of religion) devoted to
the skeptical examination (thoughtful inquiry) of why it is that
humans believe “in something” no matter how farfetched and
irrational it may be, there seems to be, at first glance, passive
acceptance, tolerance, and/or the active sustaining, of what
seems to be, religious entitlements.
A recent example may be in order. While teaching a history
and systems of psychology course, a student complained that
although h/she wanted nothing more than to become a “psychologist,” ‘everything’ h/she read in our textbook was ‘toxic’ to h/
her religious beliefs. Seeing this as a teaching moment, I asked
politely and compassionately whether the student felt that the
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authors of the textbook were overtly and decidedly anti-religion (to share the page numbers where these ‘toxic’ claims were
made) or whether certain facts, stated clearly and dispassionately were only interpreted to be ‘toxic.’
It turned out that anything at all in the text (concepts, theories)
that conflicted with h/her established notion of “mind-spirit”
was interpreted as a personal affront to h/her beliefs. Through
the years, and while teaching other courses and covering
many different topics, nursing students and future teachers, for
example, openly declared that they had to “learn all this stuff”
to do well on tests, to pass the course, but that once they became
nurses or teachers they were going to practice their professions
according to the directives of their pastors, beliefs, and religion.
I do not know what percentage of the student population they
represented or, today, represent. It is disturbing for me to consider
that almost nothing of the best that scientific psychology could
offer to these students would ever again be applied in the actual
practice of their professions.
If ignorance passes for and poses as knowledge, and
scientific psychology cannot make gains in key professions
where its findings could change society, the questions raised
in this book are not trivial. These questions are part of a wider
inquiry, made more poignant and downright scary during our
recent and perverse political discourse. The questions are the
same: Does ‘reason’ matter? Do independently verified and
objectively derived facts matter? Does ignorance pay? Do we
accept only the bits and pieces of ‘science’ that are convenient
to us or should we apply its principles across the board?
The summary point here is that schools (psychology
courses) are meant to challenge, correct, and provide additional
information—methods for critical thinking—in order to prepare
citizens to evaluate the increasingly complex and scientific
information and to be better at self-examination. How useful
can a citizen be in a real “debate”? How prepared can this
person really be where scientific information challenges the very
foundations that make up h/her “beliefs”? If the idol “rules,” and
“that is that,” what’s the point of an education?
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In this context, substituting one idol for another is neither
progressive nor constructive. At worst, substituting “spirit”
for “Gaia,” or “soul” for “Earth consciousness” is either bad
psychology, bad theology, or both. If ecopsychology is merely a
transliteration from one idol to the next, how is it advancing the
cause of psychology, that is, of a psychology that purports to be
a process for thoughtful inquiry?
For Whom do the “Nature” Bells Toll?
The psychological answer to the question, who interprets or
seeks to interpret a voice, vague feeling, or clearer insight that
they perceive as divine (or feels divinely inspired), applies to
all religious experiences, anywhere. Both question and answer
can be further explored via other inquiries that deal with the
specific constructs of identification, transference, projection,
commitment, attribution, attachment, conformity, reasoning,
and many other useful means of triangulating why and how and
in what context a person believes or came to “believe that ‘P’.”
That is, vague and amorphous categories such as “god” or
“nature” necessitate a grounding of meaning and experiences in
order for them to be useful—intimate and personally satisfying.
In this sense, it is easier to see how the transliteration “god”
> “nature” > “waterfall that makes me feel holy” becomes a
common formula in ecopsychological exercises. However, more
neurocognitively precise questions could be asked about the
basis of “credulity” itself. To the extent that different areas of
the human brain are more resilient than others to the onslaught
of questionable information (propaganda), all kinds of psychologists should be jumping at the opportunity to follow in
the research and verification steps of scientists who are already
contributing to these efforts (Asp et al., 2005; Gilbert, 1991;
Gilbert, 1993). This type of work, has potentially, greater social
value: to address the ineffectual propensities of “credulity” and
the negative consequences of people’s credulous natures--their
continued dysfunctional effects across cultures and time.
The “nature” bells toll for everyone even though their tones
might be distinctly and differentially heard. The chaparral
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ecologist, upon discovering a dry vernal pool, almost sees
the future of true fairy shrimps and frogs dormant in cysts or
burrowed in tunnels when most of us only see cracked dirt. He
almost smells flowers that only bloom after rains. The casual
dog walker worries in the same terrain about snakes, other dogs
and people. The true hiker counts meters of altitude and miles
to go to the next signpost announcing many more meters ahead,
other trails splitting on their way to other signs.
The ceremonial walker is off-trail picking up a rock here and
a quail feather there, pausing to smell the scent of Artemisia,
praying to many gods past and newly invented. The horseback
rider and her ensemble of equine enthusiasts wonder why
walkers do not yield her right of way to a six-legged monster
that barely fits between precipice and peñascos. The mountain
bikers, riding faster than anyone around, wonder the same. There
is no one “nature.” There never has been. What there seems to be
is many psychological profiles identifying with parts of “nature”
and projecting some parts of themselves onto “nature.” As with
any relationship, two partners, one passive or imagined, the
other active, one conscious and the other oblivious, share bits
and pieces of themselves as best they can. To the extent that no
single entity “nature” has been shown to exist, then, furthermore,
it seems that only one itty-bitty mind does most of the identification-projective sharing; the complexity of natural processes
being so vast and interconnected for most human minds to grasp
in one lifetime.
While being generous and inclusive of all dispositions and
manners of walking the earth, the question remains, if one is
deeply invested in helping clients through some type of “nature
therapy”: Who shall we hear “nature” interpreted through?
Which one of those interpretations is “true-er”? If the authentic
semiosis is the interpretation of forces that shape natural spaces
themselves, their phenology and ancient history, their food and
medicinal applications, why not go directly to these forces to
learn? Why should mediating “nature” take the diminished
forms of “spirits,” “trails,” “treaded rubber,” or “horseshoes”?
Why only that or only so little? And if the ancient inhabitants
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are definitely gone and only their forgetful and conflicted
descendants are left to share only partial “stories,” who is the
true-er “keeper of stories”?
Privileging, Confusion, and Confabulation
The next chapter addresses ten common assumptions,
referred to here as “misconceptions,” to the extent that when one,
with critical eyes, reexamines the historical antecedents of ecopsychology and deep ecology, for example, disentangling them
from each other, and from humanistic psychology (and other
narrow and privileged interpretations of “Buddhism”) one can
begin to appreciate how tags “nature,” “connection,” or “nature
connection,” in the ambit of green psychological counseling and
therapy (“ecopsychology”), are vague and unhelpful at best.
Practitioners and clients hold both idiosyncratically specific
and/or overly simplistic ideas of what these tags may mean.
The lack of social scientific and behavioral rigor with respect to
these assumptions may be a real obstacle to whatever benefits
might be derived from “green counseling.” It is proposed that
concepts of alienation and estrangement (a negative definition
of “connection”) allow for a testable continuum along which
sentiments or statements that pertain to “nature connections”
may be judged and classified (Stokols, 1975).
This could be the case provided that specific ideas and
definitions of what “nature” means to each individual (client)
can also be fixed, since a plurality of “natures” is more likely
to exert testable influences than any singular and oversimplified
notion (an abstraction) of the complexity of natural processes and
their potential effects on psychological well-being (Kull, 1998).
For example, Kalevi Kull’s semiotic distinction between Zero,
First, Second, and Third natures pays due service to most of the
relational possibilities implied in the phrase “nature connection”
but how many ecopsychologists are so nuanced and rigorous in
their understanding?
It matters less what a given subject defines as “nature,”
“connection,” or “nature connection,” as long as these sentiments,
concepts, and/or statements can be correctly (relevantly)
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discerned and evaluated during psychological work if one is
serious about codifying and normalizing—scientizing— “ecopsychology.”
Therefore, a high degree of introspection and self-reflection
is required to avoid falling in the trap of anthropocentrism. As
previously noted, to the extent that “ecopsychological” perspectives and similar approaches contain a high degree of humanism,
they fail to fully have trust in and live up to the phrase and
deep ecological sentiment, “the intrinsic value of nature.” That
is to say, when “ecopsychological” perspectives and similar
approaches replace the open-ended enigma that is “nature,” with
yet another absolutist and recognizable form of anthropocentric
and idiosyncratic thinking, they fail at the very task of promoting
the opposite ideal.
Proxy humanism (e.g. gods in the sky, water spirits, forest
hades, Gaia) is still anthropocentric humanism (i.e. proxy
agency). Animism and artificialism are still aspects of magical
thinking. Propping up various types of titanic exo-humanity of
our own fabrication while asserting that they are really at the
center of our universe and existence are, on closer examination,
variations and reiterations of antiquated philosophical bait-andswitch arguments—justifications for things we wish to believe
in or things we want to do; or things we are told to believe in and
do.
A human walks in the forest. A branch crackles and then
intrusively breaks the inner silence and contemplation of a
forest wanderer. Raven is surprised and loudly protests. Further
down the canyon, another responds while the maiden veils fall
in thunderous acclamation. For whom do the nature bells toll?

*
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Ten Misconceptions About Ecopsychology
“…nature is the negative figure at the heart of our making.
Nature is complexity in simplicity. Nature is a god in ruins.
Nature is a rightness of self. Nature is constant regeneration.
Nature lets us speak. (Poetry is its excess.)” (Jeffrey Yang)

In 2005, surrounded by the Italian Alps and during the first foun-

dational meeting of the then European Ecopsychology Society
(EES), it took a group of seven eager and passionate professionals almost two days to arrive at a more or less acceptable
definition of “ecopsychology.” Most of us were well versed in
so-called American ecopsychological literature such as it was at
the time. To boot, we also distilled and quoted various writings
from Italian environmentalists and nature poets (Barron & Re,
2005. Italian Environmental Literature: An Anthology).
Twelve years after its foundation, with EES morphing into
the International Ecopsychology Society (IES), the number
of definitions or qualifications to that original descriptor have
multiplied without necessarily bringing definitional clarity to
this tag.
As in the opening quote to this chapter by Yang, to the extent
that constructs such as ‘nature,’ ‘self,’ or ‘connection’ mean
something different to different people, there might never be a
completely satisfying or inclusive definition of “ecopsychology.” Short of this goal, if it is even a goal, an effort to define
something in its negative form rather than trying to settle on
restrictive and possibly ambiguous definitions may be a more
fruitful enterprise.
In this light, the following ten misconceptions of ecopsychology are meant to negate all-too-easy definitions that may
be too narrow or idiosyncratic in favor of an affirmation of the
complexity that this tag, “ecopsychology,” entails or implies.
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1. The Various Approaches Termed “Ecopsychology”
are New
One might assume that as long as humans and closely
related species were able to determine (via affective, behavioral,
and cognitive means) that a thriving and sustainable affinity
to natural processes made them feel well (contributed to their
well-being), helped their families flourish, and challenged
them to discover new means of maintaining these sustainable
parameters, there has always been an “ecopsychology.” With the
advent of enclosed, highly moralized spaces--city states--and the
privations that these exerted on optimal development, personal
freedoms and all around “thriving,” there have also been critics
who spoke of civilized decadence and dysfunctionality (e.g.
Lao-Tzu, Diogenes, Epicurus). In this sense, “ecopsychology”
is a study and critique of life and social systems and in particular
of umwelt-mitwelt-eigenwelt systemics. Any form of significant
alienation or degradation from evolutionarily tested parameters
can potentially lead to dysfunctional outcomes.
2. “Ecopsychology” is Inherently “Religious”
(“Should Be”)
To the extent that a religious perspective (e.g. Shinto, Taoism)
embraces and philosophically yokes a sensitivity for “nature,”
then, and only in this sense, can “ecopsychology” be said to be
religious. However, the appreciation of natural processes for their
own sake, the scientific exploration of natural processes, and
the personal and secular enjoyment of the “outdoors” can also
foster positive emotions, encourage physical activities, or lead
to new knowledge or insights and can be described as inherently
“ecopsychological.” To the extent that ‘a person apart,’ that
is, that individuals without ties to social structures are able to
thrive in natural settings, then “ecopsychology” is independent
of religion. Moreover, “nature” and “nature connection” have
been proposed (e.g. Rousseau) as critiques of religion and, in
particular, of dysfunctional aspects (e.g. fundamentalist, anti-science) of religion.
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3. “Ecopsychology” is Inherently “Spiritual”
(“Should Be”)
Any form of significant alienation or degradation from evolutionarily tested parameters could lead to suboptimal outcomes,
some of these dysfunctional. To the extent that many species
possess behavioral-affective-cognitive systems devoted to
gauge a homeostasis of well-being, then, one suspects, feelings
associated with optimal thriving might be emotionally confabulated with “a spiritual sense.” Equally--an inverse relation--an
awareness of dysfunctionality, different types of morbid perturbances, personal failings and needs, may all serve as signs of
umwelt-mitwelt-eigenwelt dissociations that need correcting.
Only in these senses can it be said that “ecopsychology” is
“inherently spiritual.”
A caveat: statements or positions that, in idiosyncratic fashion, force (“should be”) a diversity of personal nature
affiliation styles and dispositions (e.g. introverts—extroverts)
into a reduction of human-nature relational possibilities are
suspect. In the final analysis, the onus is on those who make
‘spiritual’ claims for “ecopsychology” to demonstrate, via evidence-based approaches, that their positions are ontologically
real.
4. Little of “Ecopsychology” is “Scientific”
To the extent that “ecopsychology” is the study and
critique of life and social systems and, in particular, of umwelt-mitwelt-eigenwelt systemics, then any empirical method
(scientific) that sheds light on the etiological dynamics of the
problem “Significant alienation or degradation from evolutionarily tested parameters can potentially lead to dysfunctional
outcomes” is scientific. Admittedly, like other sciences (e.g.
astronomy, psychology, physics), the speculative, free-form,
and projective qualities of the word “ecopsychology” open the
door for unproven, uncritical, and personally satisfying notions
that are ultimately non- or pseudo-scientific preferences (e.g.
astrology, new-age psychology, pseudo-physics). The complex-
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ities of umwelt-mitwelt-eigenwelt systemics demand more, not
less, science.
5. Serious Academic Preparation in Psychology and
Ecology is not Needed in Order to be a Professional
“Ecopsychologist”
This statement implies (begs for) an empirical examination
and procedures which aim at determining a correlation, at
least, between the degree to which any professional has been
thoroughly educated in these fields and other related areas (e.g.
biology, sociology, statistics, human ecology, physical anthropology, resilience studies) and the quality and seriousness of
what passes for “ecopsychology.” Means and ends (preparation
and outcomes) are indicative of the measure of the professional
referring to her/himself as an “ecopsychologist.”
6. Everyone Knows What the Word “Nature” Means
Like most tags containing highly projective value, “nature”
is a construct similar to other vague, potentially ambiguous, and
universal constructs: god, happiness, love, freedom, personality,
or intelligence. Although everyone may have a sense or even a
personally satisfying definition of “nature,” that is not to say that
they understand what the word “nature” means, inclusively, or
what it refers to. The word “nature” is not a clearly descriptive
map. “Nature” is, at best, an incomprehensible vast territory.
Our immediate (physical, cognitive, affective) relations to this
territory define, in small part and dynamic fashion, the vastness
that is (are) “nature.” One ought to be a bit suspicious of any
claims that singularly answer the question, “What is nature?”
with, for example, simplistic tautologies: Nature is love—god,
consciousness, the ethereal realm.
7. Everyone Knows What the Phrase
“Nature Connection” Means
The complexities implied in umwelt-mitwelt-eigenwelt
systemics, via personally and culturally diverse (affective,
behavioral, and cognitive) vectors, suggest that the phrase
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“nature connection” is a multi-determined and multi-variate
construct, not easily defined for every person, every time, or
by any one person for another. However, deviations of basic
and evolutionarily thriving and sustainable affinities to natural
processes could be a starting point for identifying the causes of
“disconnection.” The very phrase “nature connection” seems
limited when contrasted with other phrases such a “nature
affiliation,” the preferred usage in this book, which implies a
greater complexity and depth of “relations.” However, even this
latter and more preferred phrase and sense needs to be vetted
with a precise science of “relations.”
8. “Ecopsychology” Implies “Diversity”
Many proposals exist under the tag “ecopsychology,” with
some individuals justifying the value of any idiosyncratic
idea by conjuring the word “diversity.” Although a necessary
deconstruction (critical, evidence-based) and questioning of
the function of male-dominated, militaristic, tyrannical, and
destructive tendencies and their concomitant results in the
denudement of once thriving and diverse ecosystems, is an
example of serious scholarly work that enhances and expands
(diversity) the scope of “ecopsychology,” other enterprises
may not be as useful or relevant. To the extent that “anything
goes ecopsychology” borrows a continuing laissez faire from
“anything goes psychology,” then bad habits and misinterpretations of serious and diverse approaches could become an obstacle
to fruitful ecopsychological inquiry. Bad ideas, when they are
demonstrably bad, need not be protected under the hubris and
laxed heuristics, “diversity.”
As stated under #5, means and ends (preparation and
outcomes) are indicative of the measure of the professional
referring to her/himself as an “ecopsychologist.”
9. “Earth” is a “She”
A feminist voice in green psychology might be emancipatory in nature. That is, “ecopsychology,” for example, can become
yet another vehicle from which to erect a given platform,
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“feminism,” sadly, without due criticism of what we all mean
or understand by “feminism” or “nature.” Ideological stances
and spiritual beliefs aside, a critical and interesting question for
“ecopsychology” (continuing from mainstream psychology) is
why individuals feel strongly about attributing “humanness”
to abstractions (“nature”) or to various elements in/of “nature”
(thunder, water, fire, tree, lion, lamb).
Earlier, we referred to these psychological dynamics as
self-nature gestalts—of various kinds. Uncritical feminism, as
emancipation, while rediscovering traditional ways of relating
to earth processes, without delving deeply into the psychological reasons for these identifications, is in danger of becoming not
only lazy psychology and bad science but may also amount to
novo-spirituality. The need for spirituality itself is a psychological question that must be addressed no matter its reappearance
under new guises—“ecopsychology,” feminine spirituality.
Is “Earth” a mother, a father, a snake, twins separated
at birth, a raven, a lion, an egg, or a butterfly? What all these
designations have in common is a real human need to reduce
complexity to simpler and more graspable ideas. (By the way,
the previous question is of the same type as: Is “God” a bearded
man, a woman, the devil, the sun, the moon, all of the stars—
raven?). Genderizing the ghost does not make it more real; it
only makes the delusion more familiar.
The socio-cultural and psychological mechanisms by which
the genderization of “nature” or natural forces, as male or female
processes, takes place might be the same as those occurring as
part of the arbitrary designations and functions during any psychological projection or identification. The abstract-complex and
engulfing qualities of the natural world cry out for oversimplification. The genderization of nature is only one more example
of these oversimplification tendencies. People “humanize”
anything—cars, rocks, smart phones.
Feminine aspects and qualities projected onto nature are not
intrinsic at all. Thus, the re-appropriation and re-application of
feminine principles as part of “feminist perspectives” that deal
with “nature” and reduce it to an entity (e.g. Mother Nature) do
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not erase the psychological question: Why do women and men
read gender in anything natural to begin with?
10. “Indigenous Wisdom” is Superior to Other Approaches
In certain cases, it is entirely appropriate to view the misappropriation and misapplication of “indigenous wisdom” as
another case of “green washing,” particularly if some person,
group, or organization employs marketing approaches in order
to sell “products.”
As part of this marketing ploy, idiosyncratically selected
aspects of indigenous lore, beliefs, diets, artifacts, or
“ceremonies” are packaged and sold for profit.
In addition to financial gains, there is an assumption that
ancient European wisdom, for example, is faulty or lacks
provenance to be relevant. At this very moment, thousands of
villages across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia continue on
a path of sustainability that was established long before humans
crossed The Bering Strait.
In contrast, if feathers, dots, crystals, incense, didgeridoos,
or bones are not part of the “magical mix,” then it isn’t
“indigenous” enough. That is, for reasons that have more to
do with exoticism and strangeness (as if tobacco, chiles, and
cocoa weren’t enough) some new world indigenous practices
are exalted as being superior forms of “spiritual enlightenment.”
The fact that at least three species of ancient humans
coexisted in Europe and Asia long before the appropriated and
preferred new world cultures came into being, successfully
adapted and lived sustainably for tens of thousands of years, is
mostly overlooked. Even so, these peoples, their geography, and
fauna are gone. We can only infer what their “ecopsychological
attunement” was like.
In this light, a serious “ecopsychological” science should
inquire into the reasons and motivations (psychopharmacological, consumerist, behavioral necessities, boredom,
rationalizations, etc.) for the allure offered by exotic and strange
practices and beliefs. The desire for novelty itself or nostalgia
might explain quite a bit. In an age of rampant consumerism and
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easily replaceable and disposable goods, these very talismans,
feathers and crystals, stand for ages, peoples, practices, and
ways of life no longer accessible or replicable to well-intended
practitioners.
Moreover, one presumes that local wisdom is partly an
expression of a unique set of survival strategies which developed
in specific geographical regions, ecological circumstances,
historical contexts, and as cultural expressions originating from
unique ethnic identification necessities.
To the extent that only a limited subset of these practices
and attitudes are universally transferable, and that only locally
do they represent pragmatic arrangements for successfully
navigating evolutionary challenges, then one must conclude
that focusing on one or more of these approaches outside their
autochthonous terroir and place has more to do with personal
preferences than with the notion of “indigenous wisdom” as an
absolute and universal epistemology.
If and when the white “ecopsychologist” trades in “indigenous
wisdom,” and h/she is not an authentic representative of those
traditions, one is right in suspecting “green washing” at the very
least. The fraudulent potential of misrepresenting, misappropriating, and repackaging “indigenous wisdom” for profit should
give the overly eager neophyte some pause before investing
monies in sure bet psychological fixes and fetishes.
Nevertheless, the truly desperate or the credulous will always
pay good money for the “right” talisman.
The Empty Egg Shell
When “ecopsychology” is thus viewed, it opens up the
constructs of “connection” and “disconnection” to many more
and diverse interpretations of nature affiliations, not less. The
advantage of this is its inclusiveness. If one sort of “ecopsychologist” were to claim, for example, that “ecopsychology”
relates uniquely and exclusively to the religious or spiritual
experiences of the Yanomami people, and furthermore, insists
that not partaking of these specific experiences suggests a being-deficit with respect to nature affiliations, then a good number
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of folks who are avid gardeners, who feel connected to this labor
and don’t give a hoot about jungles, magic or ghosts may be
incorrectly “diagnosed” as having a diminished sense of “nature
connection.”
Of course, the same “agnostic” gardeners may not give a
hoot anyhow, for their degree of intimacy to soil, sweat, toil, and
land (nature affiliations) is ample and sufficient recompense.
The obsession, at times, with prejudging the great richness and
varieties of the nature of “nature connections” and restricting
unknowable parameters to a few inches of a moralistic measuring
tape seems elitist.
Agnostic or atheist kayak woman, hunting Joe, scientist
Lucy, and sea diver Kathy, experience as deeply a range of
emotions and insights that are, on the one hand, incomparable to
other experiences of “nature,” and equally one and the same.
To the “ecopsychologist,” professionally defined, goes the
burden of making ever deeper and more inclusive inquiries of
what it is to be human in natural spaces and explaining how and
why, sometimes, a human apart from natural processes seems to
behave in dysfunctional ways (e.g. a relational science of nature
affiliations). This type of deep inquiry suggests more scientific
and philosophical training, not less.
Ironically perhaps, the diversity of “nature connections”
demands a refinement and an exactness of methodologies that
aim at studying the multi-variate nature of nature affiliations.
Conjuring up any old notion that satisfies a given individual
and making it into some sort of “ecotherapy” may only work
for a short while. Afterwards, many more folks wise up. Even
placebo effects make more sense when studied in the well-structured context of science.

*

*
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Chapter Three
Nature Affiliation: Self-Nature Gestalts
“The Passenger Pigeon’s adaptations, the strengths that allowed
it to be the commonest bird on Earth, were also its weaknesses
when we disrupted its habitat.” (Mark Avery)

One of the many ways to connect “ecopsychology” to the

dual discipline and etymological roots of its tag and to many
enterprises that seem to operate under its name is to look for
and utilize recognizable psychological and even social scientific
methodologies from which to develop structural, functional, and
meaning (semiotic) theories.
The author has proposed two, both revised and original,
approaches (Conesa-Sevilla, 2006; Conesa-Sevilla, 2016) with
which to understand “nature connections” (Self-Nature Gestalts
SNGs) and as a way of empirically assessing the therapy value
(judge the effectiveness) of so called ecotherapy systems and
exercises (Integral-Experiential Nature Affiliation Dimensions).
Both ideas and this present effort are an attempt at formulating a
science of relations-in-nature affiliations.
Self-Nature Gestalts
A self-nature gestalt, SNG (see Figure 1), represents a
dynamic and holistic organization, that is, an organism’s inclusive
interpretative coda and behavioral plans in correspondence and
interplay with its environment. SNGs as inclusive experiential
representations, although varying and changing from moment to
moment, can be used to describe or predict an organism’s degree
of affinity and affiliation with its original and natural evolved-in
environment.
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Figure 1
In short, an interpretative coda (biosemiotics) and its
complex (conscious and unconscious) meaning interactions with inclusive aspects of ‘self,’ ‘culture,’ and ‘nature,’
are manifested in behavioral plans and actions toward some
personality cluster of self-nature gestalt. At any point during
personal growth or therapy experiences, there is the potential
for new accommodations of meaning-action-direction vectors
toward new self-nature gestalt configurations (a Psyche-Natur
‘personality’ ensemble).
Ideally, if they are to be adaptive, SNGs are moment-to-moment evaluations with accommodations which are normally in
complex psychodynamic and ecological states of flux. Simply
put, new interpretations and habits can change the meaning-action-direction of agency (in the social scientific sense of this
word).
As Figure 1 suggests, a SNG includes, structurally speaking:
a) Cognition 1 (Meaning): interpretative codas (semiosis),
b) Behaviors (Actions): plans and actions, c) Cognition 2
(Intention/Motivation Vectors): the potential of new opportunities and accommodations--meaning-action-direction vectors.
Factor Cognition 1 is best described as “past experiences and
their present meanings.” In contrast, Cognition 2 is analogous
to J. Piaget’s description of learning as accommodation where
new information challenges and reshapes cognitive structures
and schemas. To reiterate, given past behaviors (X) and their
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meanings (Y), new stimuli (S), and new circumstances (Cs), any
organism has the potential of redirecting its agentic purpose.
In the ambit of ecotherapy, to the extent that nature alienation
is assumed to be pervasive and that it runs deeper than any
person might suspect (at an unconscious level), consequently, it
shares important elements or features with trauma that must be
similarly addressed.
Its dynamic description suggests that the totality and the
integrity of an organism’s relation to its environment (a species
‘goodness of fit’) rests on its ability to make use of past and
useful experiences (both innate and learned), and judge these
to be in accordance with present, ongoing circumstances, and
should major anomalies occur, the very integrity (existential
momentum) of a SNG would prompt new interpretations and
evaluations, thus driving adaptive behaviors.
Just as it is impossible to think of a bone-tendon-muscle-skin
gestalt configuration existing outside integral bodies, nutritional
requirements, rest, and a supportive environment, so, too, it
is impossible to think of unintegrated ‘self,’ ‘culture,’ ‘nature’
(self-nature) gestalts without imagining that their disconnection may have something to do with health or well-being. When
individual self-nature gestalts are studied in a larger context
of societal upheavals and dysfunctions, it becomes clear, as it
was to writers such as E. Fromm and K. Jaspers, that a semiotic
description of all these interacting life spaces becomes necessary
if one is to begin a serious study of social and nature alienation,
as illustrated in Figure 1b.
This fashion of tracking “nature affiliations” and alienation has
the benefit of incorporating and synthesizing ideas from the social
and behavioral sciences, biosemiotics, and evolutionary science.
As “ecopsychology” approaches go, the notion of SNGs is
too abstract to be useful to many “ecotherapists.” The presumed
dynamics of SNGs can be, nevertheless, a theoretical language
with which to discuss, in general terms, nature affiliations.
Therefore, a more practical evaluative tool is needed to directly
assess the quality of these affiliations.
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To this practical end, it may be more useful to precisely
describe the nature of distinguishable (testable) sets and processes
of Nature Experiential Affiliation Dimensions (NEADs).
Integral-Experiential Dimensions:
Nature Affiliation Features
When describing practices that make use of “nature” as a
whole, the outdoors, or (some) natural elements, it pays to differentiate between various degrees of “connection” across several
nature experiential and affiliation dimensions. The following
four Nature Experiential Affiliation Dimensions (NEADs)
can then be used to judge whether the intentionality, possible
outcomes, and actual eco-therapeutic practices are producing
greater or lesser integrity—whether they are “integral” or not:
1. MEANING--A Biosemiotic Dimension: Nature itself
and by itself or human mediated (designed) therapies
and approaches
2. ORIGIN--An Ontological Dimension: Accepted (agreed
upon) human needs (origins) or idiosyncratic and psychologically ideological
3. TIME--Time Dimension: Long term or short term
4. GOALS--Purpose Dimension (Aims and Goals):
Inclusive and integral-authentic relations or “activities,”
“tasks,” or “experiences”
Even though Table 1 lists all four NEADs in terms of
functional polarities, one suspects that measurable continua
exist between them. For the purposes of this presentation it is
easier to introduce them as either-or dualities.
Table 1 also suggests a way of applying these dimensions
during a comparison, and ultimately an evaluation of what might
come closer to integral nature affiliations. To the extent that a
given practice or approach can be best described as having most
or all of the components listed under column A, one can be
confident in saying that there is a higher probability of achieving
more integral nature affiliations.
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Given its ecopsychological emphasis, and for the purposes
of the present work, the phrase “integral nature affiliations” is
both an evaluation and a classification applied to organisms in
relation to their natural, sustainable environments.

Table 1
On the other hand, if a given “ecotherapy” (or ‘way of
life’) shares most of the dimensional components listed under
column B, one can be fairly confident that it is, by definition
and speaking in relative terms, less integral. Congested urban
life, passing and short-term diversions (parks and recreation),
and weekend therapies might all share features of Column B.
To be fair, it is important to note that although meaning-action
vectors (progressions) that culminate in more diversely integrated
self-nature gestalts represent an ideal of human nature connections,
realistically speaking and in practice, the typical urbanite wishing
to embark on these projects of self-discovery for personal growth
or therapy reasons may not ever fully accomplish this.
Notwithstanding this realistic limitation, any person is
sure to gain something of significance even when involved in
practices that lead to less integral nature affiliations, hence their
therapeutic value.
Also, some elements that are important to some practitioners
may not be as valuable to others. Referring back to the list of
ten misconceptions about ecopsychology, to the extent that
any given nature therapy (approach) has a spiritual or religious
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component, then it needs to be weighed against the practical
value (pragmatic outcome) of belief itself as part of an integral
self-nature gestalt.
In some cases the spiritual or religious component is a
null factor, that is, it adds little or nothing fundamental to the
self-nature gestalt—‘tis “window dressing.” In other cases, the
spiritual or religious component might be in opposition or contradictory (a real obstacle) to a progression toward more integral
self-nature gestalts.
Finally, if a person is already spiritually inclined and finds
comfort in religious associations, it is very likely that they shall
seek “nature therapies” that fulfill this personal need.
Toward Better Informed Constructs of
“Nature Connection”
It is proposed that concepts of alienation and estrangement
(both negative definitions of “connection” understood in terms
of “affiliation”) allow for a testable continuum along which
sentiments or statements that pertain to “nature connections”
may be judged and classified (Stokols, 1975; Conesa-Sevilla,
2006). This could be the case provided that specific ideas and
definitions of what “nature” means to each individual (clients
and therapists) can also be fixed, since a plurality of “natures”
is more likely to exert testable influences than any singular
and oversimplified notion (an idiosyncratic abstraction) of the
complexity of natural processes and their potential effects on
psychological well-being (Kull, 1998).
For example, Kull’s semiotic distinction between Zero, First,
Second, and Third natures pays due service to the complexity
of most relational possibilities implied in the phrase “nature
connection.” Although in casual and personal engagements with
the natural world it matters less what a given subject defines as
“nature,” “connection,” or “nature connection,” when it comes
to therapeutic, clinical and counseling claims these sentiments,
concepts, and/or statements should be correctly (relevantly)
discerned and evaluated during serious (evidence-based) psychological work.
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However, if constructs such as “nature,” “connection,” or
“nature connection,” are incorrectly discerned and evaluated
during psychological work, then actual practices in wilderness
therapy or in so-called “ecopsychology” are bound to be “false.”
That is, if natural processes are imperfectly understood, psychological and physiological responses misinterpreted, and
conclusions drawn that assume a certain “connection” has taken
place, then, one may suspect that these conclusions are idiosyncratically and/or even “desperately” confabulated.
So, for example, despite apparent “success,” being clueless
(uninformed and naïve), both clients and facilitators (therapists)
may feel superficially and temporarily “good,” and take
euphoria (terpsis, euthumia) and tranquility (ataraxia) to mean
“connection” or an actual “communion” with “nature.”
On the other hand, if the same constructs are correctly
discerned and evaluated during psychological work, actual
practices in wilderness therapy (in “ecopsychology”) are bound
to be “true.” This would be the case if natural processes are
studied critically (e.g. ecology), psychological and physiological responses anticipated and known, and conclusions drawn
about their likely interactions, empirically tested and confirmed.
In this context, and ironically, with a measure of practical
knowhow and expert knowledge, both clients and facilitators
(therapists) may feel horrible in the wilderness, their mind-body
systems tested by sharp rocks and freezing rain, and take the
constructs “connection,” or “communion” with “nature” to be
entirely different processes/experiences, yet still have a transformative experience.
The Implication of Self-Nature Gestalts
Every experience involves elements of projection (top-down)
and reactions to ‘the real’ (bottom-up). Even though it is next
to impossible not to project “culture” onto “nature,” natural
processes provide the most authentic semiosis in situations of
“nature connection.” We evoke, raw “nature” does not.
Thus, “falsely” interpreting “nature” via an idiosyncratically
arbitrary or intentionally deceiving therapeutic lens, “the guru”
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may bring about temporary changes and some momentary joy
(terpsis, euthumia), but is it lasting (credible) therapy?
If semiosis (communication, interpretation) is significantly
modified from “nature-as-it-is” to “what-the-guru-says-it-is,”
we have us religion, not psychology. If so, and as in other areas
of psychology, some clients and therapists may purposely and as
a matter of personal need erase the line between evidence-based
psychology and religion. In such cases, “ecopsychology”
becomes yet another instance and vehicle for finding solace and
meaning, an extension and continuation of previous (or found
anew) religious pursuits.
To add confounding circumstances, any number of outdoor
activities which do make people physically fit, healthy, and
“happy” could be co-opted and disguised, through other activities,
as “ecopsychology.” If so, are they honestly “pure” and unique
forms? For example, if most of these practices share essential
components (variables) of fresh air, more intimate social interactions, physical activity, intentional doings, relaxation, solitary
wandering, or attention to different visual and auditory dynamics,
then it would be easier to build up a science of “ecopsychology” by controlling the function and contribution of these more
“prosaic” variables. Even simply walking outdoors produces
measurable psychological changes (affect) and measurable
cognitive changes without therapeutic interventions (Bratman et
al, 2015a; Bratman et al, 2015b).
Furthermore, more intimate and relational attributes
(variables) when involved in equine and/or horticultural
therapies, for example, could be similarly assessed for their
cognitive and physiological underpinnings--value. If so, “horse
spirit” and “magical gardens” can be evaluated for their more
cognitive, affective, or behavioral qualities. Here, a science
emerges that is serious and predictive.
Natural Restorative Arcs
As far as “eco-therapy” goes, there exist long proven
therapies (e.g. Morita Therapy; Chang, 1974; Morita, 1998)
which seem to have ecological and even evolutionary validity.
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Perhaps universal and ubiquitous in the animal world, recognizable restorative arcs (functions) in/of the “wounded animal,” as
illustrated in Figure 2, if and when combined with amenable and
congruent “nature therapies,” may speed up recovery because
their timing and etiologies are based upon real physiological
processes as understood in medical terms.
The healing processes described by the above restorative arc,
if understood as a basic therapeutic imperative and sequence,
again, ubiquitous in the animal world, may be improved by
infused “naturalness” as evidenced by faster patient convalescing recuperation times (Ulrich et al, 2004).

Figure 2
To clarify, at every turn in this evolutionarily sensible
therapeutic sequence, some sort of “ecopsychology” may be an
ideal form of intervention if only we understood what sort of
animal we were at each curative phase (e.g. Morita Therapy;
Chang, 1974; Morita, 1998). And if ideas of alienation or estrangement are theoretically and empirically useful, how does
agency, for example, change during the curative process with or
without the assistance of “naturalness”?
A basic and psychological understanding of alienation and/
or estrangement, applied to the vague phrase “nature disconnection,” seems to be key if psychologists are to have a clear sense
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of how their clients come to “nature therapy” or for clients to
be informed with respect to who carries out these practices. The
work of Daniel Stokolos (1975) is still relevant today and could
provide this needed foundation. If nature is “proxy agency,”
“welcoming” all and “allowing” for any projection, would it be
useful to know how “agency” operates? Who are the agents and
the structures in these interactions?
At a minimum, if human-nature relations are understood in
terms of “love,” then Robert Sternberg’s Triangular Theory of
Love (Sternberg, 1997), to name another approach and example,
could also be a foundational work from which to begin assessing
affect and “connection” from theoretically sound and empirical
grounds.
“Nature,” “spirits in nature,” or “nature connection,” plus all
sorts of other words and catchy phrases, when vaguely understood
or purposely misleading, may seem attractive panaceas for
desperate people (both clients and therapists). In light of the
above assumptions about restorative arcs, the following are all
understandable, credible, and valid pursuits: understanding that
organismic and reflexive human needs exist to seek solace in
nature, to make its forces catalysts for psychological change, to
ease pain and accelerate healing, and to find respite in the midst
of overwhelming and unjustifiable social complexity.
Walking in the woods remains, without fuss, occultism,
ulterior motives, or adornment, the “talking cure” of feet and
minds. There is an effective “agent” there partaking of the
oldest “structure” that there is—or ever was. Confounding this
intimacy with less rigor than it takes to walk one or two miles
seems suspect.

*

*

36

*

Chapter Four
Deconstructing Origins
“The seagulls are always starving. That’s why they follow the
boats.” (Carlo Cassola)

It is neither an accident of human affectation nor disingenuous

to think of particular places as “homes,” or of an entire planet as
our home. An excerpt from the Uruguayan poet Mario Benedetti,
entitled “Ésta es mi casa” (This is my home), is very telling
about the ease for cognitively transliterating the concrete to the
abstract and from the abstract to the concrete (home><self):
Without a doubt, this is my house. Here I happen, here I
deceive myself, immensely. This is my house held in time.
(No cabe duda. Ésta es mi casa aquí sucedo, aquí me engaño
inmensamente. Ésta es mi casa detenida en el tiempo.)

The poem, an apt and profound psychological study in its own
right, is very telling of our human capacities to locate and live
within the material confines of a special place with whom we
identify; the processes of psychological becoming in the ambit
of a chosen or significant place; the forces and opportunities, the
potential for self-deception, that exist when we have decided to
inhabit a personalized space; and, as in Benedetti’s poem, the
time-bending possibilities that might aid, distort, or stand in the
way of the very processes of becoming.
As an extension of our own psyche, a home is a projection
of our faults, our present realities, our potential, and of our most
farfetched dreams. But even when incorrectly or imperfectly
signified, “our home,” is cherished and valued as a sanctuary.
Both the positive and pernicious nature of these identifications,
self > home, may be useful metaphors and analogical vehicles
from which to understand the plethora of attributions made
about places, identity, and the otherworldly phenomena humans
associate with natural spaces. Plain “space” being a daunting
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abstraction, is transformed into a familiar location and intimate
space. In this chapter I will focus on how and why people who are
known writers, scholars, and otherwise perceived to be intelligent
individuals betray deep seated wishes, fantasies, and insecurities
by the very public process of misappropriating, distorting, misunderstanding, and sharing their own interpretations about the
tags, “nature,” “connection,” or “nature connection.”
What follows is an honest attempt at reviewing and critiquing
publicly accessible material that tries to make sense of our sense
of place, and of our sense of self in places. This is a summary of
at least three aspects and effects that deep ecology, in particular,
seems to propose or have as philosophy, how it energizes
“feelings” or sentiments—insight—into righteous activism, or
as a scholarly product and its influence on “ecopsychology.”
Some Anomalies are Introduced
Deep ecological themes introduced in this chapter include explorations of: 1) the assumption that Self-realization (Goldstein,
1939; Naess, 1979; Devall & Sessions, 1985)--a still ambiguous
term that the author shall address first—and “intuitions” should
have epistemological primacy or equal footing as a counterweight to other ways of knowing “nature” (“shallow ecology”),
2) the still relevant reiteration of traditional ways of “knowing”
or understanding “nature,” and 3) the contradictions and even
logical impasses that DE as philosophy creates when its original
proposal (and particularly Arne Naess” Ecosophy T) is misunderstood and/or misapplied. These themes are approached and
treated with a critical eye, humorously, and even with face-value
acceptance, to a degree, but also with a humbling and proverbial
“grain of salt” caveat that no person who feels “deeply connected
with nature” really needs to justify the intensity and phenomenological veracity of these sentiments and feelings with some
sort of eco-philosophy or “ecopsychology.”
The author’s basic position throughout this chapter and book
is that, verily, neither a day in the woods needs to be justified nor
the sentiments that might ensue from a sylvan insight need to
be applied, as “principles.” Notwithstanding my own personal
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sentiment of “interactions in/with nature,” and in keeping with
Alan Drengson’s continued and important reminder that authors,
for clarity’s sake, keep an unambiguous distinction between the
DE platform and fundamental principles (Drengson, 1995, and
personal 4 communication; Glasser, 1995), I too shall be mindful
to keep these distinctions clear, including my own personal interpretations of DE. In the words of Drengson (1995):
Supporters of the principles have a diversity of ultimate
beliefs. "Ultimate beliefs" here refers to their own metaphysical and religious, basic grounds for their values, actions and
support for the deep ecology movement. Different people and
cultures have different mythologies and stories. Nonetheless,
they can support the platform and work for solutions to the
environmental crisis. A diversity of practices is emerging, but
the overlap is considerable as can be seen in hundreds of environmental conflicts all over the world. (p.3)

However, and despite, Glasser’s (1995) warning that one could
mistake Naess’ own sense of “Self-realization” as “singular
fundamental norms of deep ecology,” in practical actuality, some
readers do not see or perhaps even care about this distinction and
continue to interpret Naess’ DE as the “go to” DE—or however
they wish to interpret it. That is, readers persist in conflating,
understandably, conveniently or inconveniently, the messenger
with the message, even despite DE’s own founder’s clarifications (Naess, 1984).
Consider this, on the surface, sensible-sounding statement
from Naess (quoted by Drengson and Inoue, 1998, p.8): “By
an ecosophy I mean a philosophy of ecological harmony or
equilibrium.” Particularly when bold-typed and highlighted in
the fertile imagination of an “ecopsychologist,” this statement
begs for deconstruction on several grounds, and ecologically
principally, to the extent that system models like Panarchy would
assert as physically impossible to conceive that a central feature
of ecological “well-being” could be described and qualified as—
privileged as—teleologically harmonious or in equilibrium.
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Extending this description further, into human physiology and
psychology as ecologies, then the very notion that either can be
described as ‘harmonious’ or in ‘equilibrium’, specifically, that
both tend toward a definite ontological teleology, suggests little
understanding of development, developing, being, and becoming
as what they truly are: shearing and destabilizing processes—
change as a norm—in growth (Holling, 1973; Gunderson &
Holling, 2002).
Even when unintended as such, a static and idealistic view of
nature (ecology and/or human nature) has the danger of quickly
disintegrating into greater horrors. In the words of mathematician Marco Janssen (2002):
The utopia-dystopia approach can be used to explore a variety
of images of the world’s future…However this approach is
static in the sense that an emerging dystopia does not include
adaptive behavior. If the system collapses, the agents do not
respond. Hence, the scenario outcomes are rather implausible,
both for utopias and dystopias, […] Surprises are an essential
and certain element of the future. In exploring possible
pathways of the future, surprises should be explicitly taken
into account. (pp.250, 260)

Another case in point: my first introduction to both DE and “ecopsychology” was through William (Bill) Devall. His textbook for
our class at Humboldt State University (circa 1987) was Deep
Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Devall and Sessions,
1985; & Naess, 1973). On one hand, the amorphous and idiosyncratic presentation of so many concepts (“ecopsychology,”
eco-feminism, spiritual wisdom, the poetry of Gary Snyder, and
DE) in a saltatory, quizzical, and ingenious format, was the ideal
introduction, for a sophomore, to how these ideas might be interrelated—useful and important.
On the other hand, and after years of reading the original
sources of those very entries, more questions have arisen that
were not obvious or evident in the mind of an eager young
student with Bill Devall as his teacher and, later, mentor. Mostly,
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these inquiries generally arrive at the question of whether it is
practically possible to disengage DE from its metaphysical roots
or the persons we associate it with: both the initial theoretical
contributions of its founder, Arne Naess, and the subsequent
and expanded spiritual ideology of its beat poets, and Buddhist
co-founders (e.g. Robert Aitken, William Devall, Joanna Macy
and Gary Snyder).
That these foci or emphases might be the first and lasting
introductions of Naess’ ideas cannot be ignored and it might
explain why it is perhaps difficulty to separate a core (and
secular) Naess Environmental Philosophy and ethics from his
own personal philosophy and that of others. For better or worse,
these works dominate the field of ideas about DE and are the
most frequently quoted sources.
The legacy of DE in toto is then perceived as rich and multilayered and as a branching out and hybridizing force merging
with other movements (e.g. “ecopsychology”). This state of
affairs may make some grumpy, others very happy; however, in
this work this situation is treated and stated as a matter of fact, as
the way things really are. This excising, this splicing (selecting)
from the spiritual to the secular, from the sacred to the profane,
if it is even possible, may only be useful or even a scholarly
necessity to those who seek to align DE with other proposals
within environmental ethics and who are still suspicious that
DE’s platform and foundations are irrevocably connected (Conesa-Sevilla, 2006).
Experiences are Experiences—Feelings and Sentiments
and “Other Things”
Before continuing this discussion, it might be useful to
anticipate the tenor that holds together these sections and
discussions by utilizing and explaining a quote by William
James which illustrates a common theme across these sections
and work:
Apart from anything acutely religious, we all have moments
when the universal life seems to wrap us round with friendliness. In youth and health, in summer, in the woods or on
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the mountains, there come days when the weather seems all
whispering with peace, hours when the goodness and beauty
of existence enfold us like a dry, warm climate, or chime
through us as if our inner ears were subtly ringing with the
world’s security. (1902)

Captured by James’ eloquent and still relevant description, we
read, yet another iteration, in a long history of quotes and observations that could be taken to mean two confusable and/or
confounding experiences. One is secular or profane, purely psychological, and the other sacred with a “spiritual” basis. James is
careful to leave his description open to a secular (even profane),
personal interpretation and appreciation of the sentiment and
feelings associated with “being one, happy, in/with nature.”
Under this guise, there is a sense of democratization about the
accessibility of these experiences by anyone, irrespective of an
absence of a particular religious orientation or learned interpretation. That is, “nature,” potentially, is the source of seemingly
endless but also, ironically, psychologically convergent familiar
(recognizable) experiences, that when coming together in a
precisely poignant moment and manner, or quite by accident,
could trigger a collection of sentiments and feelings common—
recognizable—to all people. If not common to all people, these
experiences (sentiments and feelings) are at least common
(and recognizable) to enough people (writers, sages, outdoor
enthusiasts, forest dwellers or wanderers etc.) that they, over the
span of human history, feel strongly that their sentiments and
affectations be known and understood.
Whether we are talking about experiences particular
to individuals in large or small groups, the fact that these
experiences are, to be sure, psychologically convergent, do not
make them, necessarily, objectively (irrevocably) metaphysical.
In the same statement (James’) there is also an obvious
opportunity for projecting the sense of a source-force that
presupposes a designing and ordering intelligence (generally
benign and in charge of “harmony,” “equilibrium,” or
“balance”). This tendency is shared by some “deep ecologists”
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(and “ecopsychologists”)—see later in the text--who adhere to,
purposely infuse, or even force a particular or personal religious
view while interpreting their experiences in “nature,” as of
the certain-luminous-otherworldly type (i.e. Numinous). It is
at least a psychological curiosity to wish to study why certain
people make one sort of projection or another onto “nature”
and under what circumstances, and then, ascertain how they go
about justifying their experiences as beliefs (i.e. a psychology
of religion).
To be clear, the author sees continuing value in DE as an
important intellectual contribution to environmental ethics but
does not subscribe to that certain-luminous-otherworldly sense
(Numinous) of “connection with nature.”
Ironically to some, even confusing, the author is also a
regular zazen “sitter” who has experienced “things,” both
in nature or inside a zendo, but nevertheless adheres to early
Zen-Taoists traditions and suggestions that dissuade one from
further speculation about what these experiences might mean
or be about. With this disclaimer aside, the author shall attempt
to explain why some of these exclusively spiritual presentations
of DE might be erroneous and confabulated with other notions,
mainly, coming from psychology and/or “ecopsychology.”
From a neuroscientific perspective alone, a reasonable
assumption such as a specific fallen apple came from a specific
apple seed, tree, and soil, to use a metaphor, might have
something in common with the equal presumption that feelings
and sentiments are products of a particular brain/mind system—
no more and no less. In the words of neuroscientist David Linden
(2011):
…most experiences in our lives that we find transcendent—
whether illicit vices or socially sanctioned ritual practices
as diverse as exercise, meditative prayer, or even charitable
giving—activate an anatomically and biochemically defined
pleasure circuit in the brain…They all evoke neural signals
that converge on a small group of interconnected brain areas
called the medial forebrain pleasure circuit. (p.3)
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That, more and more, a neuroscientific perspective seems to be
a testable and reasonable “middle way,” as far as our growing
understanding of “transcendence” goes, then it pays to examine
these fruits with equal interest and earnest. To merely keep
repeating that this set of experiences is of a “transpersonal” or
“transcendental” sort, and let’s leave it at that, sounds a lot like
saying the apple fell for me alone; let’s leave it at that.
I have adopted three narrative approaches for describing
ideas, aptly I think, from a movement that runs from the philosophical to the poetic. The next section adheres more or
less to a scholarly narrative. The second employs a first-person perspective with relevant and personal examples. Lastly,
the conclusion of this chapter exploits poesis, impressionistic
elements found in some of the presentations of DE in order to
more appropriately consider “living with” some of the contradictions inherent in DE.
Ultimate Norms: Self-Realization
Naess’ choice of the term Self-realization (Naess, 1979,
1984), one could claim, the one sense that most readers starting
a discovery of DE ideas might encounter, is used to indicate
both an ontological origin (a metaphysics) and the subsequent
logical primacy of evaluations about “nature” based on personal
insight and affiliation—confirmation thereof. As affiliation (and
even teleology), it describes an innate connection and participation with planetary and even universal consciousness—their
possibility. In this sense, Naess’ “self-realization” is in keeping
with contemporary (his) uses of that term, for example, found in
the Indian religion and philosophy of Paramahansa Yogananda
who introduced the term in the United States in 1920. Coincidentally, Yogananda knew and admired Mahatma Gandhi, whose
principle of non-violence and social activism Naess himself also
admired and later emulated.
Interestingly, in one way or another, the precepts of
Yogananda’s Self-Realization Fellowship Order (SRF)
(Yogananda, 1972, 1997) of “meditation and prayer, service,
spiritual study and introspection, exercise and recreation, and
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time for solitude and silence” can be seen as the antecedents
and/or prescriptions of many forms of deep ecology by various
authors (Devall & Sessions, 1985).
In a circular discursive form and manner, not uncommon to
the traditional privileging of philosophical terms whose aims are
to add authority to certain arguments (Rorty, 1979), it is perhaps
by borrowing and creating both a metaphysical teleology and
a phenomenological ontology that Naess is able to argue that
personal insights of this kind have equal (or even superior) value
and authority with respect to scientific discoveries and knowledge.
Without this metaphysical scaffold, it comes down to, basically,
his “insights” against scientific proposals of ecology—to “insight”
versus “science.” Now, it is important to stress that Naess did not
wish to do away with “shallow ecology.” However, as part of any
convincing argument or dialectics, he needed “a decent leg to
stand on.” He chose metaphysics, thusly the dice was thrown.
In psychology, this very term, Self-realization, in a very
restricted and secular sense, is first proposed by the German psychologist Kurt Goldstein (1939) to suggest human, latent and
untapped resources from which to achieve greater vocational
heights and psychological potential. Goldstein (1956) is very
adamant that the very steps/levels that Maslow later reintroduces in his own hierarchy of needs, do not have to be sequential or
hierarchical toward “Self-actualization.”
In Goldstein’s (1956) words: “It seems to me doubtful
whether it is really possible to assume a fixed hierarchy of needs.”
This was not only the case of Maslow changing Goldstein’s
little “s” to big or capital “S,” but also, deciding that human
“drives” should be arranged in hierarchical fashion. One can
also understand Goldstein’s common sense caveat from a Zen
Buddhist perspective: When hungry, eat; if you need to do zazen,
do it; when thirsty, drink; when you need to go to the bathroom,
by all means, go! Nothing divides these actions as being any
less “sacred” or important—all “profane” is equally “sacred.”
All so-called “drives” (the skills and functions expressed by
these drives—e.g. eating) are in this sense equipotential in their
possibility to serve self-realization.
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Even from a neuroscientific perspective, let alone Goldstein’s
caveats or my own “zen” argument, such a hierarchy of needs
is questionable to the extent that brain circuitry is close-ended
and finite with respect to satisfying them—perhaps even tightly
recursive in managing both mundane (profane) and serious
(sacred) experiences by a limited set of or even the exact same
circuitry. According to Linden (2011):
[…] some people, acting on their religious principles [i.e. as
Self-actualization or Individuation], can forego sexual activity
in service to what they perceive as a more important goal.
Likewise, the politically or spiritually motivated hunger-striker is activating her pleasure/reward center by furthering her
own ideas, even when this requires acting in precise opposition
to one of our most basic and ancient drives. (p. 169)

Perhaps not Self-actualization per se but Self-Transcendence, a
final rung that supposedly Maslow introduced toward the end
of his life (Cloninger et al, 1993; Koltko-Rivera, 2006), and
when it is assumed to be an actual spiritual path, is also judged
in parity or concordant with another spiritual model of human
psychology, C. G. Jung’s (1967, 1972) notion of Individuation:
“The Self (“For the self alone embraces the ego and the non-ego,
the infernal regions, the viscera, the imagines et lares, and the
heavens,…” p. 125).
Less appropriately perhaps, but even the parity between
Maslow’s Self-Actualization and Individuation comes in the
form of analogies during teaching or in casual conversations,
and even more explicitly, while presenting these ideas in introduction to psychology textbooks (Gross, 2009). In the words of
Gross:
“The self: This is the central archetype (‘the archetype of
archetypes’), which unites the personality, giving it a sense of
‘oneness’ and firmness. The ultimate aim of every personality
is to achieve a state of selfhood and individuation (similar to
self-actualisation). (p.753)
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Furthermore, it is worth noting that although Devall and Sessions
(1985) make a distinction between Naess’ sense of self-realization and its psychological use or sense in the work of Maslow:
It is also crucial to remember that this top norm or
ultimate norm, Self-realization, is meant not in the sense
of narrow ego realization nor in the sense often used by
Abraham Maslow and other Western humanistic psychologists, but in the sense of universal self as described
in the perennial philosophy; a self with capital “S”[…]
(p.227)
Obvious contradictions aside, this distinction may not be
accepted by run-of-the-mill transpersonal psychologists who
take it at face value that Maslow is talking about self with a
capital “S” and really assume a “hierarchy of needs” with
S-A at the apex, and really assume that some sort of “spiritual
enterprise” is afoot.
The writings of A. Maslow, C. Rogers, and K. Goldstein are
to be found, together, in Clark E. Moustakas book (Ed., 1956),
the very work that launches Humanistic Psychology. Moustakas
himself (1956) “plays with” and summarizes these nascent ideas
of Humanistic Psychology in ways that can be adopted into a
philosophy and psychology that could be termed “deep”:
The organism has different potentialities, and because it has
them it has a need to actualize or realize them. The fulfillment
of these needs represents the self-actualization of the organism,
a constant emerging of self, of one’s “nature” in the world.
Failure to actualize essential capacities is equivalent to not
being…Intrinsic nature, being, and becoming are involved in
every true experience. (p.273)

Again, these words, from a psychologist writing almost
twenty years before Naess introduces DE, can be just as easily
adopted as a psychology and a philosophy of “intrinsic value,”
and further, cemented in some sort of ethics that seeks (even
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demands) the protection of any organism’s “intrinsic right”
toward self-realization.
In either case, or in all cases, whatever the case may be,
coming from ultimate premises or even platform principles, one
should be cautious of not committing an Is-Ought Fallacy. In the
particular case of Naess’ Ecosophy T, a definition of Self-realization (“Is”) that is metaphysically obtained from thin air, and then
pushed as “intrinsic value” ethics (“Ought”) warrants further
scrutiny. In short, that the profane easily becomes the sacred, or
that the secular the spiritual, may suggest—profoundly for psychology--that as part of human nature some individuals are willing
to go further, with language and actions, to differently evaluate
and value (Conesa-Sevilla, 2006), perhaps an identical set of
sentiments and feelings, as being ontologically more mysterious
and hierarchically of greater standing or significance given an
as yet, unidentified by science, identical set of neurochemical
“happenings” such as in the phenomenology that William James
described or what Dr. Linden alluded to earlier (2011).
Not to be glib, that is to say that where some folks see
cherubs in their bread toast and immediately have a profound
mystical experience (the perceptual projection called pareidolia)
with/about this object (Gantman & Babel, 2014), others continue
spreading butter and jam and proceed to devour it with great satisfaction—without a second thought.
A DE/“Ecopsychology” Exotic Cocktail
By proposing, describing, and finally juxtaposing self-realization as a fundamental ontology with ensuing “ultimate
norms,” in retrospect, and in light of what the term self-realization (self-actualization and self-transcendence) has come to
mean in DE and in psychology, some aspects and presentations
of DE waded in murky waters from the start. In a sense, it is not
a very surprising cocktail of familiar—relatable—ideas. Some
may read these distinctions as having a fight inside a thimble
while a flood is coming—irrelevant or unimportant. I would
agree. There are real environmental and environmental-psychological challenges ahead, the likes of which humanity has
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not seen before—even adapted to. However, again, it is hard to
ignore that coincidental and historically contemporaneous with
the ideas generated and proposed by Naess, there already existed
a pre- or supra-scientific ethos around the very term Self-realization that then becomes central in a distinction between “deep”
(intuitive, self-affirming with nature-cosmic interrelations in
mind) versus a “shallow” (scientific, mechanistic, academic,
technical) ecologies.
In the same breath, none of us who have a soft bone or two
for DE should ignore that these distinctions matter to many who
still perceive DE as a product of religion, and its close cousin
“ecopsychology,” as its virgin priestess. The following passage
(Noel, 1998) illustrates, for example, an “ecopsychologizing”
of Jung, and then the regilionazing of “ecopsychology.” This is
a rather lengthy quote but necessary in order to establish the
ease with which some authors weave a tale from one specific
sort of psychology to another and then to religion in a few
sentences. To anticipate, Noel’s argument goes something like
this: a) Let’s make way too much of a tiny percentage of what
Jung ever wrote that even remotely resembles “ecopsychology,”
b) Then, as it is customary when talking positively about Jung,
let’s deemphasize the merits of “psychoanalysis,”—the “other
guy,” c)Conveniently, let’s also forget that many, many schools
of psychology exist that could have a scientific crack at “ecopsychology,” and d) Let’s do a “bait-and-switch” quick maneuver
and, somehow, make this sort of “ecopsychology” a “Nature
Religion”:
Let me begin by quoting words I take to be both exemplary
for the tradition in question and pertinent to our discussion
of "nature religion":[Jung] Yet there is so much that fills
me: plants, animals, clouds, day and night, and the eternal
in man. The more uncertain I have felt about myself, the
more there has grown up in me a feeling of kinship with all
things. In fact it seems to me as if that alienation which so
long separated me from the world has become transferred into
my own inner world, and has revealed to me an unexpected
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unfamiliarity with myself.[…] Beyond modest if valuable
ecopsychological efforts to psychoanalyze attitudes toward
environmentalism or to use diagnostic categories to assess the
mental causes of our historical divorce from nature, psychology’s sense of the boundaries of the self will need to expand,
so that the individual psyche, losing its familiar isolation,
might become an “eco-psyche,” participating in the subjectivity of the more-than-human as well as human realms. […]
To reiterate, a post-Jungian ecopsychology, collective as well
as individual, emotional as well as intellectual, does not have
to succeed politically at present for it to be of value to those
of us seeking to understand "nature religion" as a theoretical
construct. (One Page)

Once again, for me, it is difficult to even decide where to begin
a critical evaluation of these exaggerated and confounded claims
except to consider the source and context, be generous, and leave
it at that. We could then find some comfort in saying something
like, “This could be another case where, in matters of “religion,”
anything goes.” But critically speaking, by unduly focusing on
a (possible) failure of a certain brand of “psychoanalysis” to
more fully explicate “nature connections,” myopically so, this
author seems to prematurely disregard the entire potentiality of
all sorts of “psychologies” (cognitive, evolutionary, developmental, psychobiological, etc.) to have some scientific say in matters
“ecopsychological.” Whoever said or decided that “ecopsychology” must be a single flavor enterprise? Mr. Noel did in this case.
More problematic yet, take some of the actual “ecopsychological” work, for example, of recognizable figures like
John Seed, Joanna Macy, and Molly Young Brown. Here is a
description, in Macy’s words (1998), about how the Council
of All Beings, a now popular “ecopsychology” workshop, was
originally conceived:
One day after a weekend workshop, John Seed, founder of
the Rainforest Information Center, took me to one of the last
vestiges of his continent's primordial forests, saved from the
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timber companies by blockades mounted by John and other
local protesters. On that excursion John and I discovered
that we shared a passionate interest in deep ecology and the
writings of Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess about the
"ecological self." As Buddhists, we both resonated with these
concepts, finding them close to the Buddha’s core teaching on
the interdependence of all life. John expressed the wish that
my workshops include a “deep ecological” group experience
to directly challenge the anthropocentrism of industrial
society. So together, that day, we invented the Council of All
Beings. It was introduced shortly afterwards, in the course of
the weeklong training that culminated my workshop tour. At
a camp north of Sydney, on huge flat rocks by a waterfall,
some forty people took part. And soon they were taking the
ritual back with them to their local communities. Within a
year, by word of mouth--and through John's and my travels-the Council of All Beings spread to North America, Western
Europe, and Japan. From the Grand Canyon to the banks of
the Rhine, in redwood groves and classrooms and church
basements, people were gathering to shed their personae as
humans and give voice to the plight of the Earth. They spoke
as whale and wolf and wind, aspen and marsh and any other
nonhuman they felt called to represent. […] I like to begin the
proceedings by inviting the beings to identify themselves in
turn, a kind of roll call: Wolf is here, I speak for all wolves. I
am Wild Goose; I speak for all migratory birds. […]

No doubt, the strange but equally creative idiosyncratic amalgamation of interpretations of some brand of “deep ecology”
and some brand of Buddhism, in a metaprocess of interpersonal
authentication and mutual affirmation, turned into some kind of
“ecopsychology,” is likely to be well-received by folks who are
desperately seeking immediate and impressionistic (emotionally
satisfying) explanations to reconnect, at some emotional level
with “nature, but is this work also critical of DE, Zen Buddhism,
or “ecopsychology”? What ensues is almost foretold in the Rune
Stones: very sincere folks, so-called “ecotherapists,” run for the
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hills, replicate “the workshop,” dawn paper masks, speak for
some sort of “otherness,” without any one critic (a scholarly
examination) voicing an opinion about the validity of these
“forest experiments” with respect to their purported theoretical
foundations or psychotherapeutic benefits or outcomes.
To the extent that these exercises are labeled “deep ecology,”
Buddhism, and/or “ecopsychology,” by their creators, they
encompass most all of the wishful-thinking (also real emotional
needs) that is present (or latent) out there by sincere folks who are
seeking remedies for their own existential woes, angst-eco-anxiety or work as professionals--as planet-attuned mediators. Not
surprisingly, “shallow” ecologists, environmental scientists or
philosophers are quite justified—who can blame them—after
witnessing this Sylvan drama, in their suspicion of the whole
of DE-thing—guilty by association, once again. Then, when
and if we wonder why DE is not an overriding paradigm in environmental philosophy—at least— forty years later, we have
to consider that if one is already perceived as being “guilty by
association,” espousing some form of Eastern religion and/or
Humanistic Psychology, then not much will happen afterwards—
DE’s critics will point this out (Marshall, 1988). Ironically, DE
has been described in some cases as not being radical enough or
not being self-consistent (Bookchim, 1987).
However, and to be fair to all these “cocktail” ideas, in
the final analysis, little of this matters, really, if one is not a
philosopher or social scientist and “simply” needs an impressionistic “value” structure and/or frame of reference from which
to justify certain actions or express deep and genuine feelings of
“connection.” In fact, I doubt that any person who has felt the
feelings/sentiments described in the quote by James, and/or has
gone onto making them a regular aspect of their lifestyle and
psyche as some sort of “ecopsychology,” and/or has used them
as a justification for righteous—in their view—activism, ever
needed DE principles to begin with, in Naessian or other forms.
There is, no doubt, something “true,” something enchanting,
something valuable, something even delirious about the
rediscovery that humans are organisms like any other and are
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forever locked into an interconnectedness “dance” with the
whole of “nature.” We are all beautiful forms.
Beautiful Forms
There is much about DE that is instantly recognizable to
those readers who delve in ecosophy, ecopsychology, Buddhism
and ecofeminism, particularly in the work of Devall and
Sessions (1985). Their continued connections with and elaborations of DE as when presenting Paul Shepard’s Human
Ecology and ecopsychology, or the work of Dolores LaChapelle
and Theodore Roszak, poets like beat-Buddhist Gary Snyder,
and Zen Buddhism proper (Robert Aitken) made me giddy and
validated my own feelings and sentiments: these people were
all right—good eggs. My own heart had fellow tree-kissing
comrades. For that matter, any reader of DE just as easily, and
for similar reasons, may study and embrace Whitehead’s and
Cobb’s (Whitehead, 1919; ix Cobb Jr.,1972/1995) derivations
from metaphysics to ecology preceding DE, or merging these as
instances as a similar family of insights: ecological interrelatedness is inescapable in “god’s” (or “Gaia’s) ecology.
To disclose again, I have been a student of, sat in meditation
with, and gone hiking with Bill Devall. I destroyed the invasive
lupine plants he ordered me to eradicate—for no extra credit.
For four years, I lived in a small ohana that Robert Aitken built
with his wife as their first Hawaiian zendo (Haiku, HI). Most of
the present work was written there. These are not empty abstractions. To this very moment these experiences are felt like cool
tropical rain and hot spicy tea. For years I have been nourished
by beat poetry and my South American Animus has been fortified
by eco-feminist works, in particular. Their combined language
and messages are about beautiful forms constantly emerging
and ever sustaining. Above all, they balance, then and now, my
tendency to measure and tally—which is as strong. At some
point though, I “grew up” and without parting with their wisdom
I delved deeper into why DE owes much to Eastern philosophical traditions, for example, but equally important, I learned why
DE cannot make certain claims with respect to the traditions that
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color and contribute to its very real and contagious fluorescence,
without receiving due and healthy criticism.
Before sitting in zazen and many years since I have had
experiences that can poorly be described as “profoundly
ordinary.” This is the language that Alan Watts translates and
shares to characterize, in essence, some of the experiences that
have been passed down to us from the early Chan Taoist monks
as “insight” or “satori” (1957). And the next section will perhaps
not sit very well with many individuals who profess some kind
of spirituality, and in particular, a nature spirituality.
The Spell of Sensuous Ordinariness
Whether my experiences (“zen moments”) occurred
outdoors or indoors, whether they happened early in my life or
later, one thing was common to all: there was never a specific
sense that “nature” existed apart from my own experience.
More importantly, at least to me, there was no specific sense
of “nature,” period, distinct from a broken bit of glass, a dirty
shoe, a house, another person, etc., from the whole collection of
perceived objects and happenings that I describe as my “reality.”
That is, in these states, no distinctions were relevant, useful, or
meaningful. A sense of ever-present “ordinariness” (the thing
was the thing, no more no less) pervaded my psychefield of
experience. Only afterwards, and with great difficulty, while
employing poor analogies, I could have declared any or all of
the following without ever saying anything pertinent and while
being pertinent:
I am one-third with the world I am several natures depending
on the weather…Love is life, life is blood…Some teeth are
sharper than others…The tea smells of gardenias and smiles
of ginger… Look at my left shoe; it needs new laces…I do
not exist, but co-exist with lots and lots of bacteria— Lots!...I
really love pecans, especially when swimming in a pie—not me,
the pecans!... That bit of green glass, it’s sure pretty…I am as
ordinary as any other thing can be, but today, now, more so…All
is beautiful, beautiful forms are all… All is ugly, ugly forms are
all… All or none of above is quite extraordinary!
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Perhaps, in this context, some readers would appreciate
my own sense of confusion when some of the literature of DE,
or of “ecopsychology,” or new age psycho-edifying treatises,
combine almost willy-nilly, spirits, voices, different measures
of religious traditions, profound water fall fairy revelations,
ayahuasca wisdom, secret and intimate encounters with bears,
sex with dolphins, in short, an amorphous glob of super-naturality as aim and purpose of, or final destination for “natural
connections.”
So, in the end, the questions are both philosophical and psychological: 1) Whose set of experiences--whose epistemology-do
we hold as the “gold standard” for evaluating and valuating the
authenticity of some experience we call “nature connection”?
and assuming that this could be done—I doubt it—2) What sort
of ethics ensues from these experiences, intuitions, feelings, or
sentiments?
Interestingly, the very, recalcitrant at times, traditional
literature coming from Chinese and Japanese Zen traditions and
texts (Watts, 1957), upon which many of the ideas or extensions
of DE applications are based, over and over, explicitly or
implicitly, warn against easy classification-with-words about
these very experiences. Apropos, for a Chan-Zen master, acts of
“compassion” involved actually chopping bodily limbs in order
to diminish self-centeredness, in order to “transcend” a petty
ego. This is not the flower-in-the-vase variety of compassion
but acts that are so extant and removed from their historical
and experiential context that their reification by selecting some
exclusive subset of “acts of compassion” do little to elucidate
the tradition from which these emerged. In particular, and
according to the great Chan masters (Watts, 1957), there is
no reason to exclusively or directly link profound “ordinary”
experiences with “nature” per se. So, how does one go from,
DE enthusiast to the non-metaphysics of “say-no-thing” and “no
categories exist,” to very precise and exclusive formulations of
“compassion” ethics or intrinsic value?
And should DE ideas be expressed while employing Zen
Buddhist terminology, contradictions arise anew if one stays
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with primary sources and/or personal experience, centrally, the
very notion of “self.” In the words of Alan Watts, “Zen points
out that our precious ‘self’ is just an idea, useful and legitimate
enough if seen for what it is, but disastrous if identified with our
real nature” (p.120,121).
Here is the problem, perhaps only my problem. Going back
to that phrase Self-realization as a central motif in Naess’ DE,
empirically speaking, there is no testable/credible justification
in assuming that merely from experiencing personal feeling or
sentiment “A” we can generate principle “B,” that is, going even
further and formulating, specifically, an intrinsic value system
that makes our “connection with nature” some sort of ethics. That
is, there is no testable/credible justification in affirming that some
sort of Self-realization(self-transcendence) process exists—a
universal principle—and that as a consequence, all forms,
beautiful and ugly are irreducibly engaged in “this business,”
and therefore, everything shares in this value, Becoming. If so,
it can be said that DE never needed to, nor needs today, to make
value statements consistent with otherworldly metaphysics, or
with sentiments and feelings based on insights--formulate a code
of ethics based on these hard to measure ontologisms or make
unlikely statements such as in (my own characterization) “the
self-realization potential of this tree is as important as mine.”
More importantly, as far as anybody knows, the strange
experience of overriding “ordinariness” or other feelings,
sensations, and sentiments that ensue thereafter as part of a
“Zen experience” are a unique condition and predisposition of
a human brain/mind system without psychological correlates
or any profound and objectively significant relations with the
rest of the natural world and universe—a very un-Batesonian
statement to make. Simply, and in James’ words, the “days when
the weather seems all whispering with peace, hours when the
goodness and beauty of existence enfold us like a dry, warm
climate, or chime through us as if our inner ears were subtly
ringing with the world’s security,” is nothing but, and exists only
in our brain/mind imagination-as far as we know. If so, “we save
the planet” because we decide we must, because we want to and
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not necessarily because that tree or this lion has an “intrinsic
value or right to exist.” Ethics—morality—is, if sufficiently
inspected, self-serving even in the face of apparently noble and
impartial motives.
But, that’s OK! Lions and trees are saved nevertheless,
because without them WE WOULD BE LONELY (Shepard,
1996). Building canoes by hand, manipulating simple tools
pleasant to the fingers, being impressed and ennobled by the
behaviors of animal otherness (Shepard, 1996), deriving satisfaction from the wabi sabi ordinariness of an old wooden bench
or a tree trunk—our many enchantments or obsessions with all
their beautiful forms— reside, until or unless proven otherwise,
inside human brains/minds and only there. These feelings and
sentiments are intrinsic to the human brain/mind system and
this seems to be quite enough. “I want to save lions because
they are beautiful and powerful animals” seems to me as good a
reason as any, without having to invent questionable metaphysical predicates to justify my actions and wishes—to direct my
behaviors. We can go further and codify this very sentiment and
henceforth make new laws that declare: “Lions must be saved
because they are (have) beautiful forms and powerful animals.”
But laws are arbitrary.
Paradoxically Perplexing Songs
There is no one “Gold Standard” for “an appreciation of
‘nature’.” Instead, there are many golden means, many ways of
relating to “nature,” many ways of justifying what we do “there,”
as many, in fact, as there are eyes and brains, hands, wings, or
paws. Our individual-intimate ways of “becoming one with
nature” or simply enjoying and appreciating all the beautiful
forms, all the strange places, require no authority—philosophical or “ecopsychological” predicates.
Therefore, there could be many ethical proposals invented to
justify all these actions. Much like grammar is an afterthought
of fluid and natural speech, of language, our intimations with/
in “nature” may be followed through by capitalizing on one or
another formal system of inquiry which “simply” rationalizes
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intuitions, insights, sentiments and feelings after the fact. In
that spirit…I have thought long and hard about this. The feral
hens I feed every day make paradoxically perplexing sounds,
sometimes even songs if they are in the mood. They sound
satisfied, testy, frustrated, angry, perturbed, or scared. None of
their songs seem to say: “Jorge has intrinsic value.” That is, I am
either there for them or not, and if I went away tomorrow they
would, I suspect, still make the same chicken chatter.
I look deep and far into the starry night sky and not a single
corpuscle of light knows my name, much less says: “There,
over there, Jorge exists and he has intrinsic value.” I can make
something up, like, Hoku-ke’ax protects me, but I know in my
Haole heart of Haole hearts and in my Catalan head of Catalan
heads that it ain’t true.
I take DE to mean what it can say or mean, but no more and
no further than the night starry sky that I can see can say. All
their voices are linked to mine but none speaks louder or clearer
than the other:
Father Naess: There is a profoundly beautiful Norwegian
“chatter” about mountains— climbing them—silence, and what
could happen if this beauty or silence were to disappear just
because some other human thought that building a chalet and
ski resort was a pretty darn good way of making a living.
Fathers Devall and Drengson: There was a Zen climber in
Northern California or an avid walker in BC Canada who, both,
moved mountains and they in turn were moved by mountains.
Father Snyder: There is a testy, crafty, and crusty beat poet
that still sings paradoxically perplexing verses so that the rest of
us can smell what he sees. There was an old veteran who became
a lay zen “monk” and founded a zendo in a tropical paradise
even though he himself suffered the pain of the world.
Myself in Haiku, at this very moment: There is an invasive
diurnal mongoose that lives near my hut, which can never
quite catch a circadian-antipodal bunch of succulent and furry
nocturnal rats. By light of day, he steals eggs for a living and is
quite content, or so it appears. The rats seem relieved and go on
stealing our bananas.
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When my body allows it me, I run on a long stretch of beach.
Crabs and stilts scamper away. The green and rugged hills to the
west, sometimes the moon setting in the early morning hours,
the dry or brackish salty marshes, turtles, dolphins and whales,
every now and then, appear and then disappear, filling me with
wonder and appreciation. I am put in my place and humbled.
Awestruck is the very word I want to use to describe all these
happenings. We are all doing our business, I on two older legs,
they on faster and strange ones. DE makes sense HERE on these
occasions. Who or what can deny any other “who” or “what” the
privilege of appearing and disappearing, running, scampering,
posing majestically, or taking turns at eye-spying? Also, any
who or what, can and does deny any other thing or process its
flow in our almost daily life-and-death “plays,” oftentimes, for
reasons I shall never know.
Really, that certain and that simple: Who or what can deny
any other who or what the privilege of appearing and disappearing, running, scampering—being-both, an extraordinary and
also a very ordinary multitude of comings and goings, living
and dying beautiful forms?
Some Paradoxically Perplexing “Things”
We affirm with terror, love or care, We negate in joy, at
leisure, or in jest, We carelessly take more than any one thing
could eat or hoard, We exist as unfettered imagination and in
minute, lucid moments, We are invasive species and are too
ravaged by the intrusion of many-a-foe, We enact laws that no
deer or wolves obey, but their rules always seem to matter more,
Mountain-slides raze towns and kill infants without a thought
in mountain or of child, We see and not see, want and not want,
wish and stop wishing, And yet, “nature” does not care, we do,
Above all--and here is the paradoxically perplexing thing—we
live inside ourselves every second, and every second that counts,
we live outside ourselves and become the beautiful forms we
affirm with terror, love, and care.
If nothing else, because of all of this, one needs a deep ecology
or some kind of “ecopsychology” to help us begin to sort out our
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existentially inescapable relations to the natural world, and us
too, as part of this naturalness-ness. But these paths begin in
the middle. They are neither the trailhead nor a destination. No
person has yet invented a microscope that peers into the paradox
that is life and death with clarity. Most likely, even if such a
device existed, we would be instantly and precisely perplexed,
when the silly scope magnifies absolutely nothing of worth,
nothing worth being perplexed about. From an “ecopsychological” perspective, if nothing else, we need some kind of DE
when we realize we have gone too far--when we have killed too
many things and heaped too many bones and then wish to atone
for these sins—wish to amend our transgressions. In short, DE
can be seen as an epistemological structure that facilitates not
only catharsis, a necessary social and psychological need, but
equally, suggests meaningful-to-the-person positive behavioral
outlets, activism, even though, at its core, it is metaphysically
questionable.
Mostly, we need some sort of DE and/or some sort of “ecopsychology” in order to, again, have faith in ourselves. Perhaps,
no other justification is needed for wearing a cardboard bear
mask and pretending to be a bear (speak for bear). Similarly, the
existential psychologist Otto Rank (1956) remarked:
The patient needs a world view and will always need it,
because man always needs belief, and this so much more, the
more increasing self-consciousness brings him to doubt. Psychotherapy does not need to be ashamed of its philosophic
character, if only it is in a position to give to the sufferer the
philosophy that he needs, namely, faith in himself. (p.75)

There is “ecological” and even “ecopsychological” wisdom that
has been passed down to us from long ago ages and thinkers.
In a nutshell, this wisdom is a continued exultation of the virtue-habits of frugality, simplicity, non-attachment, and humility.
Epicurus, Buddha, St. Francis are notable and salient voices
espousing the connection between a simple life and nimble or
unburdened psychology.
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That these voices and wisdom often originate in the context of
a religious tradition, does not make “ecopsychology” a religion
any more than medical cures, architecture, animal husbandry, or
agriculture are “religious” when these sciences too emerge in the
context of a dominant cultural paradigm. Religious and spiritual
overtones are not intrinsic to any of these pursuits unless a
person, idiosyncratically so, forces or needs this connection.

*

*
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Psycho-Phenology: Applications of Ecological Panarchy to
Psycho-Ecological Systems
“…the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with
the blood of patriots & tyrants. It is it’s [sic] natural manure.”
(Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to Williams Stephens Smith, Paris,
Nov. 13, 1787)
The above quote by Jefferson might give uncomfortable
pause to any sensible and socially stable person. One suspects
a “positive psychologist” may balk at this notion on some sort
of personal or empirical ground. Nevertheless, the unsettling
declaration speaks to the recurring dilemma, a historically corroborable fact, that the human psyche negotiates from
time to time (must, according to Jefferson), the quality of its
human standing and health vis a vis unfavorable, diminishing,
or crumbling social and natural structures. More often than not
the “negotiations” with an established order are bloody and
disrupting. On the other hand, a Taoist or Buddhist monk might
not be at all surprised or perturbed by the factual nature of this
claim.
Given the fluidity and projective potential inherent in the
words “ecology” and “psychology,” it is not surprising that there
could also be multiple approaches that attempt to justify their
relational dynamics. Chapter Four reviewed several approaches
that make use of existing systems (e.g. Buddhism) with which
to make these terms seem amenable and congruent to each other.
Some of these proposals run the gamut from simply paying lip
service to these tags, that is, they are through and through non-scientific idiosyncratic proposals, to, in mainstream psychology,
attempting to understand some deeper connections within and
between various eigenwelt, mitwelt and umwelt systems.
With respect to the latter, this is the case, for example,
when J. J. Gibson presents us with a dynamic understanding of
perception in context (Gibson, 1986) or when seen in U. Bron63
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fenbrenner’s complex and truly ecological approach to human
development (Bronfenbrenner).
The position taken here is that it is clear that both tags
determine, from the start, a scholarly conversation about systems
and systemics. Throughout this work, it has been emphasized
that “ecopsychology” seems to be addressing or readdressing
eigenwelt-mitwelt-umwelt relations with an eye toward understanding the degree to which nature affiliations could be
described as optimal for an individual, groups of individuals,
and/or societies. The same approach might produce descriptions
of sub-optimal and even dysfunctional affiliations (nature estrangement and nature alienation).
An aspect of the relationship that exists between these two
types of descriptions, optimal and sub-optimal, includes the
revisiting of ecological proposals that look at the challenges of
sustainability and resilience from psychological perspectives.
Paul Shepard’s work, Nature and Madness, does so comprehensibly well, but it is not a work that was intended to develop a
precise science of nature affiliations. His work orients us in the
right direction and begins to ask fundamental questions about
the possible arcs of human development vis a vis changing socio-cultural structural and normative dynamics.
In ecological terms, humans have burned savannah and
prairie alike in order to ensure constant and renewed grazing
by large herbivores to make for easier hunting. Particularly
vulnerable megafauna (e.g. on islands, flightless birds, slow
reproducing) have been hunted to extinction by humans (Stuart,
1991; Holdaway and Jacomb, 2000; Brook and Johnson, 2006;
Metcalf, et al, 2016). Humans are ecological mega-disruptors on
an order comparable to natural catastrophes (Zalasiewicz, 2010;
and Revkin, 2011) with no abating in sight.
Moreover, and culturally speaking, any of the key terms to be
presented (destruction, organization, reorganization, resilience,
sustainability) equally apply to a hero’s monomyth (Campbell,
1949), here to be taken as an important (realistic) psychological
model from which to abstract and value psychological becoming
and to draw analogies from.
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As psycho-ecologically intuitive as these connections are,
the generally accepted goals of psychological functionality and
sustainability are insisted upon with a therapeutic goal toward
sometimes vacuous or even noxious social contexts.
Neither the therapist nor the “client” nor society (Conesa-Sevilla, 2006; Fromm, 1955) seem to “get it together,” despite the
well-wishes, admonitions, theories, and the many interventions
that are meant to catalyze psychological wellness. Another
unsettling reality: The best that psychology has posited and now
offers seems to be a pale benefit when compared to the global
scope and scale of a variety of woes that the whole of humanity
and other planetary systems face. During a global epidemic of
existential discord and dissonance, a few vaccinations for a
handful of affluent patients simply won’t do.
The nature of ontological psychological dynamics, its
stability continually tested and upturned by developmental and
historical events, was not lost on psychologists like Erik Erikson
(1950) and Erich Fromm (1955), both writing in the context of
WWII and the incipient rising of the “throw away” society.
Psycho-Phenology
The term Psycho-Phenology is here coined in order to
continue bringing greater parity to ecology and psychology
(Conesa-Sevilla, 2005; Conesa-Sevilla, 2006; Conesa-Sevilla,
2013). The grand master of phenology, Aldo Leopold (Leopold
& Jones, 1947), saw the relevance of understanding the cycles
and seasons in a given environment as a way to comprehend
the totality of a terroir and make predictions of its likely and
further development. Psycho-phenology can be considered
a sub-perspective under a scientifically rigorous and grander
“ecopsychology.”
The term psycho-phenology also implies the study of a
“sense of place.” In essence it is an intimate understanding and
account of the cyclical nature of an organism-in-context. Its
basic assumption is that the dynamics of change is as much a
value of ecology as apparent constancy and sustainability.
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Psychologists are also de facto phenologists if they make the
following assumptions: 1) The human mind-body system is first
and foremost an ecological system; 2) The ecology of the human
mind-body system constantly interacts with diverse aspects and
multiple kinds and levels (respectively, eigenwelt, mitwelt, and
umwelt; and micro, meso, and macro) of many other ecological
systems; 3) Change, disruptions, and turbulence are key transformative elements of any ecology; 4) Apparent stability
(sustainability) is a limited and partial measure in time (Conesa-Sevilla, 2005); 5) All ecological systems fail, or are designed
to fail, provided some compensatory maneuvers are also in
place. Vulnerability to “failure,” in ecological terms, is seen as
an opportunity for reorganization and transformation; and 6)
Natural selection, among other mechanisms of evolution, is the
grand paradigm under which ecology makes the most sense—it
is a most useful tool for making fruitful predictions and testable
hypotheses.
In this light, Psycho-Phenology is a reconciliation with
ecology that human beings, without and within, are ecological
systems, and because they are “systems” they are governed by
laws that transcend their perceived and actual “infinite cultural
status.” That is, human culture, for most individuals, presents an
illusory sense of permanence in that it might psychologically be
assumed to be a sustainable culture, even though signs of great
change stir on its historical horizon.
Although stability and certainty are desirable conditions
for humanity under which to succeed, realistically speaking
and across many of the organizational systems envisioned and
practiced by humans (political, religious, economic), change
and uncertainty are equally the norm. To make idiosyncratic-human exemptions, to ignore the volatility that is “life,”
or to fail to take into account variables that shape all circumstances, actual and potential, is to negate (as in denial) a basic
constitution of existence. As an example, and in the words of
Steven Stoll (2016), “Economic growth partakes in this magical
thinking: the capacity of the environment remains constant at
infinity.”
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Human nature (habits, preferences, likes, and dislikes) tends
toward stability even though its own biological understrata and
larger ecological contexts are in states of constant dynamics.
This mismatch between the ecological ideal and the actual
leads to underestimating change itself, the rate of change, the
direction of change, and the repercussion that change might
have on resilience and sustainability.
Viewed from an ecological perspective, boom and bust,
happiness and sorrow, health and disease, interest and boredom,
elation and depression, hedonistic and suicidal tendencies are
one whole cloth of the human experience. They all suggest
that actual life is subject to the whims, moods, and cycles of
real events and that no one person can make these onslaughts
stand still. Siddhartha’s father tried sheltering his son from
sorrow and harm only to contribute to making him one of the
most remarkable examples of the rejection of human psychological stability-permanence. In short, to fathom human-nature
cycles, to beware of their temporary and superficial constancy,
ironically, their apparent “dependability” as harbingers of the
potentially chaotic situation they might become, is the domain
of Psycho-Phenology.
In this context, and with a full understanding of psycho-phenological facts and dynamics, one can better appreciate and
incorporate the disciplines of frugality and non-attachment as
an ideal being-form; as optimal psychology. If so, and in this
light, some of the wisdom of Epicurus, Buddha, or St. Francis is
recognizably “ecological” and even “ecopsychological.”
Thus, although one might favor the mostly predictable plot
of a Bildungsroman novel--youth, step by step learning his or
her way in society and eventually achieving maturity--this developmental arc is teleologicaly speaking all too ideal. On the
other hand, and not surprisingly, the assuredly laborious and
potentially lethal arc of the monomyth (Campbell, 1949) has
been the most enduring, and ironically, the most realistic myth
across human cultures and time. Life is suffering and conquering
with moments of respite--in a person’s life, in a group’s time, in
the history of any nation, and further back into prehistory.
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Ecological Panarchy
Gunderson et al (1995), Holling et al (2002a), and Holling
et al (2002c), modified traditional frameworks for understanding
ecological dynamics. Their work added to an already existing
phenology, a more realistic emphasis on processes of destruction
and organization in addition to the traditional ecological foci on
growth and conservation. Their framework adds two additional
functions, release and reorganization, with which one can also
understand the inter-medial mutability of ecological systems—
their inter-phasic dynamics. Within the limitations of the
panarchy model (Gotts, 2007), there is much that is already
relevant to an understanding of human systems (see Appendix
II).
Figure 3, adapted from Gunderson and Holling (2002),
minus the added references to its original (in red), depicts the
dynamics of Ecological Panarchy. At first look, panarchy, at
least implicitly, tracks the systemic historical changes that some
systems are likely to revisit. Panarchy can be made congruent
with other descriptions that emphasize the dynamics of all
organisms and systems with regard to life’s basic components
and interactions of Energy, Safety, and Possibility (Conesa-Sevilla, 2005).

Figure 3
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Questions of resilience and sustainability arise when the
establishment and diversity, “functionality,” are understood
and also tracked as part of the dynamics that panarchy aims
to elucidate. In the words of Holling and Gunderson (2002b),
resilience can be seen as “the magnitude of disturbance that
can be absorbed before the system changes its structure by
changing the variables and processes that control behavior.” If
so, then the psychological concept of “coping” suggests a direct
analogy to ecological resilience, where an increase of coping
and varied strategies implies greater resilience—“the magnitude
of disturbance that can be absorbed.”
All ecological systems, including human psychology,
fail eventually, or are so developmentally dynamic that they
are inherently unstable—a virtue of adaptability. A Freudian
perspective allows for the notion that human psychology, itself
dynamically changing, while embedded in changing social
systems, necessitates innate ego-defense mechanisms in order
to accomplish the goals of basic survival. Thus reinterpreted,
a non-teleological view of human development, for starters,
suggests that psychological failure and collapse are proximal
and expected in order to learn new strategies for coping (Conesa-Sevilla, 2013).
In this light, detachment, physical toughness, stoic
endurance, civility, selfishness, perseverance, cooperation,
politeness, generosity, negotiation, or plain stubbornness can all
be equally effective coping strategies depending on the nature
of the social or nature-environmental change. In this context,
psycho-phenology deals with psychology in real historical and
contemporary contexts, focusing on “what is” rather than on
idealized conceptions of “happiness” (Seligman, 1991). The
happy-go-lucky optimist may be the first casualty of the Anthropocene.
The Resiliency Cycle Revisited
Figure 3 and Table 2 (a & b) introduce and juxtapose four
ways of identifying the psycho-ecological passage from ruin to
riches. It also serves as an anthropological format (nonnorma-
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tive, value-free) of mapping different models of psychological
well-being. For example, idealized notions of human prosperity
(Seligman, 1991) can be defined by the “thriving/inhabiting” and
even the “stagnation” phases (shown in Figure 3 and described
in Tables 2a and 2b).
Whenever chaos or new possibilities for growth are the
existential status quo, then, respectively, “destruction” and
“survival” modalities will be the norm. In ecological terms,
coping strategies that may work during the “thriving/inhabiting”
phase may be useless or unwarranted during the “destruction”
and “survival” phases. During times of plenty, a predilection
for certain foods, and specifically the religious adherence to
eating kosher foods, for example, may no longer be sustainable
without noticeable risk of decreasing the chances of survival.
These forced changes in the procuring of basic nourishment may
also lead to new dietary discoveries that themselves shape the
very direction of evolution (eating more meat, cooking meat, or
preserving meat; ingesting hallucinogens and fermented brews).
Survival
(Reorganization phase ά)
Emergency

Disguise

Thriving/Inhabiting
(Exploitation Phase r)
Solace

Disclosure

Remedy

Hiding/Displacement

Wellness

Inhabiting

Short-term

Procurement

Long-term

Planting/Harvesting

Open-ended (O-E)

Location

Less O-E, more close ended

Place

Disorientation

Map

Oriented

Territory

Make-shift

Strangers

Enduring/durable

Companions

Un-planned

Dissociation

Planned

Association

No sense of place

Estrangement

Sense of place

Familiarity

Basic Needs

Disconnection

Amenities

Connection

Vigilance

Respite

Monitoring

Rest/Recreation

Pernoctation

Necessity

Habitation

Luxury

Trauma/Healing

Temporary

Strengthening

Enduring

Flight/flee

Otherness

Stand ground

Oneness

Table 2-a
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Stagnation
(Conservation Phase K)

Destruction
(Release Phase Ω)

Saturation

Secrecy

Breakage

Paranoia

Sedentary

Owning

Displacement

Trading

Transgenerational

Managing

Individual/Masses

Hoarding

Closed-ended

Homeland

Chaotic

Locations

Domicile

Cartography/Platted space

On the move

Distances/Time
Competitors

Entrenched

Neighbors

Volatile

Traditions

Identification

Uncharted

Alienation

Fatherland

Dependency

No-man’s land

Loneliness

Luxuries

Yolking

Bartering

Separation

Surveillance

Industry

Look-out

Adaptation

Residence

Inheritance

Shelter

Useful

Capitulation

Legacy

Hunted

Passing

Persevere

Is-ness

On the move

It-ness

Table 2-b
Table 2 (a & b), in addition to encapsulating the functionalities of
survival, thriving/inhabiting, stagnation, and destruction, presents
another perspective, albeit in very broad strokes, in understanding
the psychology of place, or a sense of place. The intertwining of
psychology and place in psycho-phenological approaches is an
indispensable and naturally ecological association without which
human psychology cannot, on the whole, be understood. People
live in places, they sleep in bedrooms, they identify with a town or
a city with specific streets and neighborhoods; that is, they thrive
or struggle in places. People create sanctuaries (temples, natural
parks, recreational sites) to seek solace, to cope, or to maximize
already present potentialities.
When studying psychology from a humanistic or teleological
perspective, scholars may tend to emphasize human potentialities as idealized forms (make them normative) and run the risk
of ignoring other adaptable human capabilities. Psychoanalysis
emerges in the context of anti-Semitic struggles and humanistic
psychology after the horrors of WWII, for example. In both, there
are implicit and explicit (Fromm, 1955) acknowledgements that
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human nature is subject to both social and natural environmental
circumstances, most of the time unavoidable. Whatever intrinsic
coping strategies may be at hand, whatever new adaptations to
changing circumstances may be learned, no single standard of
“adaptability” may be warranted.
Panarchy’s Resilience Cycle has been modified (Figure 3
and Table 2) in order to illustrate an organic interpretation of
change as it impacts human psychology. There is no singular
“change” but a series of phases and differing sets of strategies for
maximizing “survival.” The likelihood that the human organism
might capably and successfully navigate the contingencies of
and transitions between each phase demands that the notion of
resilience be defined as a multitude and variety of behavioral and
mental accommodations predicated on individual or collective
definitions of “a sense of place.” “Place” is not a transcendental realm but the site where real events are unfolding and when
any organism is forced to figure out what set of strategies will
best suit the moment and the location. The passage of time in an
actual “place” where events happen or are self-actuated makes
psychology a phenology of the psyche in a real, ecological sense.
(See Appendix II for additional applications of Panarchy.)

*

*
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Nature as Madness
“But his soul was mad. Being alone in the wilderness, it had
looked within itself and, by heavens I tell you, it had gone mad.”
(Joseph Conrad)

In the west, at least, the praising and exaltation of nature (or
properties and elements in nature) in contemporary movements,
in a relatively recent historical romantic past, or as part of
more ancient approaches of worship and veneration, are just
a handful of projective emphases to a comparable if not equal
evaluation of nature as hostile wilderness (Nash) or as the source
of madness: nature as madness or becoming mad in nature.
The word “madness” is employed in order to add a degree of
uncertainty and unreality (psychic flux) to self-nature gestalts.
Madness in this sense adds a factor of fluidity, which in its best
sense could be akin to the Taoist notion of free-flow. This idea
bears inclusion in a serious discussion and inquiry of self-nature
gestalts, to the extent that nature too changes, unpredictably,
and new psychic accommodations to its processes demand the
formulation of new meanings.
That is, for almost every description of nature as benign, holy,
motherly, serene, comprehensible, harmonious, peaceful, etc.,
there are as many corresponding descriptors (evil, promiscuous,
whore, turbulent, incomprehensible, chaotic, lethal, etc.) which
suggests that no absolute or fixed ontology of nature is readily
discernable, but more likely that a humanly projected and shifting
taxonomy, individually, collectively, and/or historically voiced,
drives these perceptions and representations. Even within the
same historical and cultural zeitgeist, both perspectives could
be ambivalently perceived and expressed. This contradictory or
oppositional range of perceptions and attributes say more about
human psychology than about nature. They also express a sort of
madness in the sense used earlier.
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As Roderick Nash writes in Wilderness and the American
Experience, unkept, distant, and territorially unknown natural
spaces present a challenge to understanding, and also to cognitive
coherence and legibility (to use Kaplan’s terms). In this sense,
nature represents madness or the potential for madness. Later
we shall see that this is not necessarily a negative description,
particularly if human existence must choose between different
types of madness: depersonalization caused by city states, the
alienation of living in densely populated cities, working in
factories, or confronting the incessant propaganda to participate
in senseless consumerism. This description, nature as madness,
allows for free play and opportunities where nature, even though
at first perceived and evaluated as a place of madness, may be
redeemable in the long run, understood and thus accepted as a
realm, if not wholly rational, then at least supportive of reason.
While employing Patrick Fuery’s definition of madness
(Madness and Cinema: Psychoanalysis, Spectatorship, and
Culture) in his semiotic treatment of the relation between the
cinema, spectators, and madness, the following characteristics make the case that defining nature as madness allows us
to understand many other approaches of relatedness across a
humanly diverse spectrum of “nature connection” and disconnection--sentiments and processes.
Thus, borrowing and adapting from Fuery, the phrases, mine,
‘in nature madness,’ ‘nature is madness,’ ‘madness in nature’
can be supported by the following alternating and complementary propositions:
Madness/nature…
• Is excess
• Has an order of meaning and knowledge within itself
• Is mutable
• Represents what cannot be done—the impossible/impossibility
• Is knowledge’s (certainty’s) ‘other’
• Is resistance
• Is impossible to represent
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• Isn’t any-one-thing, but everything
• Is disorder
• Resists translation, interpretation, and stability
• Risks meaning in order to be heard
(Adapted from Fuery 2004: 1-31)
I have merely added the word “nature” next to the original
text where he defines madness. I encourage the reader to
look further into Fuery’s work and be gifted with many more
connections that could be made between his text and mine. For
now, we have enough to work with. Presenting this thesis of
“nature as madness” is key to understanding a basic human
necessity to experience a type of madness, or at least for flirting
with madness when life is perceived to be incomprehensible
across other dimensions or when it as absolutely predictable and
unfulfilling.
A Sextet of Madness
In order to simplify the complexity of relatedness with
respect to nature and the built-up “civilized” environment, as
well as psychic life and a need for challenging easy and familiar
psycho-social dynamics, it might be useful to think of a set of
relations (affiliations) as illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4
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Additional modes or relationships of understanding, relating,
or affiliating to nature as both a solace from madness or as madness
itself, are possible. The above set of relationships, tropisms, and
dynamics, allows us, for example, to situate and evaluate—to
categorize--the influential work of Paul Shepard (Nature and
Madness) and the romantic writings found in Rousseau, Goethe,
Emerson, Thoreau, and Muir. More importantly, and as Fuery
defines “madness,” it frees up the concept from its narrow
medical definition, and it includes all the important and relevant
senses in which one can speak of “madness” across various
disciplines.
Many times I have been witness to “city folk” making their way
into “the wilderness,” in order to seek out recreational activities
that included fishing, hunting, boating, or snowmobiling, which
also involved equal parts drinking, partying, rowdiness, and
letting off steam (madness as excess and disorder). For these
folks at least, it seems that “going mad” in nature was essential
to maintaining well-being or offsetting the results of the daily
toils of living in another setting for madness (city living) or
trying to beat very mundane and predictable existences. It is as
if a psychological and social construction of nature had already
occurred, that nature was madness itself, or that nature allowed
for the expression of a temporary madness. The thousands of
broken beer and liquor bottles found in pristine natural settings
are a testament to this psychologically necessary, so it would
seem, on the surface, debauchery.
The above set also allows for opportunities to judge when
nature seems comprehensible—legible and coherent—if and
when thoughtful and inquisitive approaches are followed.
Going back to Fuery’s definitions, once something is known,
or is potentially knowable, it ceases to be the source of/for
madness. The more nature is made legible and coherent, the
more we understand that its apparent complexities often yield
to practical, wondrous, and apprehensible realities--its madness
diminishes—or we have entered its madness so deeply and
profoundly that its madness is also our own.
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Fuery lists additional dimensions of madness associated with
cinema viewing which can be easily extended as descriptors of
madness in nature. Slipping into animality, passion, and fear
are all expressions of madness. In this light, authentic totemic
identification with a power animal (understanding its anatomy,
ecological function, and real natural attributes) could be the
means to enter the madness of nature to a degree of psychological functionality that successfully mediates between the realms
rational and fantastic.
Imagined or sought-after experiences such as transcendence,
bliss, aesthetic eroticism, and many other states (the “divine”
itself as madness) can also be euphemisms for madness. To the
extent that there is a semiotic transposition (Fuery) between
what these states and their function might mean for each of us
and their readily available cultural descriptors or correspondences, and a closely delineated path of their discovery in nature,
then the phrase “madness in nature” is no longer capricious or
overstated.
To reiterate, the ambivalence of nature as representing
madness or being madness itself, and wilderness as the place
where conventional morality ends and animality, passion, and
fear take over, or of nature as a place of solace, tranquility, and
healing from other forms of madness, points to many natures
and to many psychologies—nature connection becoming an
incomplete phrase with which to capture this richness.
Panopticism and Human Nature
Humans differ, temperamentally and at a basic biological
level, in their degree of tolerance to crowding and social
complexity. Hence our individual motivations for preserving
and partaking of natural spaces, when they derive from these
or similar basic psychobiological propensities, become an
important and necessary ecopsychological study.
That is, being observed, and our psychological reactions to
social observation and judgment, elicits predictable responses
and accommodations along known temperamental continua,
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extreme introversion and extraversion being the most obvious
contrast.
To reiterate earlier assertions, rather than assuming that one
sort of “nature” exists for all, even casual observations indicate
that many psychologies interpret, adjust to, and transact with
highly selected aspects of “nature” in an idiosyncratic manner
with various degrees of “success” (psychological functionality).
Therefore, it is no accident that the need for individual
privacy, our intolerance of the mundane and the noisy, or a
needed respite from social casual observation and judgment
are achieved, in a significant portion of the human population,
in solace and the very notion of sanctuary. Fences, cubby-hole
niches, cars with tinted windows, and sunglasses are all proxies
after the same need.
The physical and almost absolute manifestation of wrap
around surveillance is the panopticon. In Paul Rabinow’s interpretation of Michel Foucault’s ideas:
The panopticon consists of a large courtyard, with a tower
in the center, surrounded by a series of buildings divided
into levels and cells. In each cell there are two windows:
one brings in light and the other faces the tower, where large
observatory windows allow for the surveillance of cells. The
cells become “small theaters, in which each actor is alone,
perfectly individualized and constantly visible.” The inmate
is not simply visible to the supervisor; he is visible to the
supervisor alone—cut off from any contact. This new power
is continuous and anonymous.

Recently, one of many prisons built around the world and styled
after the original panopticon design by the English philosopher
and jurist, Jeremy Bentham, in Harleem, the Netherlands, is to
be converted into a mall, essentially another panopticon.
Before we judge Bentham too harshly, it needs to be said that
he was also one of the first philosophers to advocate for animal
rights. Even those who implemented his utilitarian and efficient
design as a practical way of controlling large populations of
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inmates were perhaps merely innovating on well-established
means of managing the masses.
Communal living that results in panoptic architectural arrangements (tepees, Yanomami and Viking halls, wigwams,
and churches) is very ancient indeed. Essentially, the panoptic
arrangement, new and old, is equally the inward and inescapable
public gaze looking for signs of troubled psychology and a forum
for seeking and reaching consensus. The family unit and the psychological and material restrictions of its dynamics is perhaps
the first panoptic circle.
An adolescent’s rebellion is an affront to this first communal
panopticon and part of a necessary “cry for freedom” that
has long lasting consequences to society as a whole. As Paul
Shepard observed, wherever youth has “nature” at its disposal,
empty spaces can be a liberating canvass on which to explore an
emerging identity free of unnecessary prohibitions.
But youth is running out of places to explore. In its more
recent panoptic reiterations, as intensely scrutinized and behaviorally tracked shopping malls (e.g. Mall of America,
Bloomington, MN), airports, and libraries, monitoring the
behavior (and intentions) of large numbers of people necessitates specialized architectural plans—many variations of cells.
However, several features distinguish older from newer
panoptic designs, most importantly, the notion of having a
vote toward the formulation of a consensus. Another important
feature is that after exiting a tepee or a Yanomami central hall,
open nature, and not a serial continuation of socially panoptisized spaces, awaits exploration with minimal social judgment.
Granting as a testable hypothesis that a significant percentage
of the human population is biologically designed to better thrive
in smaller and more private dwelling spaces, needing as well
daily access to open prairie, sea, mountains or forests, then an
inclusive ethics of social accommodation and planning ought
to respect these psychological imperatives—make accommodations for its exigencies, for the good of all.
Even gregarious types, every now and then, may have a need
to seek out the inwardness of nature, finding true solace only there.
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Eyes in the Forest
A fair and balanced exploration of panopticism, both its
manifestation in communal life and perverse psychological
effects, in an attempt to understand “madness,” starts with nature
itself as the primordial backdrop exemplifying observation and
judgment.
What about “nature” is panoptic? From a biosemiotic
perspective the answer is everything, depending on the psychological orientation of the subject, or most everything, but
in different ways. Panopticism is, in this biosemiotic sense, in
nested and multiple levels of existence (eigen-mit-umwelten),
by virtue of constant and inescapable reiterative interpretation,
an inescapable ingredient of “human nature.”
Cries for “freedom” and the romantic and absolute vision of
“free will” may very well be protestations against this inescapable
reality. The “gods,” an ultimate expression of panoptic existence,
watching and judging our every action, thought, and emotion, seem
to be a proxy extension of a cognitive and “virtual” projection of
the ever present inquisitive and judgmental social hub.
Even in “nature” we cannot completely escape unwanted
rumination or the consequences of our actions. In biblical
mythology, Cain cannot escape or hide from god’s eye and
judgment:
And Cain said to Abel his brother, "Let us go out to the field,"
and when they were in the field Cain rose against Abel his
brother and killed him. And the Lord said to Cain, "Where
is Abel your brother? And he said, "I do not know: am I
my brother's keeper?" And He said, "What have you done?
Listen! your brother's blood cries out to me from the soil. And
so, cursed shall you be by the soil that gaped with its mouth to
take your brother's blood from your hand. If you till the soil,
it will no longer give you strength. A restless wanderer shall
you be on the earth.”

The “restless wanderer” can never truly escape from many other
instances of perceived and projected panoptic observation and
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judgment from “nature”--the tepee, the great hall, a cave, a
cubby-niche becoming only temporary refuge. Eventually, even
these safe spaces can become yet another microscopic investigation of self, a micro-panoptic cell (e.g. a vision quest).
One explanation for this never ending biosemiotic reiteration,
and its likely etiology as “madness,” is based on the inescapable
situation that even casual social observation could, at any time,
turn into jealousy, judgment, retribution and punishment.
For example, in interpretative terms, when several parties
are existentially engaged and interdependent, it may very well
be that the easiest way to interpret any sort of discomfort and
pain is as punishment to the extent that, usually, some sort of
punishment follows judgment. This is an assumption that Michel
Foucault makes as well when he wrote about panopticism in the
grander context of “the great confinement.” In his own words:
Confinement, that massive phenomenon, the signs of which
are found all across the eighteenth-century Europe, is a
“police” matter. Police in the precise sense that the classical
epoch gave to it--that is, the totality of measures which make
work possible and necessary for all who could not live without
it […]

In this context, and assuming that the situation has worsened
since the 1700s, even eyes-with-minds in the forest following
our every move might be an acceptable “natural panopticism”
(as seen in Figure 4, swapping Madness in the city for “Madness”
in nature) considering the societal alternative of wrap-around
scrutiny, surveillance, and “security” in places such as the Mall
of America.
Other minds sense our presence. This is obvious to anyone
who has existed within or in the vicinity of wild spaces. Again,
from a biosemiotic perspective, little occurs in the forest that
is not noticed (interpreted) by some creature. Natural surveillance is everywhere. In this context, camouflage, concealment,
mimicry and subterfuge can be seen as anti-panoptic tactics and
strategies both in nature and in society.
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In this sense, the full acceptance and immersion of “self”
in nature, as the grand or original panoptic realm--living by its
panoptic rules and conditions--may be as close as one gets to the
existential condition: Un-maddening Nature (see Figure 4).
Trickster as a Mad Comedian
One sure sign that madness and nature go together is that
humor is equally a salient coping strategy for madness, its
expression, or its resistance (Fuery). The exploits and antics of
Hermes, coyote or raven are psychological lessons, told in mythological terms, exemplifying the often-contradictory nature of
our individual and collective self-nature gestalts. Coyote and
raven often stand for our own human incapacities to understand
the often-incommensurable nature of these relations. What a
chicken is to coyote, is not the same chicken to another chicken,
or to another coyote.
While facing the fluidity of natural forms and processes a
human being must realize acts and produce modes of thinking
that can be quite extant from civilized, social reality. Coyote and
raven, as our role models, are norm breakers out of necessity
and because human societies, left to their own tendencies and
inertia, might not keep pace with nature itself.
The tension between conservativism and progressive trends
is one example of this ancient dialectics.
In the midst of collective “madness,” the gurus, tailor made
for a problem, emerge as charlatans. In their efforts, often
sincere, to make a person whole again, if that is even or ever
possible, they can become as strict as any conservative—-as any
fundamentalist.
From a serious (critical, falsifiable) “ecopsychological”
perspective, it may not be quite fair to attribute, to claim, that
certain popular writers, for example, are consciously taking
advantage of basic human credulity and gullibility by muddling
and oversimplifying the complexities of physics and consciousness. The more basic fact might be simply that their own
credulity and gullibility coupled with the real study-complexities of areas such as quantum physics and consciousness studies
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(cognitive science and the philosophy of science) made more
mud than clear water.
The writings of authors like Fritjof Capra, Gary Zukav, and
Deepak Chopra (Respectively, 1975, 1979, & 1983) to name
just one esoteric trio, might have represented, at least initially,
a genuine effort on their part to make sense of and synthesize
personal areas of interest, for sure, but equally to address
or appease some deeply personal yearnings-—more art and
literature than physics or psychology.
Assuming that additional (vetted, peer-reviewed) studies on
quantum physics, consciousness, human-“mind,” “evolution,”
health, and their purported intersection, have not yet produced
the types of syntheses the above authors were (are) proposing,
we are then, for the time being, classifying their work as “art and
literature.” Their work, to be fair, is imaginative, creative, and
inspiring to some, but is realistically short of truly tantalizing, if
by that word we mean that their collective insights have opened
up new frontiers in the above-mentioned sciences or produced
testable hypotheses. On the other hand, if any of their work, past
and present, is sold as “spirituality,” then we must take it at its
presented face value: inspirational opinion.
In the above context, it is usually an important psychological
question in the study of art and literature, and in “the history
of science,” to inquire into the basic motivations that drive any
author to commit certain ideas to ink and pages.
In parsing any author’s thoughts and words (ideas) we might
come to understand much about his/her need to give free reign
to h/his imagination in the context of, let’s assume, genuine psycho-social explorations—personal quests and necessities, and
other perturbations.
Genuinely so, they seem to be making sense of their own
madness as well as critiquing the madness they witness around
them. There are psychological needs for writers to write and for
readers to read, and then to almost-believe, and then to make
believe. At the end of this creative process, and in new age
circles, the chicken ceases to be a featherless, legless carcass on
a butcher’s table and comes to resemble painted disembodied

83

Ecopsychology Revisited
feathers wildly dancing in a Brazilian Carnaval, which like many
other similar festivities, allows for the free reign of “madness”
as culturally sanctioned rituals of psychological cleansing.
The manner in which a person or a society deals day to
day with the slippery nature of “madness” is ultimately their
choice. Any sort of formula exists or has been tried from the
extremes of few freedoms with many rules, to fewer rules and
many more freedoms; from the extremes of arbitrary socialness
to becoming a hermit. However, to do so in a natural historical
vacuum where no consideration is taken, no thought given, to
the role that natural spaces, wildness, and natural processes play
in the equation eigenwelt—mitwelt, is to exist, it seems, outside
normal parameters.
Although “madness” may be a necessary function of our
original self-nature gestalt formulations, the madness that Paul
Shepard and Erich Fromm speak of, on the other hand, is of
a different class and magnitude. To the extent that madness is
equally rejection, acceptance, questioning, disruption, accommodation, transformation, and destruction, then it dances, feet
with feet, with anthropocentric wishes or with a universe of
natural things.
There may be no rhyme or reason (no teleology) for natural
selection, but what it has left behind is true and tested madness
of the sort that humans very much need. To step aside and invent
our own separate dance seems, at the very least, rude and selfish.

*

*
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We Know What We Know and Make Up the Rest
“He who wishes to find his way to the origin of the crisis must
pass through the lost domain of truth, in order to revise it possessively; must traverse the domain of perplexity, to reach
decision concerning himself; must strip off the trappings of the
masquerade, in order to disclose the genuine that lies beneath.”
(Karl Jaspers)

In

Man in the Modern Age, the German philosopher Karl
Jaspers (1931/1957) wrote about the explosion of information
(earth and social scientific discoveries) and the necessary and
ensuing dialectics in the sciences as a means for maintaining a
more or less credible and sustainable professional communication enterprise of checks and balances: a falsifiability process for
disconfirming and confirming arguments in the face of recurring
and new evidence.
One of the dangers of the proliferation of scientific
information, for Jaspers (1957, p.151), included the likelihood
of distorted and cacophonic interpretations and competition by
parties ancillary and secondary to the main and more orthodox
scientific enterprise:
A faith in science that has degenerated into superstition is
closely akin to humbug. Anti-scientific superstition, in its turn,
will masquerade as science, proclaiming ‘a true science which
has superseded the science of the doctrinaires’. The mentality
of our generation has been clouded by astrology, Christian
Science, theosophy, spiritualism, clairvoyance, occultism,
and the like. Anti-science stalks abroad to-day amid all parties
and sects and manifests its influence among persons of the
most diversified outlooks, pulverizing the very substance of
rational human existence.
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The almost universal ubiquity of the internet and of its
seemingly endless possibilities for authorship only make Jasper’s
observation in 1931 that more poignant today.
Cognitively speaking, an individual’s need for keeping
up with and making sense of an ever-expanding information
horizon almost guarantees that misunderstanding, oversimplification, and misapplication—pseudoscience—will be a common
accidental and even strategic occurrence. In a different but
related context, neuroscientist Peter Brugger (2001) wrote about
the psychological phenomenon of apophenia, or our human
tendency to naturally seek connections, to make sense, and derive
deeper meanings from data. Although scientists share these
natural human leanings toward elucidation and interpretation,
the scientific method and the very public process of verification
of results and methodology both act as proxy rationality and objectivity—a “critique” in the words of Michel Foucault (2010).
Oftentimes, pseudoscientific arguments are expressed as a
“Texas sharpshooter fallacy,” or the over eagerness to utilize
and manipulate a privileged subset of data while ignoring the
entire (unknown) data set. In astrology, for example, a limited
set of properties (birth times, locations, and trajectories), from
an arbitrarily chosen planetary system (Earth’s solar) and target
planet (Earth), are taken to be causal determinants of human
personality.
In this sense, then, pseudoscience is not only the diminished
experience of rationality, but could take a more insidious role
as a usurper of the centrality that it is to be a “human being.”
This is the case because so-called rational processes (cognitive
and proxy) are harder to teach and train, sustain in the long
run, and then recuperate from in their absence or neglect.
Their diminishing subtracts from human noetic potentiality.
An astronomer and an astrologer are, no pun intended, worlds
apart.
This work began as a study of meaning in the context of
humanity’s consideration and interpretation of feelings and other
ways of knowing that attempt to clarify our place in “nature.”
Whether orderly, chaotic, ministered to, utilitarian, or seen as
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adversarial, different individuals and cultures throughout history
define and redefine the rules and relational modes of “being” in
“nature” or of “becoming” in “nature.”
The continued discourse human-nature, and its exegesis in
various forms of “relationship” or “connection,” has been at
the center of human becoming for most of human pre-historical and historical existence as an assumed logic and dynamic of
being in the world. As part of these interpretations, geography is
transformed into something else. In the words of Yi-Fu Tuan:
Certain human environments have figured prominently in
humanity’s dreams of the ideal world: they are the forest, the
seashore, the valley, and the island. The furnishing of an ideal
world is a matter of removing the defects of the real one.

The last sentence of the above excerpt, and particularly its use
of the words “defects” and “ideal,” sum up both, oftentimes
contradictory, tendencies of a Super-Ego dutifully at work with
its dual task of sanctioning and praising--cajoling us toward the
next best thing, whether it was a figment of our imagination and
thus an impossibility, or a basic fact of survival.
It is not surprising then, that we get it wrong so often,
and by that I mean that our conflicted responses and manners
of “becoming” end up canceling each other out while in the
questioning of “nature” within and without. Our carrot-andstick psyche approaches profoundly miss multiple chances at
integration and reconciliation. One supposes that this psyche
duality is profoundly fixed in genes as a quick and dirty motivational force propelling the human organism forward, most of the
time, whatever “ahead” means for individuals or groups. Another
explanation for this disjunction is that we are forever removed
by virtue of language and self-awareness from “nature.” There
is some relation between the two because it is through language
that we classify and judge—idealize and misinterpret.
In a manner similar to a pre-linguistic babe, encoding and
relating to “nature” should be easy until, as Heinz Werner
(Werner and Kaplan, 1963) might have observed, we babble our
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first words and make proximity distant and the feeding breast
a long-forgotten conjecture and fetish of sexual pleasure. With
language and self-awareness, even our most sincere, deeply felt
and expressed missives go on unanswered. Nature, as it turns
out, is mostly deaf to our Logos: one can shout at trees and
rocks for days and expect no answer. Wild fox and raven flee in
response to our approximation whether we shout or not. They
too keep their thoughts to themselves.
Parceling psyche into selves and nature into capital venture,
plots to be sold or traded, soon follows. We are left then with
only fragments and a few clues about how to assemble these into
a thing of beauty, constant and nourishing, if we are so lucky.
A few of these fragments we call ‘rationality,’ ‘common
sense,’ ‘reason,’ or ‘explanations’. But even these, as psychological science reports, are not sure bets. As David Dunning and
Justin Kruger summarized (1999):
People tend to hold overly favorable views of their abilities
in many social and intellectual domains. The authors suggest
that this overestimation occurs, in part, because people who
are unskilled in these domains suffer a dual burden: Not
only do these people reach erroneous conclusions and make
unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs them of the
metacognitive ability to realize it.

The Dunning-Kruger Effect, as it is now referred to, provides a
basic psychologically verifiable principle that cuts across several
important issues and could answer the questions:
1. Why do a significant number of people underestimate
the reality (scientific, clear, and present) and impending
inevitability of anthropogenically caused environmental
mayhem?
2. Why do a significant number of politicians, who have
access to the science of climate change, underestimate
the reality and impending inevitability of anthropogenically caused environmental mayhem?
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3. Why do a significant number of leaders of large corporations underestimate the reality (scientific, clear, and
present) and impending inevitability of anthropogenically caused environmental mayhem?
4. Why do a significant number of people OVERESTIMATE the potential benefit of signifying “nature” as
“spiritual,” as a realistic means or correcting path to
address the impending inevitability of anthropogenically
caused environmental mayhem?
If “nature” can’t read, write, or do arithmetic, how are
prayers and wishful thinking a more useful Logos?
Another way of thinking about the potential and real incommensurability that could divide inner biology, shaped in natural
spaces, and our interpretation and transfiguration of “geography”
into increasingly artificially modified environs, is expressed by
Charles Lewis:
We live in two worlds. Within the envelope of our skin is a
biological entity which, through evolution, has been fine tuned
for survival in natural environments. Around us lies not the
green world in which we learned to survive and carry forward
our species, but rather a world of our own creation, built of
inert materials. The juxtaposition of our ancient biological
selves with contemporary settings creates a conflict which
is increasingly becoming the concern of environmentalists
and psychologists… Problems arise because of discontinuities between the two worlds. Not only is there a physical
difference between flesh and stone, but also a difference in
rate of change for each.

Flesh and stone, and more specifically, the weakness of flesh
(greed) when faced with the seemingly timeless substances of
the world that yield bounties without protesting, together with
the personal urgency of making a dent in the world, in a mere
generation, vis-à-vis the timeless but ever-present features of the
natural world, often pits “want” against “needs.”
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Saudi Arabians drained ancient aquifers under their desert
in order to grow hay fields and feed cattle. Presently, Saudi
Arabian companies are buying desert land in Arizona, digging
into equally ancient American aquifers and doing the same, to
then export hay around the world—“virtual water.”
That a new moral code has not been established that prevents
thoughtless greed from causing these sorts of calamities is disheartening. That there is no sense of outrage, that we are so jaded
and accepting of these and so many other greedy practices is a
really bad sign. This is another case of the shortsightedness of
flesh and bones trying to out-think timeless substances.
Denial
Most rational people of a factual-humanistic and
progressive bent are rightfully irritated, frustrated, and even
angered by “deniers.” One suspects that getting our collective
“goat” is both fun and a principle motivation for deniers—just
because they can. But surely, at some point, even flat-Earth
believers, climate science deniers, and many others who act
from implausible epistemologies, know better. But admitting it
to our faces, giving us the satisfaction of the facts being what
they are—facts—and accepting the loss of profit that this would
entail, or risking the mere appearance of diminished power, are
not options. Instead of facts and rectification, their arguments
are chosen on the merits of their Sophist’s rhetorical brute
force. Old vendettas and the continuance of bullying might
explain the rest.
Verily, there is nothing new under the sun. Reason vs lust,
sensibility vs pride, common-sense vs bloated affluence, equality
vs privilege, humility vs hubris, reform vs dynastic glut--these
forces and many more have led us into social conflict, war, and
carnage before.
The unthinkable has happened. Sophist-deniers now hold the
reins of power and are bent on retribution. For many indignities
suffered, for every argument lost on the merits of “the weight of
the evidence,” there stands a sophist-denier ready to dismantle
the very edifice of reason. At the moment, this is the only

90

Chapter 7
psychology that could explain what has already transpired and
what is likely to unfold.
Once again, human dignity, freedom from ignorance,
tolerance and reverence, as well as a commitment to sustaining
natural processes, are on the chopping block. Despair is,
however, not an option.
That this continues to be the case in the 21st century makes
most rational people frustrated and even angry. Writing for
the New York Times, Curt Stager (2017) reviewed a recently
published propaganda booklet published by the conservative
think tank, The Heartland Institute, dubiously titled “Why
Scientists Disagree About Global Warming.” Stager wonders
about the potential impact of disinformation when it comes to a
significant percentage of American teachers who are themselves
doubtful about global warming:
The cover letter inside, however, made the book’s premise
clear. “Claims of a ‘scientific consensus’” on climate change,
it read, “rest on two college student papers, the writings of a
wacky Australian blogger, and a non-peer-reviewed essay by
a socialist historian.” In fact, multiple surveys of the scientific
literature show that well over 90 percent of published climate
scientists have concluded that recent global warming is both
real and mostly the result of human activity.

Despite the widespread availability of scientific and public data
reports that make global warming itself and its consequences
on planetary stability a reality to be faced by present and future
generations of humans and accompanying animal brethren,
Stager wondered about the likely impact that disinformation
may have on just a small percentage of teachers and the students
they teach (Plutzer, et al, 2016):
Judging from the responses of educators I know who have
received “Why Scientists Disagree About Global Warming”
in recent weeks, most copies of it are likely to be ignored or
discarded. But if only a small percentage of teachers use it as
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intended, they could still mislead tens of thousands of students
with it year after year.

Reiterating previous positions, critical thinking in general
matters if we are going to raise future generations of conscientious and educated citizens. Democratic principles themselves
are at risk. Democracy, being fundamentally an agreement
around verifiable facts, crumbles when information is deviant or
when credible, reputable experts are silenced.
The Presumption of a “Rational Agent”
Friedrich Engels used the phrase “false consciousness” to
explain and signify the complex collusive dynamics (intended or
unconscious) between ideological thinking, its material reality,
and the structuring of societies (its people) around value systems
(economic-political-religious).
The assumption that people are basically rational beings and
that with enough information they can be trusted to make the
right choices is an aspect of false consciousness. That is, the
ideal of a free and empowered person is also an aspect of the
propaganda, “the rational agent,” when the agent has no clue of
the major forces creating his/her reality.
An overhaul of human consciousness, at times an impish
endeavor within new age circles, quickly crashes “head on” with
the realities of the perversity of a diverse human lot, each head/
heart going its own way. The devilish fantasy is that with enough
wise sheepherders and coyote-tricksters around, humanity will
follow in the direction of infinite possibilities, or at least, toward
happy marigolds and forever sparkling waters. Genghis Khan,
who was not so keen, we are told, on docile conversions—gentle
persuasions--slaughtered thousands for naught; long walls still
came down and the Chinese forgot how to hunt for food and
pray to their dragon and monkey gods.
The market forces (and its political propaganda) that drive
consumers to make seemingly “rational” choices are an orchestrated masquerade of self-interested motives on the part of
people who wish to make a profit and a public who believes their
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limited range of “choices” matter. In this context, I have adopted
and expanded Engels’ semiotics in an attempt to elucidate how
entrenched are the thinking and behaviors that undermine
sustainable approaches.
I favor the voice and text of Paul Shepard (1998) because
his own synthesis takes us further in diagnosing the problem
of “false consciousness” vis a vis the impotency of making
sustainable approaches work for all of us:
In the face of predominant anthropocentric values, the vision
of “natural” human kind seems eccentric, regressive, even
perverse. Our idea of ourselves embedded in the context of
the shibboleth of growth places us at odds with the notion
of kinship with nature. When we grasp fully that the best
expressions of our humanity were not invented by civilization
but by cultures that preceded it, that the natural world is not
only a set of constraints but of context within which we can
more fully realize our dreams, we will be on the way to a
long overdue reconciliation between opposites that are of our
own making. The tools we have invented for communicating
our ideas and carrying information have actually impaired our
memories. We must begin by remembering beyond history.

The analogy semiosis : psychology :: biosemiosis : ecopsychology describes anthropocentrism as a form of “false
consciousness” in light of a revision of these values and in the
context of a healthy ecological standard where “mind” is returned
to authentic “natural” existential evolutionary theaters. It is not
an argument (never was) to revert to an essential primitivism,
but a “recuperation,” a rescuing of a whole set of sustainable and
resilience values that makes for a more agreeable psychology.
That ideal balance it seems, if ever reached at all, is the “ecopsychological” as the main text (ecosemiotics).
This ideal might take the form of a revolutionary imperative
for some, or for others a day to day healing that incorporates,
little by little, a few and important features that make for “better
living.” Halfway between these two approaches are the small
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scale Epicurean communal ideals when a handful of friends, a
chicken coop, and art lessons come together into a simpler and
more real life—economies with “being” values.
Thinking with Fairies
It is perhaps not a coincidence that the Victorian and
Edwardian eras coincided with the revival of and renewed interest
in fairy lore (Silver, 1999). This was mostly an urban preoccupation when, at the same time, people lost their “knowledge of
the woods.” For an urbanite returning to the dark woods, barely
able to distinguish between hedgehog and robin tracks, most
signs might have appeared as a fairy afoot. In the 1960s, with
the help of “mind-manifesting” drugs, re-channeling fairies,
extraterrestrials, and other energies, Findhorn was founded. A
benign microclimate and good manure, not “devas,” reasonably
speaking, accounted for the size of the vegetables.
A scientific oriented “ecopsychology” should inquire
about the psycho-social and historical interactions that give
rise to all sorts of magical thinking. If it is “psychology,”
fairies are symptoms, not ontological-objective certainties. If
“ecopsychology” has anything to do with “ecology,” then autecological and synecological approaches should provide a
definitive description of fairy population distributions and relationships therein.
If it can be shown that a good portion of an individual’s
thinking is, in fact, based on erroneous, fanciful, or habitually
preferred assumptions, and furthermore that h/her psychology
derives from a fictional core, idiosyncratic or collectively
shared, then easily identifiable and catalogued ideological and
magical thinking (wishful thinking) of any type is either fictionalized psychology, or psychologized fiction. This would be the
case in claims pertaining to transpersonalization processes that
overreach (conjure up) into preferred transcendental formulas
that, when sufficiently analyzed, are all-too-familiar-fantastic—-a literature of the mind.
The fact that human minds are naturally prone to fictionalizing psychology or nature, or to naturalizing and psychologizing
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fiction, is deeply interesting in its own right. These observations
are of some relevance, particularly when studying the many
ways in which humans have fictionalized “nature” and adapted
these fictions to psychological “ways of connecting.”
An Alternative Hypothesis: The Idiotsphere
In contrast to a “Noosphere,” or as a logical consequence of
this idea, it is proposed that recent and past events suggest that
humanity is mostly uncaring, selfish, self-centered, and self-serving and, therefore, that in the aggregate, should “planetary
consciousness” be considered a factual force, lack of thoughtfulness will spread faster and wider than rational thinking.
Therefore, thoughtlessness, like faster weed propagation, will
outpace the growth of Kumbaya presumed contravening forces
that aim at a “rise of consciousness.”
Unknown at this point is whether negative or positive
feedback loops are involved in this process. If the former, extreme
thoughtlessness selects itself out of natural adaptive processes to
acceptable (tolerable) levels. If the latter, consciousness reaches
levels of instability where it might be hard to tell what’s unhelpful-deviant or thoughtless, and what isn’t.
Last year, the Pew Research Center conducted a poll on
attitudes and information about climate change among adult
Americans (“The Politics of Climate,” May 10-June 6, P.R.C.,
2016a). Some of the results were as follows:
• 48% believed that global climate change was due to human
activity
• 31% assumed these changes were due to natural causes
• 20% said that there was no evidence of global climate
change
That is, more than half of the Americans sampled were clueless
about the realities of global climate changes as publicized by
reliable scientific information sources. As one might suspect,
political ideology matters when it comes to interpreting and
accepting scientific evidence:
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• Conservative Republicans: 15% human activity; 48%
natural patterns; & 36% “There is no solid evidence”
• Liberal Democrats: 79% human activity; 14% natural
patterns; & 7% “There is no solid evidence”
The above two extremes and ends of a normal distribution
are somewhat ‘balanced’ by intermediate or more moderate
ideological identifications with response patterns that are nevertheless not very reassuring:
• Moderate/Liberal Republicans: 34% human activity; 46%
natural patterns; % 27% “There is no solid evidence”
• Moderate/Conservative Democrats: 63% human activity;
22% natural patterns; % 15% “There is no solid evidence”
In the same poll, means for addressing global climate changes
were split into two camps:
• 61% believed that major changes (attitudes and behaviors)
within the next fifty years would address climate change
• 55% believed that technological advances would address
climate change
The above data suffice as a preliminary a means to inquire
into the possible psycho-social causes driving these almost
polar opposite trends. In general terms, it could be said that a
continued utilitarian interpretation of “nature,” a neglect of the
unconsciousness of “mind,” a persistent and collective denial
that prevents concerted and collaborative actions—sustainable
behaviors--are important factors in understanding our present
inability to effectively address global environmental challenges
(McKenzie-Mohr & Smith, 2008).
In many ways that matter, personal denial, unconscious and
conscious collusion, the inability or unwillingness to openly and
honestly examine unconscious motivations, and a dependency on
the goods that “nature” provides in order to maintain a perceived
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“high standard” of living, could be sound starting points from
which to begin a Psychology of the Anthropocene.
From a psycho-social perspective, the question is: What
other mainstream social scientific ideas, constructs, or factors
could be employed or investigated in order to shed light on
these complex and dire challenges? The above main factors
[1. Personal denial--unconscious and conscious collusion; 2.
The inability or unwillingness to openly and honestly examine
unconscious motivations and processes; and 3. A dependency
(continued exploitation of) on the goods that “nature provides”
in order to appease unsustainable life styles] could be broken
down into and expanded to include at least ten socio-psychological, cognitive, and affective tendencies (dispositional and
situational) which, in tandem, do not bode well for a timely
resolution of these pressing challenges.
En toto, and provisionally, these may be named and
categorized as a Collusive Credulity Complex Construct (CCCC)
to signify their social effects of both ill-action and inaction. They
are:
1. Self-serving propensities (self-serving and confirmation
biases)
2. Self-deception (Dunning-Kruger Effect)
3. Subservience (conformity, compliance, and obedience)
4. Wishful, magical or fantasy thinking
5. Impulsivity and reactivity (unreasonableness)
6. Misunderstanding or misapplication of in-group
traditional knowledge
7. Decontextualized (ineffective, irrelevant, or antagonistic) “spirituality”
8. Shallow (‘green-washed,’ decontextualized) tribalism
9. Adult but immature over-identification (‘persona’ cults)
10. Lower levels of education and scientific literacy
Extreme ideological group identification alone could account for
factors 1-4. Level of education might account for factors 5-10.
There is also a significant overlap between factors 1-4 and 5-10.
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We Live in Interesting Times
In 2016, a significant number of U.S. voters elected a new
president who, presently and swiftly, has acted on rationalizations or base impulses that a serious and thoughtful person could
characterize as potentially injurious to vulnerable people and to
life on this planet. As social experiments go, Americans will be
the first subjects to be exposed to the results of these rationalizations and impulses, with seemingly very little power to prevent
many questionable policies from being enacted.
Sound psycho-social theory and research, originating from
accepted areas such as the Psychology of Religion, have already
provided theories, models, perspectives, and data from which
to make testable inferences and inquire about our collective
inability to act upon a basic and necessary understanding of the
exigencies of global climate threats. For example, Jean Jacques
Rousseau (1769), writing almost 250 years ago, described the
pervasive overlap and effects of religious dogma in civil society,
referring to it as “civil religion.” Other authors have written
about the psycho-sociological effects of this overlap, specifically when describing the U.S. main societal orientation as being
a “civil religion” (Bellah, 1967; Greely, 1972; Wilcox 1996;
Wilson, 2000; and Green, 2000).
The proposed ten dimensions of the Collusive Credulity
Complex Construct introduced herein could be applied to the
study of other and seemingly benign, alternative lifestyles and
belief systems that are equally fundamentalist in their attitudes
and actions (e.g. so-called “New Age” movements). That is, to
the extent that an aversion to scientific inquiries (the scientific
method and scientists) and the embracing of pseudo-science
make for a reduction of rational and systematic approaches to
information (less information literacy and critical thinking), “a
diminution of being” might be suspected (Kruger & Dunning,
1999; Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003; Conesa-Sevilla, 2017).
There are some reasons for cautious optimism. Since the bulk
of the aforementioned research began (circa 1960s), generational shifts have caused significant deviations in social trends.
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Although millennials worldwide are less likely to participate
in politics than voters from the baby-boom and X generations,
they, nevertheless, across several core social identification
dimensions (national customs/traditions, traditional religion,
or nationalism), seem to be less attached to ideology (P.R.C.,
2016b).
Ignoring the socio-historical roots of multiple, complex,
and interacting global crises or the many and ever-increasing
ramifications of our collective, conscious and unconscious
denudement of nature (Wendling, 2009) comes at a high price.
Although the scientific method is, by a long and painstaking
historical process, a product of Greco-Roman-Islamic-European thinkers, its fruits and promises pale in comparison to the
pernicious anti-science and pseudo-science tendencies here
described as the Collusive Credulity Complex.
We are now faced with different situations and increasing
occurrences and volumes of world population displacements
with concomitant erosion of individual and collective (environmental) resilience. At best, our efforts seem reactionary and
reflexive. To the extent that we have a responsibility as scientists
and individuals to address these problems, an emergent paradigmatic nexus begs for new forms of intervention (McKenzie-Mohr
& Smith, 2008).
The psycho-historical investigation of the reasons behind
the systematic destruction of entire ecosystems, starting with
the Mediterranean basin (Hughes, 1975; Ehrlich, et la, 1978),
coupled with similar and concerted efforts by other areas in
psychology, point to a new direction and paradigm with an
urgent mission-focus: Psychology in the Anthropocene.
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Chapter Eight
The Murmuration of Transfixitive Wants
“Culture now signifies something which never acquires a form,
but is to emerge with extraordinary intensity out of a vacancy
into which there is a speedy return. The associated estimates of
value are typical. Men are quickly satiated with what they have
heard, and are therefore ever on the search for novelties since
nothing else tickles their fancy. Novelties are acclaimed as the
primal knowledge of which people are in search; but they are
whistled down the wind a moment after, since all that is wanted
is sensation.” (Karl Jaspers)

Global warming is only one example of human-caused en-

vironmental problems. To the extent that these problems
reflect the paw-tracks of intentions, activities, and behaviors
of human beings, they are, more accurately defined, psychological problems with underlying social, economic, and
political forces. In this sense and context, “ecopsychology” is
also the examination of the interface between thinking, affect,
and behavior and the perception and interpretation of “nature”
for whatever human means or ends. Under one description,
the study of the interactive effects of ‘thinking, affect, and
behavior’ is also the study of “personality,” and in this work,
of a unique sense of that construct: Psyche-Natur. These efforts
continue to be an extension or continuation of mainstream
psychological studies, or deserving of their own emphasis or
perspective, given the fundamental importance of the aforementioned construct.
In this sense and context, human-caused environmental
problems signify problematic (shortsighted, avaricious, ignorant,
etc.) or even dysfunctional psychology.
At an existential level, the eternal and psychic reality of a
world coming together into new forms, syntithenai (construction), and also being pulled apart into components, analyein
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(destruction), are foundational assumptions and formulations in
the sciences and in their derivative poetic, other artistic, and/or
bastard intuitive liturgies.
Recently, the Italian towns of Amatrice, Accumoli, Arquata
and Pescara del Tronto were hardest hit by an earthquake. The
human horror and confusion in the aftermath of natural catastrophes such as this is beyond words. It is terrible! We say
to ourselves, “I hope I never experience their suffering.” In the
media, phrases such as “acts of god,” “terrible nature,” or “mother
Earth’s doing” are imperfect forms (childish, uninformed, or
tentative) for acknowledging the geological and “brute” reality
of a changing planet.
But no virgin sacrifice or heartfelt prayer ever stopped Pele
or Chimborazo from erupting. There might be comfort in these
actions, however, earthquakes and lava eruptions are physical-natural processes, not beings—deaf, blind, and unfeeling to
our desires or supplications.
The native populations of Amatrice, Accumoli, Arquata and
Pescara del Tronto, and countless visiting tourists, took these
picturesque surroundings for granted--took their daily toils,
small and grand pleasures, one suspects, as a steady-state and
given existence.
Heraclitus observed (ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν,
ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ), “Ever-newer waters flow on
those who step into the same rivers,” and (τὰ ὄντα ἰέναι τε πάντα
καὶ μένειν οὐδέν) “All entities move and nothing remains still.”
An inclusive science of “ecopsychology” has to be accepting, or
at least aware, that the world, nay, the universe, coming together
into new forms, syntithenai, and also being pulled apart into
components, analyein, are foundational and ongoing processes
without exceptions. Earlier, we presented the idea and reality of
a world in flux in panarchic ecological terms.
That is, psychology and ecology, as sciences, operate
under the assumption that there is potential suffering and chaos-transcendence--in destruction (analyein) as well as in
creation (syntithenai). The transitional, steady-state forms (e.g.
“happiness”) are a mere short-lived illusion. The artist too takes
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this fluidity and dynamics to heart. This foundational interplay
is, after all, what we term “art.”
Biophilia and Other Euphemisms of Nature Affiliation
A sign of our desperate times and perhaps misplaced
optimism is the exclusive and absolutist sense in which people,
even professionals, overuse and, eventually, semantically
calcify favored tags. It is of particular interest when self-identified “ecopsychologists” latch onto terms such as biophila and
make them into some sort of hopeful mantra that attempts to
explain everything. In general, this happens for many words that
are judged to carry great psychological import (“god,” “justice,”
“nature,” “heaven,” “sustainability,” etc.).
Tags come and go, thus one suspects that next year they’ll be
onto something else—or not.
That the very term biophilia has a rich and complex history
(E. Fromm, E. O. Wilson) and that its meaning is nuanced toward
several possible but precise aims is oftentimes lost to some folks
who lean in the direction of senseless mantra chanting. In the
context of Howard Gardner’s proposal of multiple intelligences,
biophilic tendencies are exemplified in his “naturalistic intelligence.” Because this is a bona fide intelligence, one suspects
that it is not so widespread, pure, or manifested in its fullest
capacity equally in every person. For if every person expressed
naturalistic intelligence with concomitant biophilic tendencies
in full form and function, our planet would be a very different
place.
Another argument is that like all the other intelligences
(linguistic, interpersonal, logical, etc.), some aspects of naturalistic intelligence can be taught. When this argument is made, it
is usually in the form of efforts to ensure that important concepts
of environmental education are taught early on. Another way of
making this argument is that this is part of a greater effort for
raising planetary, “green consciousness.” It is not clear, however,
if proponents of these (latter) efforts privilege “consciousness
raising” as some specialized personal transformation toward
oceanic enlightenment. If so, this seems an exclusive enough
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journey not to matter, in critical short and practical terms, for
expediently “saving the planet.”
Furthermore, and as presented in the previous chapter, if
this notion of “consciousness raising” implies the hope that a
“noosphere” of sorts is teleologically progressing toward ultimate
perfection, then we have us another sort of religion with little
to show in the form of evidence. Present and past circumstances, however, point to the very opposite of this claim, and in fact
suggests that we live in an ever spiraling downwards “idiotsphere.”
Proof of this horrible descent is that major and minor
religions and countless nature “cults,” past and present, have
failed to achieve these or similar goals or to prevent our probable
apocalyptic demise. This is evidence that there are significant
psychological limitations to personal growth and transpersonal enterprises—that these efforts were always limited to a
handful of conscientious people. Thus novo-Druid approaches
and corresponding sentimentalities seem to be of psychological importance to a few mistletoe collectors but useless when
it comes to the science of planetary intervention. It seems as
though “primitivism” will not be a universally accepted model
for collective transformation any time soon—unless a truly
horrific and dystopian future befalls us.
Moreover, the semantic calcification of terms like biophilia
into polarized overly optimistic goals obscures the fact that
gardeners, for example, kill for a living. That is, naturalistic intelligence with its supposedly concomitant biophilic tendencies
make room for processes of death and decay (destruction
even) as integral to “life.” To loudly and continuously cheer
for “love” and “life” without accounting for the natural reality
of death processes is tantamount to neuroticism. It has always
been a psychologically important reality that the repressed and
unconscious anxiety of death and decay is suppressed, displaced,
denied, or sublimated.
That most people can and do experience a rich variety of
deeply felt sentiments, emotions, insights, images, and other
mental experiences, in nature or elsewhere, does not necessarily
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imply a credible-solid (unquestionable) and confirmable
metaphysics. A failure to recognize that complex nervous
systems, for reasons of evolutionary adaptation, are bent on
forced semiosis, leads some to privileging subjective experience
as a channel-effect of ‘marvelous and mysterious forces.’ Be that
as it may, it takes some effort to begin accepting the profound
inadequacy of metaphors. Even when these are oftentimes apt
approximations of internal, subjective experience, they may say
nothing about stand-alone metaphysics.
Some philosophers (and the average speaker) have taken
for granted that familiar words are more than metaphors which
describe existing ontologies, when in fact they could be instances
of catachresis, or using words in the wrong, reality context. For
example, according to Jacques Derrida, the founding concepts
of metaphysics (e.g. logos, happiness, natura) are instances of
catachresis and not actual (demi-causal) metaphors. No matter
how fervently and religiously a person claims to have had a
“magnificent nature connection,” no one truly knows what
this experience is about, and even if we could know, it would
more likely be a descriptor of subjectively bound or contained
experiences.
The giddy jump from “I feel this” to “fairy dust” is both a
disturbing and telling aspect of human psychological semiosis.
To the extent that, early on in development, we begin to associate
certain feelings with less than certain metaphors, words and
their meanings come to be feared and are also comforting. Like
comfort foods, comforting words manage, as placebos do, to
reduce anxiety taking us into the familiar. Words, their meaning
valences, are the actual currency irrespective of their implied, or
hoped-for metaphysics or ontology. This fundamental acknowledgement ought to be the beginning of scientifically serious
psychological discussions—a first premise.
In this sense, the phrase “nature connection” is a case of
compounded catachresis. That is, it reveals next to nothing about
the intricacies of “nature” or what is meant by “connection.”
Intuition is usually in the eye of the beholder.
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Our Many Disabilities
To the extent that “ecopsychological” scientific research
is minimal at best and testable constructs need to be newly
invented and vetted, there are some analogical approaches that
could inform the general public about the “raison d'être” for
pursuing such work.
The term “disability” could be easily applied to most forms
of extreme nature alienation where body, mind, affect, and
social relations are distant and extant from natural adaptations
and from tested and enduring social organizations. That is, one
could identify artificial umwelts as being antagonistic to or only
prosthetically supportive of numerous human interactions today.
For example, and in this very sense, the over consumption
of fats and sweets, their resulting effects on greater lipid mass
and on the onset of earlier sugar metabolic diseases; the physical
changes made to furniture in order to accommodate our more
corpulent bodies; the redefinition of space and locomotion
(walking); the structural rethinking of buildings and modes of
transportation, to include just a few umwelt situations, can be
defined in terms of actual disabilities. The term “impairment”
would also apply if changes in human genotype and phenotype
are detrimental and limiting to the types of activities, survival
obligations, and possibilities that humans once enjoyed while
still embedded in natural pursuits. The strong argument is that
most people who live in developed countries are dependent on
artificial modes of transportation, live in urban situations where
social estrangement or alienation are the norm, and generally
consume in excess of their genomic and phenotypical needs, are
in fact disabled and impaired in fundamental and testable ways.
To reiterate, to the extent that so-called indigenous cultures
and their accumulated wisdom, too, fell victim to candy and
burgers, not only was transmitted culture a poor defender of
unhealthy trends but one cannot even rely, like Jungians do, on
the notion that some unknown ‘genetic’ force will come to their
(and our) rescue.
To wit, the terms “ancestral,” “genetic,” or “racial,” when
used in the context of the construct “memory,” are sometimes
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used interchangeably, usually to imply or directly signify a
Jungian form of “collective unconscious,” still operating and
directing seemingly innate psychological tendencies.
That “collective unconscious” was ambiguous and
misinformed to begin with does not deter Jungian followers from
continuing to make incredible claims, mostly in order to justify
any number of outlandish beliefs that might include (a short
list): reincarnation, autistic giftedness, and the continuation of
“esoteric wisdom” that might be tapped into via, for example,
hallucinogenic admixtures, trance states, or mindfulness
practices, that is, “anything-goes psychology.”
Presumably, and in a Jungian sense, the human mind can
“tune into” the ancestral memories of indigenous cultures who
had an inside track and affinity with “nature,” “channeling”
these insights in order to solve present-day woes, from infertility
to midwifing “planetary consciousness.”
Of psychological interest is the characterization of Freud’s
approaches as “male-centered” (animus) and those of Jung’s,
particularly the late Jung, as being less so (anima). The former
seriously embraced evolutionary ideas as a step toward understanding the human psyche. The latter opted for actually religious,
pseudo-religious and mythical interpretations of culturally
available symbols in order to account for the biology and the
cognitive science he did not understand—which developed
after his death. It is an empirical question whether modern-day
“Jungian lovers” are drawn to his psychology as a type of anima
projection—as a need to feminize the psyche.
A Whole World of Good (Better) Science
Has Come after Jung
As a matter of historical fact, at the time of C. G. Jung’s
death, June 1961, the gene-centered view of the then modern
evolutionary synthesis was just being formulated by W. D.
Hamilton, George C. Williams, and John Maynard Smith (early
and mid-1960s); thus Jung’s knowledge of genetics, if he had
any intellectual sophistication at all in these sciences when he
was alive, was lacking in fundamentals—what was to come.
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Equally, when it comes to cognitive advances in understanding
memory, Jung’s death in 1961 precedes the important foundational work of Atkinson and Shriffin (1968) and of Craik and
Lockhart (1972).
Without the above foundational work in the biological and
the cognitive sciences, which comes after the Jungian “era,” it is
next to impossible to grant Jung a deeper, informed understanding implied in the tags “genetic” and “memory.”
Additionally, most present-day scientifically credible
definitions of “memory” emphasize three basic processes:
encoding, storage, and retrieval. Moreover, dividing “memory”
into implicit and explicit, or into procedural and semantic---modular systems—allows for the neurocognitive empirical testing of
actual (in present and real time) neuronal pathways and cerebral
modules.
Given this present-day scientific literature, there is no iota
of support for continuing to justify the ambiguous use of these
terms (e.g. “ancestral,” “genetic,” or “racial”) as if they relate
to anything important and known about neuroscience and neurobiology. Specifically, Karl S. Lashley looked for engrams
everywhere in the brain only to discover that memory is widely
“distributed.” No ancestral memories have been found in the
human brain.
It seems only appropriate then to talk about “ancestral
memories” in metaphorical and literary terms. That is, in this
sense, orally transmitted stories and biblical or Buddhist texts,
for example, that are written, become, with time, “ancestral
memories.”
The fact that they were written does not imply, however, that
they are free of factual errors or that the “wisdom” they espouse
is actually relevant to solving the unprecedented and multi-dimensional problems modern humans face today.
It takes arduous scientific and statistical training, thinking
and skills to understand the implications of the gene-centered
and neurocognitive revolutions which a non-sensical and empty
phrase such as “the collective unconscious” (genetic, ancestral,
or racial memories), cannot even begin to “gloss over.”
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Feathers and Drum Medicines
Placebo effects (Dunlop, et al, 2012) are, assuredly, the hopeful
and tenacious workings of a complex “mind” fulfilling and
reaching out to desired outcomes—prompted by the appropriate
context. The motivation to “get well,” when properly channeled,
is the companion co-variant benefit of the placebo effect. That
a percentage of humans, through expectation and hope, can
temporarily or routinely alleviate physical pain, on their own,
suggests that a previously unreached ceiling of latent psychosomatic capacities has been broken.
As useful and important as these findings are (Dunlop, et
al, 2012), no one should magically conflagrate the body’s
previously unrecognized (underestimated by medical science)
aptitude for natural self-healing. The healing successes attributed
to any shaman depend on it, for without the expectation of this
normal distribution of natural or spontaneous recuperation in the
population, medical interventions would seem less miraculous
or scientifically prognosticable.
More prosaically, then, “nature” is a “healer” only to the
extent that we wish it to be, that we allow it to be. Now, to turn
the knowable upside down, it is equally likely to assume that
feathers and drums, and a few choice incantations, are the cause
behind a placebo effect—the independent variables and determinants. More often than not, though, one suspects a feather is just
a feather, and a beating drum and continuous chanting no more
than repetitive noise, where the patient simply wants to escape it
all as soon as possible.
So-called “authentic shamans” tend to be, after all, rather
frightening, shabby, and squalid characters. And therein lies
the other third of their “powers.” Appeasing and pleasing the
shaman are as much an outcome of “wellness” as nimble feet
and harder stools.
To wit, much of so-called “magic” is both verbal and
behavioral polysemy. Polysemy refers to a multitude of meanings
that a given word could convey in different contexts. The word
Venus, for example, might refer to a planet, a mythical figure, or
a famous tennis player.
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For Dick Hebdige polysemy means that “Each text is
seen to generate a potentially infinite range of meanings,”
making, according to Richard Middleton, “Any homology,
out of the most heterogeneous materials, possible. The idea of
signifying practice — texts not as communicating or expressing
a preexisting meaning but as ‘positioning subjects’ within a
process of semiosis — changes the whole basis of creating social
meaning.”
The following are examples of Polysemy that can be extended
toward an understanding of the ease with which humans make
arbitrary labels to mean much more than meaning object/idea:
Venus
1. A planet; 2. A goddess (mythology); 3. A famous tennis player
Crane
1. A bird; 2. A type of construction equipment; 3. To strain out
one's neck
Examples of “nature” as a Polysemy:
1. a thing (female or male, good or evil); 2. a cause (prima
causa); 3. an effect; 4. absolutely nothing; 5. a psychological
tendency; 6. a propensity; 7. a process; 8. a force; 9. a deity; 10.
recreational space; 11. a TV show; 12. a girl I used to know
Grammarians (Strunk & White, 1979) recognize the confusability and arbitrariness of language with respect to our use of
the word “nature”:
Nature should be avoided in such vague expressions as 'a
lover of nature,' 'poems about nature.' Unless more specific
statements follow, the reader cannot tell whether the poems
have to do with natural scenery, rural life, the sunset, the
untouched wilderness, or the habits of squirrels.
(Strunk & White, "The Elements of Style," 3rd ed., 1979)
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The above fairly innocent and innocuous linguistic habits
demonstrate that it is fairly easy to be careless with the words
we use, particularly the most important one of all, “nature.” In
addition to remediable ignorance, there is also deliberate confusability that makes, as with any aspect of magic, the chicken
entrails appear as if they were human parts extracted under the
auspices of a “medicine man.”
Polysemy in language reflects our thinking. When left to
our undisciplined devices, a sort of murmuration of transfixitive
wants runs amok in mind and language. We say things we want
to believe in, we believe the things we say or want to say, and we
keep saying them: “nature” is a bird, my mother …
If disciplined discernment matters, then like Alice in
Wonderland, we are always called to a questioning of discourse
at a basic level despite bizarre and uncanny challenges. The
following exchange, revised to make a final point, is one we
might face when arguing with a proverbial stoned caterpillar
who seems too sure that no rules apply to a valid and critical
inquiry.
Another “Nice Knock-Down Argument”:
Alice-Earth Egg Revisited
-- “I don't know what you mean by ‘nature,’” Alice said.
-- Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course, you
don’t-till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down
argument for you!’”
-- “But ‘nature doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument,’”
Alice objected.
-- “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a
scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.”
-- “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make
words mean so many different things.”
-- “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be
master, that's all.”
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-- Alice was too much puzzled to say anything; so after a
minute Humpty Dumpty began again. “They've a temper
some of them- particularly verbs: they're the proudest-adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs-however, I
can manage the whole lot of them! Impenetrability! That’s
what I say!”
(Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, Ch. VI)

*

*
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Feathers, Crystals, and Plenty of
Whiskey--in the Apocalypse
“It was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking
thirteen.” (George Orwell)

Undeniably so, a good number of environmental problems

are human-caused, impacting both local and global ecology and
climate. These include: deforestation, extinction of multiple and
once abundant species, emission of greenhouse gases, overpopulation, industrial use and scale of pesticides and fertilizers,
among many others. There is no “Planet B,” there are no second
chances, and no foreseeable rescue missions coming from “out
there.” Mars is a dead planet where Angel’s Falls do not majestically tumble from tepuis.
Humanity and fellow species have seldom experienced an
intrusion of this magnitude and duration to the whole of life—on
a planetwide level of assault. The severity (quantity and quality)
of these problems has intensified in the last three hundred years,
even though humans have been altering their environments and
causing significant environmental changes (the loss of mega
fauna around the world) since Homo erectus.
This new order of magnitude of abuse and destruction has
direct consequences to human psychology as well as to the way
societies organize themselves. It is very difficult at times to know
what interventions are more important. The genesis and continuation of these major disruptions took time, so, equally, correcting
and normalizing them (merely stabilizing these trends) will also
take time.
The psychological dynamics contributing to and exacerbating the above situations are themselves complex and require
sophisticated methodologies--serious science. Words like “sustainability,” “harmony,” or “co-existence” mean very little if we
do not understand how these relate to actual ecological and/or
psychological science.
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In one way or another, and while employing diverse
approaches, “ecopsychologists” around the world begin their
work under the assumptions depicted in the following illustration (Figure 5).

Figure 5
The ecopsychological vicious circle here produced is a
systems’ view of cause-and-effect dynamics and interactions
illustrating the folly of expecting easy or quick fixes to these
intricate and complex challenges. In view of this, “ecopsychologists” are in for the long haul.
Two major challenges for future reiterations of “ecopsychology,” for it to be taken more seriously by mainstream ecology
and psychology, follow:
1. An increased implementation of evidence-based
approaches that can shed light on the specific and varied
ways in which humans interpret ‘self,’ ‘nature,’ and
‘connection’ (Self-Gestalt Nature Affiliations).
2. Increased collaboration between professionals in other
areas within psychology and across other social and
behavioral sciences in order to put forth and validate
constructs of “nature connection” (Nature Affiliations).
Since the beginning of “civilized” life, and through almost
uncountable cycles of psychological, social, and ecological
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upheavals, there has never been a greater need to capitalize on
the insights of “ecopsychology.”
To the extent that “ecopsychology” is both an evaluation of
an existing self-gestalt ‘circumstance,’ and a means toward new
accommodations of meaning-action-directions (toward new
self-nature gestalt configurations), it promises and fulfills an
important function in the whole of psychology.
More importantly, ecopsychology fills in an essential
knowledge niche as part of a new set of psychological survival
and resilience skills now sorely needed if we are to survive on
this planet beyond the next millennium.
Otherwise, Carry On…
As we have seen, a recurring theme in “ecopsychology,” in its
present and inchoate form, is the continuation and extension of
“spirit” in juxtaposition with other privileged and/or habitually
preferred (perhaps even psychologically needed) practices or
causes, such as spirituality-somethings; farcical chemistry or
physics; yoga; coopted and partially understood indigenous lore;
extreme diets; and a multitude of fetishes. That is, its inchoate
form resembles and revisits earlier efforts to make “the soul” a
central study of psychology.
That these mostly emotion-laden, unreasoned, and/or idiosyncratic amalgamations are prevalent says more about the
psychological needs of the persons espousing these sentiments
or beliefs than about “nature.” Certainly, it is nothing new that
humans project their hopes, desperation, and wish-fulfillment
thinking onto the shifting and accepting canvas, “nature.” No
new “ecopsychology” is needed to state the obvious. Devotion
toward a particular aspect of or force in nature and our many
votive offerings are, after all, the staple of archeology.
Devotion, however, no matter how deeply felt or practiced,
does not a real god make, nor do rumors and whispers of “spirit”
a real spirit make. But when these intentions and projections
come with psychology degrees and names, they are also wrapped
and presented in an aura of imprimatur credibility. Then, it is a
question of great interest and value to inquire further whether
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these unreasoned expressions of “nature connection” are
themselves the byproducts or even the very symptoms of “ecoanxiety” or aspects of other more fundamental psychological
work that needs tending to. To be fair, that an aspiration toward
a communal, planetary praxis centered around spiritual motifs
(votives) is seen as desirable therapeutics is understandable.
It is also understandable that these idiosyncratic amalgamations could be an attempt to bring greater coherence and
meaning into our psychological lives. However, the fact that
mostly well-meaning therapists are themselves the origin and
sustenance of these ideas could blind us to more central (psychological) questions: Is the “spiritual” in “nature,” or do we bring
“it” (invent it) there? Does this even matter if while in this psychologically confabulated process we end up saving “Mother
Earth”?
What’s Next?
The 2016 American election crystalized the significant divide
existing between groups of people who have, one presumes,
always co-existed, everywhere. The list of differences that divide
these groups seems to fall into the categories shown on Table 3.
There are, of course, many more attributional aspects and differentiators to these divides which social scientists will continue
to tease out while formulating a grand explanation of how and
why these divisions emerged in pointed form during these past
elections.
Assuming that we trust the different polls, then at least 40%
of the American electorate fall, in one way or another, under the
attributions listed under “A.” These percentages have not varied
for the last four elections, suggesting that entrenched ideology,
impermeable-foreclosure identifications, absolute ethnic-gender
divisions, various social ills, and lack of educational opportunities have fixed these numbers for some time to come.
According to the best scientific evidence (often negated by
those in List A), time is running out with respect to the concerted
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and collective measures that must be undertaken in order to
mitigate and rectify the onslaught of human-caused local and
global environmental disasters.
List A

List B

Nativism

Globalism

Fear

Hope

Ignorance

Education

Animus

Anima

Complacency

Proactivity

Rudeness

Assertiveness

Insular

Outward

Absolute

Relative

Extrinsically/Motivated

Intrinsically/Motivated

Literalist

Interpretive

Grievance

Reconciliation

Propaganda

Data-driven

Pubescent

Mature

Apocalyptic

Progressive

Table 3
The conundrum is that working toward an apocalyptic
resolution precisely validates the ideologies of members in List
A. In this light, the hopeful claims that some folks in List B
make with respect to a peaceful and rational resolution (e.g. via
“consciousness raising,” “indigenous wisdom,” magical interventions) seem to be misguided and naïve.
Answering the question “What’s next?” under the governance
of those in List “B” should include addressing the underlying
causes of these deep ideological divisions. That seems unlikely
to occur in the next four-year cycle. That is, things are likely to
get much worse before they get any better. At least in the near
future, the probable answers to the question “What’s next?” are
mostly terrifying or unanswerable.
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Pre-Apocalyptic Realism
In this unhopeful context, a reasonable position to take,
let’s call it pre-apocalyptic realism, steers “ecopsychological”
discussions (including debates in conservation and environmental activism) toward the following axiom points:
1. Humans are self-serving (or justify self-serving under the
guise of political or religious affiliation). With increases
in human population, diversity of views, and a continued
appetite for creating for-profit-in-a-vacuum enterprises,
humanity is unlikely to reach a timely consensus that
would seriously alleviate environmental stressors. It is
the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) multiplied
to levels never seen before. My family and sheep first.
2. Humans are ignorant or self-deceptive. Because of
unfair circumstances or by design, most humans
lack the educational level, the scientific sophistication, the deconstructive sagacity, actual experiences,
or the open-mindedness to closely study the central
and branching environmental issues (global warming,
to name just one environmental stressor) that are now
deciding the fate of “LIFE” on planet Earth.
3. Humans are fantasy-prone. When it comes to making
choices between scientifically based arguments and
their preferred ingroup, political or religious positions,
devoted ideologues deny, undermine, sabotage, or
misunderstand evidence-based findings. The institutionalization of a clear and legally consistent line between
“church” and “state” continues to be challenged by
persons or groups who oppose objective-neutral means
for establishing “truth.” ‘Believing in something’ trumps
‘facing something.’
4. Humans are followers. Political courage and enforcement
of sensible “commons” laws that protect basic necessities
(clean water, clean air, and diverse wild environments)
are often lacking, or when demonstrated, are diluted as
part of slow, “democratic” compromises that are unlikely
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to reach a timely consensus to seriously alleviate environmental stressors. Humans follow charismatic ‘leaders’
with fan-full ardor and zeal—to the end.
5. Humans are reactive. Only under situations where
extreme changes in weather demand proactive measures
(extreme climate and latitudes), or where geography
and geology dictate that humans organize into capable
working collectives does one see efforts to “think ahead”
and take necessary measures for dealing with potential
disasters and unfavorable or taxing circumstances.
Otherwise, most humans are “loafers,” waiting to see
what the next door neighbor might do.
6. Traditional “wisdom” is misapplied. This point harks
back to one of the misconceptions about “ecopsychology” presented in Chapter Two. When human communities
were small in number and history was passed on as part
of a necessary drive for survival, proactive, sensible,
or practical behaviors and attitudes were more or less
easily shaped into respected laws that most members in
a community could test, if needed, by empirical means.
However, oftentimes, “traditional” or “ancient wisdom,”
when offered out of context (ancient vs modern) and
misapplied (small scale vs large scale) to solve more
complex problems (indigenous communities vs global
communities) fails to deliver its once true-and-tested sustainability formulae. At other times the tags “traditional”
or “wisdom” appear as idiosyncratic and very personal
descriptions by individuals who have little knowledge of
the authentic cultural and geographical contexts within
which these behaviors and attitudes evolved.
7. Humans are “tribalists.” In the worst sense of this tendency
humans display an innate need to belong and define
themselves in superficial and irrelevant ways as they
join preferred groups and clicks (“cat person,” “tattooed
person,” “dog person,” “Ferrari driver,” “gun owner,”
“snowmobiler,” etc.). Tribalism can be a relevant force
for social cohesion toward conservation, for example, if
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it does not focus solely (or mostly) on the acquisition,
maintenance, or ownership of “things.” Frugality is seldom
seen as the principle and virtue of most hobby dabblers.
To the extent that, according to the most recent physical environmental evidence, we have already passed the point at which
a concerted and serious global effort might have diverted or
mitigated the most grievous of these effects (human-caused environmental problems: overpopulation, rampant consumerism,
pristine habitat destruction, greenhouse gases levels, species
extinctions, etc.), then preparations that matter should now be
undertaken under this new existential priority: pre-apocalyptic
realism.
The psychological (“ecopsychological”) dimensions implied
in pre-apocalyptic realism both foreshadow and harken back
to eras of depravation or forward looking sustainability with
an emphasis on resilience, gratitude, frugality, temperance,
equanimity, and pragmatic know-how.
One cause for optimism is that the scientific method has
proven its worth and it is too systemically engrained for it to
be easily abandoned when its methodologies may be the only
means for bridging salvageable patches of integral nature still
present with a sustainable and verdant future.
The most challenging accommodations and uncharted
transitions remain ahead for our children and grandchildren.
Like it or not, seven generations henceforward, scientific practicality and magical thinking are likely to be companions on the
same road.
Regardless, from this point in time and perspective, it looks
like more feathers, crystals, and plenty of whiskey--in the
Apocalypse.

*
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Appendix I:
“Ecopsychology” as
Eupraxsophy:
Marg and Précis
“Nothing is enough for the man to whom enough is too little.”
-Epicurus
Introduction: “Ecopsychology” as Eupraxsophy
After reading the preceding chapters, two reviewers
suggested that I summarize most of the content of this book into
a literary form more amenable to today’s competing demands
for time and reading. To that end, I borrowed and reinterpreted
the forms marg and précis, an abridged delineation and boundary
of what in this book is presented as the eupraxsophy of “ecopsychology.” The following entries may be read independently
from the main book and text.
Throughout this book, I have made Epicurean arguments
of practical living that exalt ideas of community, simplicity,
frugality, creativity, and non-dogmatism. In the 20th century, Paul
Kurtz coined the term eupraxsophy to describe a similar mode
of being (thinking and acting) which values living an ethical,
rational and exuberant life (biophilic). Admittedly, many of us
fall short of consistently living up to all three. Nevertheless, they
are noble and ennobling endeavors worth pursuing—thinking
about. In the context of a diverse and oftentimes cacophonous
field of ecopsychological trends and ideas, I argue that they are
also necessary—an Occam’s razor.
This perspective will deter some readers from reading these
pages, no doubt. For others, who wish to delve deeper and
explore further the implications of what might mean to be a
natural human being, a signifying and emergent organism in a
natural world, I offer a non-dogmatic (i.e., it assumes that no supernatural forces or destiny shape our existence) narrative that is
deconstructive, in the general sense of that word, of close-ended
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and idiosyncratically preferred self-nature assumptions. In so
doing, it is my hope that “Ecopsychology,” as eupraxsophy, is
understood as a serious effort at distilling basic notions and explorations about “being in the natural world” without resorting to
supernatural (unproven) or unwarranted (unjustifiable) esoteric
arguments.
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Marg and Précis
1. There is no one “self.” There is no one “nature.” “Self” is not
he-she. “Nature” is not he-she. “Self” or “nature” are neither
nouns nor pronouns. They are verbs—processes--dynamic.
2. Singularizing “self” does not make it more understandable
or accessible. Singularizing “nature” does not make it more
understandable or accessible. A noun is never the process it
singularizes. Although words can and do shape subjective
reality, they are not, reality.
3. A singular “self” seeking “communion” with singular
“nature” is already bound to find projections—confirm expectations.
4. If there is no singular “self” and no singular “nature,” what
“connection” do we speak of?
5. “Nature” is not a singular sentient entity, thus needs no
defending—seeking, worshiping, idealizing as such.
6. From S. Freud we inherited the semiotic lens with which
to begin examining eigenwelt—mitwelt—umwelt processes
as they give rise to the emergents “self” and “nature.” Alas,
this foundation, important as it still is, emphasized (and
others overemphasized) eigenwelt-miltwelt interactions
and dynamics, oftentimes, at the expense of eigenwelt—
mitwelt—umwelt integral processes. That is, and analogically
speaking, he and others paid attention to psychology-semiosis interactions without formulating an equally robust
ecopsychological biosemotics (and ecosemiotics).
7. Without taking away from an understanding of psychological semiosis, nevertheless, the shift we propose is as follows:
psychology : semiosis :: ecopsychology : biosemiotics*
The right side of the above analogy represents truly
integral approaches whereas the left is derivative.
*(In certain cases one can replace biosemiotics with ecosemiotics and still retain the meaning of the intended shift.)
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8. The implications of the preferred (right) side of the above
analogy is the study of self-society-nature systems or “ecopsychology.” This study is an intricate and complex endeavor
demanding philosophical, mathematical, and scientific
training.
9. Lest one should think the above studies are only open to idiosyncratic and/or overly discrete formulations (low brow
humanistics), a more fruitful (evidence-based) approach is to
begin describing the above analogy in mathematical terms.
That is, the elements “self,” “society,” “nature” (and subcategories thereof) are amenable to manipulation via differential
equations (ordinary or partial). The complex-intricate nature
of these interactions, at all levels, demands sobering mathematical expertise and follow-up experimental testing (e.g.,
the Lotka-Volterra equations as they are applied to human
overconsumption in the context of limited resources).
10. Naming a cloud does not essentially (scientifically) explain
“cloud.” However, it is quite acceptable that “cloud” becomes
the informed shorthand tag after a thorough and essential
(scientific) knowledge of multiple processes involving water
vapor dynamics in the atmosphere (e.g., a water cycle).
11. An emotion-driven “self” seeking answers in “nature” is
bound to find (invent) cyclops, mermaids, fairies, nymphs
and many other projected magical or turbulent forms. Oh,
the gods! They behave so human-like.
12. Rather than “connection,” “self-nature” affiliatory processes,
should one persist in using these terms singularly, are supported
by multiple processes deserving in-depth examination. In this
sense a “self” consists of both transient and deeply entrenched
interpretative codas, behavioral plans and actions, both creating
additional meanings and redirecting the organism toward or
away from new definitions and assessments of its situation
in any given environment—time. This dynamic organization
is ever-changing and can be described as self-nature gestalts.
With a full understanding that these modalities are fluid, only
then can one be safe in using the terms “self” or “nature.” This
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organismic fluidity is to be expected in a curious and creative
fission-fusion species.
13. Natural processes, outside self-aware consciousness, do not
bargain, cajole, trick, deceive, supplicate, or demand tribute.
14. Equally, the truly monstrous, that is, the inability of human
reason to understand or change basic instincts as these defy
and foil our sublimated and/or idealized human propensities,
originate in “nature.”
15. The attitude, expressed in the statement “anything goes in
‘nature’,” is not scientific. It is more likely a psychological
projection fueled by subjective and idiosyncratic expectations or desires. The above statement is an example of
trivialism, or the assumption that every statement is true
[ⱯpTp; Trivialism (the opposite of skepticism): Given any
proposition, it is a true proposition]. It is true that natural
processes are diverse and varied; however, these processes
are governed, for example, by observable and measurable
(testable) physical and biochemical constraints. A diversity
of forms and mechanisms of natural existence, with the
above restraints in mind (and in place), is not a proposition
for supposing that anything is possible, including very
intelligent but diminutive fairies.
16. The human animal seeks kinship with, is inspired by, and
depends for survival on non-human animals. This is understandable. Humans also mistreat and torture non-human
animals. This is reproachable and disturbing. Humans also
keep non-human animals as pets. This is also understandable. When humans are tamed by civilization and they
become but comical or disturbed shadows of ancestors
who were self-sufficient, frugal, brave, resilient, and
practical, their pets too become farcical creatures. This
makes psychological sense. Then, the descent to petness
on both sides, becomes a special interest study within
“ecopsychology.”
17. Many species of animals, including humans, replace their
own kin with token or fetish trans-species or object relation-
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ships. It is psychologically important to study and understand
why and how it happens that the favorite poodle becomes a
“child.”
18. Humans do the darndest things is search of “love” and
affection, including hugging trees and/or snowmobiles.
Nobody knows what the tree or a machine understands by
this, if anything.
19. A dog is never a person. However, it could very well be that
a farcical human being indulges in, expects and induces
farcical behaviors from h/her preferred companions. To
confuse this (descent to petness on both sides) with true
humanity or original animality deserves a thorough psychological analysis.
20. Earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, and fires kill people without
intention. Without sentience and motive, these naturally
occurring events cannot be “brutal,” “vicious,” or “out to get
us.” On the other hand, the “brutality” of “nature” seems alltoo-human. Furthermore, to say that they are “acts of god” is
suggestive that the equivalency “nature” = “god” is a human
psychological feature or characteristic.
21. Humans can be very destructive, vengeful, spiteful, and
petty—dogmatic, misinformed, and psychologically
unstable. In contrast, humans can also be constructive, kind,
forgiving, and enlightened—well-informed, curious-smart,
and psychologically stable; with mixes in-between. This
is a sobering realization for anyone who thinks that magical
formulas (e.g., “changes in consciousness,” converting to
the ‘right’ religion, practicing yoga) are likely to be timely-effective universal engines toward a more enlightened
future that makes natural ecological stability and global
human mental health more prevalent.
22. For anyone who has a scholarly and skeptical bent for asking
basic questions and doing due diligence when it comes to the
historicity of any movement, “ecopsychology,” like many
other conveniently confusable trends, seems to have blended
an array of incongruous ideas by selectively appropriating
an assortment of religious concepts, social movements, and
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personal preferences into quirky catechisms. This is understandable to the extent that the compound terms “ecology”
and “psychology” are altogether negated, bypassed, or
reinvented to mean just about anything, or everything.
23. The dogcatcher sees the reality, every day, of infantile or
dysfunctional humans projecting the best and worst of their
humanity and inhumanity onto otherwise innocent and
trusting non-human animals.
24. The environmental consequences of keeping pets, farcical
or otherwise, are demonstrably (quantifiably) shocking and
equal or surpass any other forms or sources of environmental degradation. It is fair to say that keeping pets is another
human-caused environmental stress veering into catastrophe
whose prompt solution will be stubbornly resisted—for psychological (and economical) reasons.
25. There is usually hope in a hunting camp that the rain, grasses,
and game, will return. That trust, as hope, is warranted to
the extent that ecological viability and predictable climatic
recurrences endure.
26. Nature becomes what we ascribe and describe. Long-running myths preserved and interpreted anew in a variety of
narratives, both accurate and false, partially define our relationship with “reality.” Take away actual sweating and
bleeding bodies, wild gathering and hunting, the fragility of
human existence and certain death, and replace it all with
four-square meals and traffic lights. What form of existing,
evolved long ago, and imprinted deep in our mind and
marrow, saw THIS coming?
27. It likely that earth systems will fall back into old cycles-that many life forms will survive—or that new ones will
be established after global disintegration occurs. It is also
likely that pockets of humanity will survive. However, lest
anyone believe this end to be destined or heroic, we would
have committed, collectively, a sin for which there is no
redemption or atonement.
28. I have witnessed unseemly packs of stray dogs and cats,
from Milan to Hawai’i. They survive, barely, in dark, damp,
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and liminal spaces. In some cities they are also found with
the human homeless or the vicious; all manner of human
socially discarded forms, desperate, powerless, and hopeless,
living day-to-day. In a different time or place they would
all, I fantasize, be thriving. Dogs would hunt in packs, wild.
Cats would crouch in tall grass, their roaming distances
appropriate to their temperament. Humans, would know
how to scavenge or hunt away from refuse and unjustifiable
“civilized” complexity.
29. Children say the darndest things, like, “I want to go outside
and play in the rain.”
30. Parents teach children how to pray, but to what end?
31. Harking back to the ecosemiotic presentation of self-nature
gestalts, it is not surprising that a diversity of subjective
concoctions of meaning-interpretation (“thinking”), the
cultural or natural context of “reality,” behaviors, and
motivations would produce almost any sort of psychological profile. In this vein, a person who dabbles in Buddhism,
pseudo-mysticism, animal totemism, drives a car without
guilt, thinks their three dogs are children and should be
treated as such, spends hours indoors, and seldom gets h/
her feet wet or dirty, is inertia-prone to continue interpreting
“reality” in a vacuum.
32. How does a Deepak Chopra-type steal your “consciousness”? Are you that needy? How does one detect and reject
pseudo-profound bullshit?
33. There are no shortcuts to saving our planet (from ourselves).
34. Any form of ideology, by definition, is close-ended.
Ideological thinking rarely produces, true (fair, well-informed, honorable) discourse. Ideology survives through
propaganda. A central aim of propaganda is to suppress
competing (factual) sources of information. Therefore, when
ideologs speak of task-oriented problem-solving approaches,
they are speaking in oxymorons.
35. It is almost certain that coyotes do not give a fig about
humans except when we threaten their livelihood and their
lives.
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36. “Old school ‘ecopsychology’” and “new school ‘ecopsychology’” should have environmental history as their
inquiry foundation and bridge. To assume that environmental
problems are new and/or that our psychosocial accommodations (or failures) to changing situations represent a new turn
of human consciousness is, to say the least, myopic.
37. Americans (other peoples as well) inherited the gambles,
excesses, and tradeoffs of our grandparents. Our children
and grandchildren will inherit ours.
38. Even the best-intended and orchestrated parenting befuddles
children. This is because children are, on the whole, observant
and smart. Eventually, they catch up to our lies, contradictions, hypocrisies, insecurities, and faults. It is better to tell
them the truth (fact-supported and corroborable) early on.
For example, no child older than eight should believe in
Santa Claus, fairies, or that the Earth is six thousand years
old and flat. The latter is, at least, farcical and, at worst,
dangerous.
39. Nowadays, it seems to me, youth believe and look forward
to dystopias more often than dream about creating edifying
utopias. The pastoral has been substituted for a bloody
end-of-days mythology. This is very troubling. It is understandable that youth, while forging an identity, hanker for
recognizable heroes. It is also understandable that heroes
inhabit both dystopias and utopias. But why “go there,” the
dystopia, and waste so much emerging talent, when there is,
still, some time to correct our collective demise-course?
40. I urge all youth to learn how to grow gardens, butcher
game, recognize bird song, and vacate the empty spaces of
Facebook. Your selfie is only one among seven billion.
41. What is “compassion”? Indeed! The old Zen masters would
tell us that compassion hurts—‘tis a sharp sword cutting off
the unfeeling, useless limb.
42. Little Leagues are major ego boosters for parents. Oh well,
at least they are all outdoors.
43. The stock market dropped a thousand points today. Now, tell
me something real.
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44. Colleagues (and whole departments) seem to have forgotten
what “psychology” (evidence-based) is all about. There is no
other way to describe what passes for higher education these
days. (The cracker-hardtack psychologist is born.)
45. What is “tolerance”? One answer is: Enduring the same old
druid-turned-expert pretending to be “a scientist.”
46. The real environment is, sometimes, missing from “ecopsychology.”
47. To collude with the credulous for fear that one might hurt
their feelings is not good psychology—not even compassionate.
48. Bears are not “into” you. They are into grubs and honey.
They are only “into you” if you take away their grubs and
honey.
49. Alice traveled from one panoptic reality to the next—the
latter she confused, at first, with anarchy. That is why the
mirror-metaphor-transference works very well. Verily, true
delinquency varies in a linear function with “civilization.”
That is, more rules and increased surveillance, aimed to keep
us on “the straight and narrow path,” beget disobedience
and natural hostility—and neurosis. Eventually, even Alice
recognized this game cannot be played with rubber-necked
flamingoes.
50. Humans’ ambivalence to ‘nature,’ from a semiotic
perspective, admits both enslaving and liberating meanings.
When operating as a grand symbol, intrapsychically and
externally, it borrows from and conjures up a multitude of
associated archaic symbols: mother-father, womb-fighting arena, home-jail. Not surprisingly, our individual and
collective responses to whatever we think ‘nature’ is are
bound to be complex and contradictory. A serious psychological analysis (psychological semiosis) begins with the
premise that ‘nature’ comprises the minotaur’s past, his
mind, the labyrinth, a surrounding island, the open sea, and
the stars beyond; all these spheres semiotically intertwined.
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Endnotes for Appendix I
“Communication, defined as a sign process which involves a
sender and a receiver, occurs not only among humans, but also
between all other organisms throughout the whole biosphere.
Not only cultural semiotics, but also bio- and zoosemiotics are
hence concerned with processes of communication. Signification, by contrast, which concerns sign processes without a sender,
predominates in ecosemiotics, where organisms interact with a
natural environment that does not function as the intentional
emitter of messages to the interpreting organism.” Nöth (2001)
“When it comes to our own species, there is no doubt that, by
nature, we form fission–fusion societies. And nor is this merely
a reflection of our current, highly mobile lifestyle within industrialized settings. More than 99% of human history was spent
in a hunter-gatherer existence, characterized by dynamically
shifting social groupings at multiple levels. At the highest tier
in hunter-gatherer societies is the ethno-linguistic group or
‘tribe’, formed by several local ‘bands’ that fuse together when
resources like water are clustered during dry seasons. Bands
themselves, which are made up of around 30 individuals, break
up into smaller foraging parties during daily forays out from a
base camp.” Couzin and Laidre (2009)
“The model population consists of individuals with no inherently
altruistic attributes, just self-centered attributes, namely an
aggressive will to dominate and a bitter resentment against being
dominated. We show that when language skills reach a critical
level at which gossip becomes the primary means of reinforcing
social ties, the egalitarian transition occurs spontaneously as a
phase transition. At this critical point, individuals who resent
being dominated become capable of forming and sustaining
coalitions that make the individual alpha position progressively unstable, ultimately motivating its avoidance by all members
of the population due to retaliation (or fear of retaliation) by a
stronger anti-dominance coalition.” Calmetes and Weiss (2017)
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“Magical beliefs involve an acceptance of mysterious or supernatural forces to explain phenomena, and where the use of
prescribed rites of precisely defined actions (often verbal) are
believed to produce mysterious effects. This may involve the
manifestation of mystical forces to cause a specific effect, or
ritualistic acts that are believed to produce results elsewhere.
Magical thinking is the cognitive process that embodies such
beliefs.” Garrett and Cutting (2017)
“[…] …it takes 0.84 hectares [2.07 acres] of land to keep a medium-sized dog fed. In contrast, running a 4.6-litre Toyota Land
Cruiser, including the energy required to construct the thing
and drive it 10,000km a year, requires 0.41 hectares. Dogs are
not the only environmental sinners. The eco-footprint of a cat
equates to that of a Volkswagen Golf. If that's troubling, there is
an even more shocking comparison. In 2004, the average citizen
of Vietnam had an ecological footprint of 0.76 hectares. For an
Ethiopian, it was just 0.67 hectares. In a world where scarce
resources are already hogged by the rich, can we really justify
keeping pets that take more than some people?" Vale and Vale
(2009).
“[…] …given the rise of communication technology and the
associated increase in the availability of information from a
variety of sources, both expert and otherwise, bullshit may
be more pervasive than ever before. Despite these seemingly
commonplace observations, we know of no psychological
research on bullshit. Are people able to detect blatant bullshit?
Who is most likely to fall prey to bullshit and why?” Pennycook
et al (2015)
“The histories of coyotes and humans have many parallels, but
one difference is that across our own evolutionary history, we
humans have created thousands of philosophies of meaning we
call religions, while coyotes, so far as we can tell, embrace no
religious tradition beyond being alive, sacred existence.” Flores
(2016)
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“Environmental historians have given attention to these contemporary problems, but they also realize that the relationship
between humans and the environment has had a formative role
in every period of history, from ancient times onward.” Hughes
(2006)
“~Buffalo Dusk~ The buffaloes are gone.//And those who
saw the buffaloes are gone.//Those who saw the buffaloes by
thousands and how they pawed/the prairie sod into dusk with
their hoofs, their great heads down/pawing on in a great pageant
of dusk,/Those who saw the buffaloes are gone.//And the
buffaloes are gone.” Carl Sandburg
“Environment can be understood to include the Earth with its
soil and mineral resources; with its water, both fresh and salt;
with its atmosphere, climates, and weather; with its living things,
animals and plants from the simplest to the most complex; and
with the energy received ultimately from the Sun.” Hughes
(2006)
Excerpt from ~The Bear and the Garden-Lover~ One time as
the gardener had forgot himself in a dream/And a single fly had
his nose at its mercy,/The poor indignant bear who had fought
it vainly,/Growled: “I’ll crush that trespasser; I have evolved a
scheme.”/Killing flies was his chore, so as good as his word,/
The bear hurled a cobble and made sure it was hurdled hard,/
Crushing a friend’s head to rid him of a pest./With bad logic,
fair aim disgraces us more;/He’d murdered someone dear, to
guarantee his friend rest.//Intimates should be feared who lack
perspicacity;/Choose wisdom, even in an enemy.” Marianne
Moore (1982)
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Appendix II: Semiotic
Matrix Theory (SMT):
Applications to Panarchy
(To insure continuity and exact reiteration, some text repeats
from Chapter 5)
Semiotic Matrix Theory (SMT) is an evaluative model
(Conesa-Sevilla, 2005) with which to gauge the relative and
dynamic systemic contributions of Possibility (P), Energy (E),
and Safety (S) constraints (elements, factors, or variables). Its
applications are widespread across most disciplines and include
the theoretical and practical evaluations of the validity of ecologically valid systems-based assumptions. As a predictive tool,
it makes allowances for a diversity of interpretations (factor
inputs) about P, E, and/or S. SMT is particularly useful in
ecological theory, research and practice. To this end, SMT was
employed to model the assumptions that Panarchy makes with
respect to stability and change. Panarchy’s adaptive cycle is
confirmed by SMT modeling.
To continue and reiterate from Chapter Five, Ecological
Panarchy, as described by Gunderson et al (1995), Holling et
al (2002a), and Holling et al (2002b), builds up on and extends
traditional frameworks for understanding ecological dynamics.
It adds to phenology a more realistic emphasis on processes
of destruction and organization in addition to the traditional
ecological foci on growth and conservation. Their framework
adds two additional functions, release and reorganization.
Ecological Panarchy is theoretically malleable and can be
applied to questions in economics and sociology, to name just
two areas, while focusing on problems of resilience and sustainability.
Within the limitations of the panarchy model (Gotts, 2007)
there is much that is already relevant to an understanding of
human systems.
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Figure A-1, also adapted from Gunderson and Holling
(2002), depicts the dynamics of Ecological Panarchy. At first
look, panarchy, at least implicitly, tracks the systemic historical
changes (catastrophic and phenological) that some systems are
likely to endure anew or revisit (Leopold, 1949; Menzel et al,
2006). At first glance, Panarchy can be made congruent with
other descriptions that emphasize the dynamics of all organisms
and systems with regard to life’s basic components and interactions of Energy, Safety, and Possibility (Conesa-Sevilla,
1999, 2001, 2005a, and 2005b). A first attempt at finding such
congruency is the main aim of this work. (Figure A-1 follows.)

Figure A-1
Questions of resilience and sustainability arise when the
establishment and diversity, “functionality,” are understood
and also tracked as part of the dynamics that panarchy aims
to elucidate. In the words of Holling and Gunderson (2002b),
resilience can be seen as “the magnitude of disturbance that can
be absorbed before the system changes its structure by changing
the variables and processes that control behavior.”
As an example of the potential interdisciplinary versatility
of Panarchy, the psychological concept of “coping” suggests
a direct analogy to ecological resilience, where an increase of
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coping strategies implies greater resilience—“the magnitude of
disturbance that can be absorbed.”
Semiotic Matrix Theory (SMT)
Semiotic Matrix Theory (SMT) was originally conceived and
applied as a means of assessing the frequency and regularity of
text terms across time, styles, and literary genre (Conesa-Sevilla, 1999). Specifically, frequency of words related to (synonym
and antonym comparisons) the Alpha categories of Possibility
(P), Energy (E), and Safety (S) were studied via text analyses
(Conesa-Sevilla, 2001a). Early modeling was promising and
suggestive of its potential application to the assessment of
ecological models, vis-a-vis psychological theories.
Subsequent revisions of mathematical relations led to
further applications (and confirmation) which extended to the
study of territoriality across species (Conesa, 2001b). Interactions of Alpha categories gave rise to multiple levels, increasing
the probability for more accurate predictions (Beta level: Power
(Pp) Control(C), Generativity (G), Nurturing (N)). Furthermore,
interactions between levels and conditions (e.g., P+C) made it
possible to model a greater number of existential conditions.
The simpler and original (and later derivates) mathematical
relation described a “matrix,” as any “organism” that exhibited
(could be described as, internalized or was sensitive to) the actual
and/or analogous conditions of growth, maturation, emergence,
and survivability, as follows:
M=P+E
S
“M” denotes a “matrix” (or matricial conditions in larger
systems: buildings, cities, colonies); “P” represents possibility
(opportunity, information, intelligence), which includes
the presumption of information growth and its intelligent
maturation. “E” expresses energy requirements for birth, growth,
and sustainability of any organism or systems that behave as
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“organisms.” Finally, “S” stands for the safety requirements
(ambient assessment, internal homeostatic sub-systems, repair,
and defense) necessary for survival and beyond, thriving.
Since its original conception, the above and straightforward model has been mathematically expanded and adapted
to evaluate and model more nuanced relationships (events and
states), including time, random (stochastic) “luck,” and more
determined (non-stochastic) conditions (e.g., Wiener process).
M=P+E(t)
S
This work made use of SMT theoretical assumptions while
evaluating the four phases of ecological panarchy as seen in
Figure A-1.
Before proceeding to the methodology and analysis an
obvious caveat needs to be mentioned. It is safe to say that most
natural processes, under the influence of entropic forces, undergo
cycles of “birth,” “growth,” “ultimate maturation,” deterioration, “death,” and decay. However, the terms sustainability or
resilience are anthropocentric descriptions of these cycles.
Stars, galaxies, ecological systems, the universe itself, are not
at all perturbed (as systems), nor do they “bother” to examine
the conditions of their existence. Only self-aware “matrices”
are capable of tracking these cycles: prepare for them, avoid
unsavory consequences, attempt to change them. Notwithstanding these efforts, death will visit us all.
We should be mindful of the limitations and misapplications
of the above cycles outside observable and confirmable scenarios
lest we, unduly so, imbue the cosmos with consciousness (e.g.,
Gaia; a teleological “progressing” universe) willy-nilly.
Both metaphorical (symbolic) and confirmable (real)
matricial descriptions are possible (the notion of “god” or
currency as “matrices”) and useful, but one must keep in mind
their ontological origin and distinction (Conesa-Sevilla, 1999;
2001a; and 2005).
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Methods
Excel modeling features and capabilities were applied under
these assumptions:
1. P, S, and E values were arbitrarily set on a 1-5 scale.
Higher numbers on the P and E columns correspond
with a Positive (+) ascendency of their attributes
whereas lower numbers under the S column suggest that
homeostatic controls have achieved a great degree of
stability. A higher number indicates a stress in the system
and the deployment of increasing survival modalities
(Conesa-Sevilla, 2016).
2. Prior to modeling, and based on ecological theoretical
assumptions, Panarchy cycles were evaluated to exhibit
the following “matricial status”:
P
3
1
5
4

K-Phase (Conservation)
Ω-Phase (Release)
α-Phase (Reorganization)
r-Phase

S
2
5
4
3

E
3
5
4
4

These ranges, although originating from an arbitrarily
designed scale, are nevertheless theoretically descriptive
and summarize, for example, the ecological progression and
regression of the life and death history of a forest (a recognized
and defined integral ecology).
The K-Phase represents, for example, a forest (“organism”) at
its peak diversity and ecological functionality (stable, sustainable).
Even at the peak of maturity and sustainability P, S, and E values
are not fully expressed (at their highest values) to the extent that
other phases in the cycle are more dramatically identified (scientifically described) with rampant growth, habitat reallocation, and
competition by species (1st, 2nd, …N order colonizers).
The Ω-Phase is characterized by dramatic (unforeseen
catastrophic and/or phenological and expected) events that
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threaten the sustainability achieved in the K-Phase. Under these
conditions diversity is greatly reduced or non-existent (P value
at 1) and the struggle to survive is at its maximum (S value set at
5).
The α-Phase represents in our example of a once forested
and sustainable environment a few weeks, months, and years
after a devastating fire. These conditions of colonization, intense
competition, increased diversification, and meager stability are
represented by the numerical profile above described of: P=5,
S=4, and E=4.
Finally, the r-Phase represents and portends the promise of
a sustainable ecological system on its way to stable diversification—filling in the final blanks. Higher expression of Possibility
and continuing dependence on outside sources of Energy prevent
this phase from being fully (long-term) sustainable.
Matricial values are to be read as follows: Higher scores
approaching 5 describe a fully functional, highly diverse,
stable, and sustainable “organism” or system (K-Phase). Under
its natural and unperturbed conditions this is the very best the
system is capable of. Scores close to 1 suggest that the system is
being challenged by internal or external influences (Ω-Phase). A
relative and comparative evaluation will describe reorganization
and exploitation phases as being medial or interim to the other
two.
Results
Predicted scaling of four phases of ecological Panarchy
yielded the following matricial values:
Matrical Values for:
K-Phase (Conservation)
Ω-Phase (Release)

3
1.2

α-Phase (Reorganization)

2.25

r-Phase (Exploitation)

2.67
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Matricial values logically align themselves with the four
Panarchy phases. Higher matricial values denote ecological
stability, whereas lower values denote ecological turmoil.
Consistent with Panarchy descriptions, as predicted earlier,
and to reiterate, higher scores approaching 5 describe a fully
functional, highly diverse, stable, and sustainable “organism” or
system (3 for the K-Phase). These higher scores represent peak
and stable performance. Scores close to 1 suggest that the system
is being challenged and in a rapid state of deterioration (1.2 for
Ω-Phase). The values for the reorganization and exploitation
phases show an expected progression and interim development
between the Ω and the K Phases.
At first glance, it is understandable to suspect that some
tautology is at play between both models (SMT and Panarchy).
Two observations make this acceptable. First, SMT was first
developed and applied independently, without the knowledge of
Panarchy principles, to other problems (semiotics, biosemiotics,
ecological psychology). Second, although arbitrary, the scales
employed above must possess construct validity with respect to
real ecological events and states. One would expect theoretical
convergence to the extent that both SMT and Panarchy describe
observable ecological scenarios.
That is, instead of tautologies there appears to be an almost
forced theoretical convergence to the extent that both models
are true to and explicit about the functional prerequisites of
“systems” (Parsons and Turner, 1951/1991; Conesa-Sevilla
1999).
Sullivan’s dictum (1896) comes to mind: “Form ever follows
function.” A fundamental description of existence, its form
and function, must abide by clearly recognizable and testable
principles. From a single cell to a sentient organism, from clay
burrows to loftier cities, from concrete to abstract, “form ever
follows function”:
Whether it be the sweeping eagle in his flight, or the open
apple-blossom, the toiling work-horse, the blithe swan, the
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branching oak, the winding stream at its base, the drifting
clouds, over all the coursing sun, form ever follows function,
and this is the law. Where function does not change, form
does not change. The granite rocks, the ever-brooding hills,
remain for ages; the lightning lives, comes into shape, and
dies, in a twinkling.”

Discussion and Conclusion
The original formulation of SMT (Conesa-Sevilla, 1999)
extended Parsons’ and Turner’s (1951/1991) idea of functional
prerequisites beyond their sociologically exclusive application
to encompass and be applied to questions of evolutionary
psychology and ecology. In this context, SMT’s interpretation of functional prerequisites are, depending on the reader’s
perspective, on a higher order or more fundamental: consistent
with a vertical and horizontal integration of physical, life, and
behavioral sciences.
Whatever formulation is preferred, matricial dynamics are the
fundamental and abstracted explanatory substrate of existential
dynamics (or classification therein) that sentient beings project
onto objects and symbols.
Although limiting their theoretically attributable functional
interactions and integrations to social structures, Parsons’ and
Turner’s notions of functional prerequisites, as originally stated,
were challenges initially encountered in the formulation of SMT:
The problem of functional prerequisites is a protean problem
because of the variety of different levels on which it may be
approached. What we propose here is to start on the most
general and therefore formal level of action theory and proceed
to introduce specifications step by step. It should be possible
to do this in a sufficiently orderly fashion. (P. 17:1991)

SMT got around this seemingly apparent “protean” impasse
by making assumptions which were concordant with physical,
life, and behavioral systems. Although incommensurable in the
details, physical, life, and behavioral systems operate “com-
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mensurably” as a whole cloth. The connections with Panarchic
thinking were anticipated but not fully applied outside the social
context by Parsons and Turner:
Thus a social system in the present sense is not possible
without language, and without certain other minimum
patterns of culture, such as empirical knowledge necessary to
cope with situational exigencies, and sufficiently integrated
patterns of expressive symbolism and of value orientation.
A social system which leads to too drastic disruption of its
culture, for example through blocking the processes of its
acquisition, would be exposed to social as well as cultural disintegration. (P. 21:1991)

SMT incorporates the semiotic emphasis given to the role of
language and applies it, as biosemiotics, to an understanding of
systems toward a fuller, integral interpretation (the vertical and
horizontal integration of physical, life, and behavioral realms).
That is to say that, in this context, the Panarchic ecological cycle
incorporates the transformation, transfer, and transmutation
of “meaning,” restating the basic existential forms Possibility,
Safety, and Energy (and Beta elements: Power (Pp), Control(C),
Generativity (G), Nurturing (N)).
In consubstantial fashion, the health of a “matrix,” as form,
follows matricial functions. According to matricial constraints,
one would never expect, ordinarily, a quadruped running blind
and backwards, or a hut built upside down, or a hammock hung
from “sky hooks” (Dennett, 1995), or happiness “forever after.”
The health of any matrix is expected to undergo changes,
some internally produced (with purpose), some of stochastic
nature and unforeseen. A forest as a matrix; a city as a matrix;
a society as a matrix; the value of a dollar as a matrix; the idea
of god as a matrix; or an individual, as the most recognizable
matrix, all, are subject to fundamental and irrevocable existential
parameters both cyclical and stable. Although much more work
needs to follow in order to fully understand and apply the
simplest of matricial relationships,
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M=P+E
S
it is both hopeful and tantalizing that consilience and commensurability are possible scenarios of future or different reiterations
of SMT. Panarchy itself, as it has been shown, has at least a very
robust heuristic value.
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to some of the misconceptions that have hardened as “ecopsychology,”
as these ideas have been reinterpreted and sometimes oversimplified
by the general public and some professionals outside mainstream
psychology. Part of the confusion arose when “ecopsychology”
became inadequately amalgamated with other ideas. Nevertheless,
within the social and behavioral sciences, at least, there is great value
in devising and applying evidence-based strategies that track the
normative ramifications dealing with cognition, emotion and behavior,
exploring how or why humans relate to natural processes in a wide
range of ways.
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